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IV.

RULES GOVERNING WEAPONS AND
METHODS OF NAVAL WARFARE

A. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF WAR 1
The guiding princi pie in a considera don of the rules governing the
weapons and methods of naval warfare is that in the absence of restrictions
imposed either by custom or by convention belligerents are permitted in
their mutual relations to use any means in the conduct of hostilities. The
essential purpose of the law of nav.al warfare is to define those actions that
are prohibited to belligerents in warfare at sea. Indeed, this purpose is
characteristic not only of the law of naval warfare but of the whole of the
law of war. Historically, it is true that in the development of the means
for waging hostilities it has been frequently asserted-both by governments
and by writers on the law of war-that the introduction of a novel weapon
or method must be regarded as unlawful until such time as express! y permitted by a specific rule of custom or convention. To the extent that such
assertions have been based upon the alleged principle that what is not expressly permitted in war is thereby prohibited, they must be regarded as
unfounded.
It is not uncommon, however, that claims as to the illegality of a novel
weapon or method of war have been based upon the quite different premise
that the weapon or method in question violates some general principle of
the customary law of war; that although not expressly forbidden by a
specific rule of custom or convention, the disputed means nevertheless falls
within the purview of the prohibitions contained in one or more of these
general principles. The validity of this latter claim has occasionally been
obscured by its identification with the unwarranted assertion that what is
not expressly permitted in war is thereby prohibited. In fact, what ought
to be contended is that the lawfulness of the weapons and methods of war
must be determined not only by the express prohibitions contained in
specific rules of custom and convention but also by those prohibitions laid
down in the general principles of the law of war. 2
1

It is to be emphasized that the following pages are concerned only with the mutual relations of belligerents and not with neutral-belligerent relations.
2 Erik Castren correctly expresses the point made above as follows: "The idea, entertained
by some writers, that everything is allowed in warfare that is not expressly prohibited cannot
be accepted, as customary law alone may condemn such acts. The approbation or rejection
of new arms and new methods of waging war depends on whether they conform to the general
principles of warfare... op. cit., p. 187. A similar view is taken by Alfred Verdross, who
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The general principles of the law of war may be briefly stated. There
is, to begin with, the principle distinguishing between the armed forces
and the civilian population of a belligerent. In accordance with this
principle individuals who form the non-combatant population of a belligerent must not be made the object of direct attack provided they refrain
from the commission of all acts of hostility, and must be safeguarded from
injuries not incidental to military operations directed against combatant
forces and other legitimate military objectives. 3 There is, in addition,
the principle of humanity which forbids the employment of any kind or
degree of force that is unnecessary for the purpose(s) of war; force which
needlessly or unnecessarily causes human suffering and physical destruction
is prohibited. 4 Finally, there is the principle forbidding the resort to
treacherous means, expedients, or conduct in the waging of hostilities. 5
It has long been recognized that one of the primary purposes of the more
specific customary and conventional rules of war has been to secure, through
detailed regulations, the effective observance of these general principles.
In naval warfare, for example, the specific rules governing the treatment to
be accorded to enemy merchant vessels, as contrasted with the treatment
accorded to warships, are based largely upon the principle distinguishing
between combatants and non-combatants. In this instance, it is usual to
state that the treatment of belligerent merchant vessels must be considered
as the application to naval warfare of the principle distinguishing between
combatants and non-combatants. Assuming this contention to be correct,
it may be further stated that where the general principles of the law of war
have received-through the agreement of states-detailed application in the
observes that all means which serve the purpose of defeating the enemy in war are permitted
if they do not transgress either specific prohibitions or the general principles of the law of war.
Volkerrecht (3rd. ed., r955), p. 36r. In this connection it is important to distinguish between
the position taken in the text and the opinion-considered as incorrect-that any weapon
necessary for the purpose of war may be employed by belligerents except a weapon designed
solely to cause unnecessary suffering and injury to personnel. The military necessity of a
weapon is not, of itself, a guarantee of its legality. The use of a weapon in war is legal only
if it is not forbidden by the law of war. Such prohibition may result either from a specific
rule of custom or convention or from the general principles of the law of war.
3 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 2.2.r and notes thereto.
It may be observed that in Article
2.2.r the terms "civilian population" and "non-combatants" are used interchangeably. The
same usage is followed throughout the present text. Strictly speaking, the distinctiOl;l between
"combatants" and "non-combatants" is one made within the armed forces, the latter .category
comprising those individuals (e. g., medical and hospital personnel, chaplains) attached to or
accompanying the armed forces in a special capacity. On the other hand, the term "civilian
population" refers-in this strict sense-to the population of a belligerent other than those
persons making up the armed forces. Most writers use the terms ... civilian population" aqd
"non-combatants" interchangeably, however, and do not use the latter term solely in its
original-and restricted-sense. This is quite unobjectionable and need not give rise to a~y
confusion.
4 Law of Naval vVarfare, Section 2.2.ob and notes thereto.
5 Law of Naval Warfare, Section 2.2.oc and notes thereto.
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form of specific rules, the question of the proper interpretation of these general principles can only be answered by an examination of the former.
Hence, to the extent that the conduct of war is increasingly subjected to
such regulation resort to the general principles of the law of war must become, in turn, correspondingly less frequent. The reason for this is simply
that the essential function of these general principles is to provide a guide
for determining the legal status of weapons and methods of war where no
more specific rule is applicable.
In a period marked by rapid developments in the weapons and methods of
war-and whose regulation by specific rules of custom or convention has
not as yet been achieved-it is only natural to expect that the general principles of the law of war will assume a special significance. Unfortunately,
however, considerable difficulties are encountered in the attempt to apply
these general principles to means for conducting hostilities that have not
as yet been made a matter of common agreement among states. In part,
this may be attributed to the fact that the states themselves interpret and
apply these principles, and being interested parties must be expected to act
in accordance with their varying interests. However, even if it were assumed that states possess a greater degree of objectivity in their interpretation of legal rules than past experience could possibly vindicate, difficulties
would still remain owing to the very nature of the general principles of the
law of war and their uncertain status in an era of total war.
To a certain extent the application of the general principles of the law of
war has always varied, depending upon the area of warfare to which they
have been applied. This disparity in application is readily apparent when
comparing the methods of warfare forbidden in hostilities on land as distinguished from naval hostilities. 6 In part, this disparity is due to differences in the conditions and circumstances attending the conduct of war on
land and at sea. In part, it may be attributed simply to the peculiarities of
historical development. Whatever the cause, it is hardly to be expected
that these general principles will receive either a uniform or a self-evident
application to novel methods of warfare in view of this past experience with
respect to the traditional methods of conducting hostilities. New forms of
warfare inevitably create new problems in the attempt to apply the general
principles of the law of war. It may be-and is-true that the novel circutnstances attending new forms of warfare do not constitute a valid reason
for failing to apply these general principles. But the validity of this contention should not serve to gloss over the practicai obstacles invariably
encountered in all such endeavors. The meagre results to date of the attempts to apply the general principles of the law of war to the conduct of
aerial warfare may serve, in this respect, as a clear warning. Elsewhere it
6

E. g., the varying rules relating to the seizure and confiscation of enemy private property,
the right of enemy merchant vessels to resort to acts of forcible resistance against a warship
attempting seizure, and the disparity in the rules governing ruses in land and naval warfare.
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is pointed out that when the principle distinguishing between combatants
and the civilian population is applied to the particular circumstances of
aerial warfare the results are likely to prove altogether different from the
results of applying this same principle to land and naval warfare. 7
To the foregoing must be added a further consideration. Recent experience has made it quite clear that the general principles of the law of war
depend for their application upon standards which are themselves neither
self-evident nor immutable. Hence, it is not merely the application of
general principles to varying circumstances that is in question but the very
meaning of the principles that are to be applied. It will be apparent, for
example, that the scope of the immunity to be granted non-combatants
must depend very largely upon the meaning given to the concept of military
objective. But the concept of a military objective will necessarily vary
as the character of war varies. And even if it were possible today to
enumerate with precision those targets that could be regarded as constituting legitimate military objectives there would still remain the problem of
determining the limits of the "incidental" or "indirect" injury that admittedly may be inflicted upon the civilian population in the course of
attacking military objectives. The answer to this latter problem may
largely depend, in turn, upon the kinds of weapons that are used to attack
military objectives, including weapons whose legal status is itself a matter
for determination in accordance with these same general principles.
The principle of humanity raises similar considerations. As applied to
weapons and methods of war not already expressly regulated by specific
rules, the principle of humanity is used to determine the lawfulness of
novel weapons and methods for conducting hostilities in terms of their
military necessity. 8 The necessity of a weapon must be determined by
the purpose-or purposes-of war. Even assuming that the purpose of
7

See pp. 146-9.
s Mention must be made of the widely held belief that the principles of military necessity
and humanity largely contradict one another, that they serve opposing purposes, and that it
is the task of the law of war to attempt to balance considerations of military necessity against
the requirements of humanity. A recent expression of this view is given by W. G. Downey
(op. cit. pp. 2.6o-1), who, following Spaight's earlier formulation in War Rights on Land, asks:
··The question is how best to balance these conflicting interests and the problem must be
answered, each time a new weapon or new projectile is developed, under the test es~ablished
by Spaight: ·noes the new weapon or the new projectile disable so many of the enemy that
the military end thus gained condones the suffering it causes?' " This belief must be seriously
questioned. Rather than .. contradict" the principle of humanity, the principle of military
necessity implies the former principle. The principle of necessity does not allow the employment of force unnecessary or superfluous to the purposes of war. Nor does the principle qf
humanity oppose human suffering or physical destruction as such. It is the unnecessary infliction of human suffering and the wanton destruction of property that is opposed, both by tl;le
principle of military necessity and by the principle of humanity. Although generally considered as two quite separate principles these remarks suggest the conclusion that military
necessity and humanity may be regarded as merely two aspects of the same principle.
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war ren1ains constant, it has never been easy to determine whether a specific
weapon or method does cause unnecessary suffering or physical destruction. 9
Nor is this difficulty alleviated by the assertion that in order to determine
the proper interpretation of the principle of humanity attention must be
directed to the practice of states. Undoubtedly it is true that the practice
of states may determine that the resort to certain means for waging hostilities is unlawful, particularly if it is assumed that such practice is constitutive of a rule of custom. But then the source of the particular prohibition would be the very practice that is considered constitutive of a rule
of custom, and it is merely superfluous to cite the general principle of
humanity. Thus, the contention that the use of poison gas is forbidden
by the principle of humanity must be distinguished from the quite different
contention that the numerous efforts by states to outlaw gas warfare is
indicative of a practice that has now assumed the character of custom.
Although the efforts to prohibit gas warfare may be the result, in large
measure, of the conviction that gas constitutes an inhumane weapon, it
would nevertheless appear that the present legal status of gas warfare must
be determined by inquiry into the practice of states (specifically: by inquiring whether this practice has now become constitutive of a specific
rule of custom) rather than by continued reference to the criteria contained
in the principle of humanity.l 0
Still more relevant in this connection, though, is the further consideration that the purposes of war have not remained constant. A war fought
for the purpose of obtaining a more defensible frontier is something quite
different from a war whose purpose is the complete defeat and unconditional
surrender of the enemy. But if the purposes of war may vary, then the
measures necessary to achieve these purposes may be equally varied. It
can hardly be expected that the principle of humanity will receive the same
interpretation in a war that is total, with respect to its purposes, as it has
received in wars that have been fought for limited purposes.
In summary: despite their intrinsic significance and undoubted validity,
It is generally agreed that Article 2.3e of the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV
(1907) has been without substantial effect. By forbidding belligerents "to employ arms,
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering," this provision merely states,
in conventional form, the principle of humanity as this principle applies to weapons. Since
Article 2.3e does not attempt to enumerate any specific weapons falling within this prohibited
category it does not materially improve upon the general prohibition already laid down by the
principle of humanity. And it is presumably for this reason that the newly revised U.S. Army
Rules of Land Warfare (1956) quite correctly declare, in interpreting Article 2.3e of the Hague
Regulations, that: "What weapons cause 'unnecessary injury' can only be determined in light
of the practice of states in refraining from the use of a given weapon because it is believed to
have that effect" (paragraph 34 (b)).
10 See pp. 51-3 for an examination of this practice. In fact, the ready assumption that the
use of gas constitutes an inhumane form of warfare has always been questioned. It is not at
all self-evident that the suffering caused by the use of gas outweighs the military purposes
achieved through its use. Yet this must be the test.
9
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the general principles of the law of war have always suffered under certain
limitations which have served to limit their potential utility. The very
character of these general principles must lead to difficulties of interpretation and application. These difficulties are magnified, of course, by the
fact that the principal subjects of the law normally must interpret and apply
the law. The consequences of this latter condition admittedly are not
without effect upon the whole of the law of war. No rule can be so specific
that its interpretation and application remain unaffected by the condition
of extreme decentralization characteristic of international law. Nevertheless, a measure of certainty may at least be achieved to the degree that
the general principles of the law of war are given a more concrete form
through the establishment of detailed rules of custom and-particularlyconvention. In the absence of such detailed regulation their interpretation
and application with respect to the rapidly changing weapons and methods
of warfare will be-almost of necessity-a matter of endless controversy
and consequent uncertainty.

B. WEAPONS IN NAVAL WARFARE
The distinction between the legality of a weapon, apart from its possible
use, and the limitations placed upon the use of an otherwise lawful weapon,
is frequently overlooked, despite its importance. Any weapon may be put
to an unlawful use, e. g., if directed exclusively against the civilian population or if used to inflict unnecessary suffering or wanton destruction. In
naval warfare there have been very few-if any-specifically naval weapons
whose legality, irrespective of their possible use, has been the subject of
serious dispute, though there have been numerous controversies over the
uses to which weapons-legitimate in themselves-have been put. 11
However, to the extent that naval hostilities may involve the use of
weapons whose principal employment is in land warfare, it is clear that
the rules applicable to land forces are equally applicable to naval forces. 12
Perhaps the best illustration of this point is furnished by mines. As against the naval
forces of belligerents the use of all types of mines has never been seriously questioned. The
provisions of Hague Convention VIII (1907) did not purport to establish restrictions upon the
employment of mines against enemy warships, but attempted-however inadequately-to insure
the "security of peaceful shipping." Nor did the disputes arising from the belligerent use
of mines during the two World Wars relate to the status as such of this category of weapons.
These disputes did concern the possible use to which mines could be put, particularly when such
use resulted in endangering the security of peaceful shipping (see pp. 303-5). A further illustration of the distinction drawn above is provided by submarines. _As a weapon employed in
naval warfare there has never been serious doubt over the legality of submarines. Instead,
the controversy has concerned the particular uses to which submarines have been put ormore precisely-the methods that have characterized the use of submarines (see pp. 57/3):
12 Thus, Article 2.3c of the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV (1907), although
immediately directed to land warfare, is equally applicable to naval warfare. See also Article
2.3a of the Hague Regulations forbidding belligerents "to employ poison or Foisoned weapons. ••
11
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There are three categories of weapons whose possible use in naval warfare
warrants their brief consideration: weapons employing fire, poisonous and
asphyxiating gases, and nuclear weapons. As employed against the naval
forces of a belligerent-and it is from this point of view alone that these
weapons are examined here-the first and third categories may be considered as permitted, whereas the second category must probably be regarded as prohibited.
Weapons employing fire include tracer ammunition, flame-throwers,
napalm, and other incendiary instruments and projectiles. Although the
use of such weapons occasionally has been questioned, principally upon the
ground that they inflict unnecessary suffering, the practice of states may be
considered as sanctioning their employment. 13
A measure of uncertainty still characterizes the legal status of poisonous
and asphyxiating gases, when employed by a belligerent not obligated by a
treaty which prohibits their use. It is true that a large number of states
are now bound by the provisions of the 192.5 Geneva Protocol forbidding the
"use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of all analogous
liquids, materials or devices," and have extended this prohibition to include bacteriological methods of warfare. However, there remain a substantial number of states, including the United States and Japan, that have
never ratified the Protocol. In the absence of treaty restrictions the latter
states are bound only by those obligations imposed by customary law.
Apart from treaties, it has been argued that the use of poisonous or
asphyxiating gases violates at least two prohibitions of the customary law
of war: the prohibition against the employment of weapons calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering and the rule forbidding attack upon noncombatants.14 In the case of poisonous gases the further contention has
13 The Declaration of St. Petersburg (I868) prohibited the signatories from employing pro·
jectiles of a weight below 400 grams (I4 ounces) which are "explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances." It is doubtful whether the Declaration has ever been
considered as applicable to aerial warfare. Article IS of the unratified I92.3 Hague Rules of
Aerial Warfare stated that the "use of tracer, incendiary or explosive projectiles by or against
aircraft is not prohibited," and subsequent practice has been to use such projectiles against
aircraft. See Spaight, op. cit., pp. I97 ff. As for flame throwers and similar weapons, a few
writers still challenge their status, maintaining that they inflict unnecessary suffering. In
view of present practice, this opinion is difficult to accept. The U. S. Army Rules of Land Warfare, paragraph 36, states: "The use of weapons which employ fire, such as tracer ammunition,
flame-throwers, napalm and other incendiary agents, against targets requiring their use is not
violative of international law. They should not, however, be employed in such a way as to
cause unnecessary suffering to individuals." And see Law of Naval Warfare, Article 6I2.a.
14 The report of the General Board of the U.S. Navy on the question "Should Gas Warfare
be Prohibited," and submitted by the American delegation to the I92.2. Washington Conference
On the Limitation of Armaments, stated: "The two principles of warfare, (I) that unnecessary
suffering in the destruction of combatants should be avoided, (2.) that innocent non-combatant:;
should not be destroyed, have been accepted by the civilized world for more than one hundred
years. The use of gases in warfare insofar as they violate these two principles is almost uni-

399334-57--5
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been made that their use violates the rule forbidding the employment of
poison or poisoned weapons.
Each one of the foregoing claims is open to question, however. The
rule prohibiting poison or poisoned weapons can be considered applicable
to gases only by analogy or by necessary implication. 15 The rule forbidding
attack against the civilian population is not relevant here, since the assumption is that the weapons under consideration will be employed only
against combatant forces. Nor is there reason to believe that these weapons cannot be confined, in their use, to the combatant forces of a state.
Whether such suffering as is caused by gas is ''unnecessary'' when judged
by the military purposes thereby served, and therefore inhumane, is at least
doubtful. Earlier discussion has pointed out that in view of the vague criteria forming the content of the principle of humanity, the decision as to
whether a particular weapon is inhumane, hence forbidden, must depend
upon the actual practice of states. The important question, then, would
appear to be whether or not the practice of states may be considered as providing sufficient evidence that the use of poisonous or asphyxiating gases
is now generally forbidden, quite apart from any specific obligations
imposed by treaty.
It is believed that a review of state practice does support the conclusion
that the use of poisonous or asphyxiating gases is to be regarded as presently
forbidden in war to all states; that this practice-which consists of treaties,
proposed drafts of treaties, and the pronouncements of states both in time
of peace as well as in time of war-is constitutive of a customary rule
forbidding the use of poisonous or asphyxiating gases.l 6 It is of course
versall y condemned today, despite its practice for a certain period during the World War."
The report went on to declare that although certain gases, e. g., tear gas, could be used without
violating the two basic principles cited above, "there will be great difficulty in a clear and
definite demarcation between the lethal gases and those which produce unnecessary suffering
as distinguished from those gases which simply disable temporarily." For this reason the
General Board recommended the prohibition of gas warfare "in every form and against every
objective.'' U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, I92I, pp. 193-4.
15 It would appear that the rule prohibiting poisoned weapons would apply-if at all-only
in the event a poisonous gas is both odorless and colorless. In the latter case, detection and
prior warning might prove impossible and there would be clearer grounds for assimilation
of poisonous gases under the rule prohibiting poison, since the latter is based principally upon
the conviction that the use of poison constitutes a form of treachery. Presumably the same
considerations would apply in considering the legality of bacteriological and biologicaJ weapons,
even though such weapons are used only against combatant forces.
16 But see Law of Naval Warfare, Article 612.b as well as U. S. Army Rules of Land Warfare,
paragraph 38.-For a brief review of state practice see Stone, op. cit., pp. 553-7. Also Oppenheim-Lauterpacht (op. cit., pp. 342.-4), where it is concluded that recent drafts and pronouncements "bear witness to the tendency to universality in the prohibition of chemical warfare."
The broad scope of this conclusion must be questioned. The prohibition against the resort
to all forms of "chemical warfare" is binding-at best-only upon the contracting parties to
the 192.5 Geneva ProtocoL Even here there is some doubt since the English text of the Protocol
prohibits" asphyxiating, poison, or other gases," whereas the French text forbids "gaz asphyxi-
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true that in the absence of a system of international inspection and control
of prohibited weapons the effectiveness of the rule forbidding poisonous or
asphyxiating gases must depend largely upon the expectation of states that
resort to these weapons will provoke retaliation in kind from an opponent.l 7
It is not easy to understand, however, why this fact should be considered
as an argument against the position that resort to poisonous or asphyxiating
gases is now prohibited in law. 18 The threat of retaliation, or reprisal,
must provide a decisive factor in leading to the observance of the whole
of the law regulating the conduct of war. Yet it has seldom been contended that to the extent that this law is dependent for its observance
upon the threat of reprisal it is thereby deprived of its validity.l 9
ants, toxiques ou similaires.'' Under the English version all forms of gas are prohibited,
by a literal interpretation. Under the French version only specific types are forbidden. In
addition, certain chemical types of weapons, at times asphyxiating in nature (e. g., white
phosphorus, smoke, flame throwers), were employed during World War II without raising
serious question.-Greater uncertainty must be expressed, however, over the existence today
of a customary rule prohibiting the use of bacteriological weapons. No doubt as between the
parties to the 192.5 Geneva Protocol the resort to such weapons-save as a measure of reprisal
against their prior use by an enemy-is forbidden. But whereas there is in the case of gas an
impressive practice of states pointing toward the unlawful character of the resort to gas warfare,
a similar practice does not yet exist in the case of bacteriological weapons. It does seem reasonably clear, though, that the present tendency with respect to bacteriological warfare is moving
in a direction similar to that earlier taken with respect to gas warfare.
17 Thus the 192.5 Geneva Protocol was ratified by a number of states with the qualification
that it would cease to be binding with respect to other ratifying states which failed to observe
the provisions of the Protocol. The Protocol does not forbid the manufacture of gases and
bacteria, only their use in war.
18 "Since . . . the Protocol of 192.5, is subject to reciprocity, its compulsiveness as law seems
difficult to distinguish from the factual compulsion arising from the mere threat of retaliation.''
Stone, op. cit., p. 556. Precisely the same statement could be made concerning any number of
the rules of war whose character as law are not questioned.
1 9 In this connection, it is relevant to note the reasons given by the representative of the
United States in the United Nations Disarmament Commission for refusal on the part of the
United States to support the proposal that the Security Council appeal to all states to accede
to or ratify the 192.5 Geneva Protocol. "The United States representative . . . stated that
the United States did not trust the paper promises of those who bore false witness especially
when the false charges provided false excuses for breaking promises-on alleged grounds of reprisals. The United States had never used bacterial warfare. It had used gas warfare only
in retaliation during the First World War, when it was first used by Germany. Of the two
wars in the twentieth century in which poison gas was used, it was significant that its use
was inaugurated by States which had bound themselves on paper not to use it. Aggressor
States which started wars in violation of their treaty obligations could not be trusted to keep
their paper promises regarding the methods of waging wars, if keeping those promises stood
in the way of their accomplishing their aggressive designs. If men fought to kill, it was not
easy to regulate how they killed. The United States wanted to eliminate all weapons which
were not expressly permitted and appropriate to support the limited number of armed forces
which might be permitted to maintain public order and to meet Charter obligations. The
United States, as a member of the United Nations, had committed itself, as had all other members, to refrain not only from the use of poisonous gas and bacterial warfare, but the use of
force of any kind contrary to the Charter. The United States . . . would support effective
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The preceding considerations relating to the legal status in war of
poisonous or asphyxiating gases are not without significance in considering
the legal status of nuclear weapons. In marked contrast to gas v\rarfare
there is neither any treaty expressly regulating-or prohibiting altogetherthe use of nuclear weapons nor is there any evidence as yet of a practice that
may be considered as constituting sufficient basis for the emergence of a
customary prohibition. Whatever restriction may be applied to nuclear
weapons must therefore be derived from rules already regulating war's
conduct. In this connection the rules prohibiting the infliction of unnecessary suffering and requiring that a distinction be drawn between
combatants and civilian population undoubtedly constitute the more
general, and the more significant, grounds for questioning the legality of
using nuclear weapons in war. 20
The objection that the use of nuclear weapons must cause unnecessary
suffering (and destruction) deserves only the briefest comment. As already
pointed out, the quest~on as to whether or not a particular weapon is to be
considered as causing unnecessary suffering is one that can be answered
only by examining the practice of states. In the case of poisonous and
proposals to eliminate all weapons adaptable to mass destruction, including atomic, chemical
and biological weapons. But until such measures and safeguards had been agreed upon, it
did not intend to invite aggression by committing itself not to use certain weapons to suppress
aggression. To do so in exchange for mere paper promises would be to give would-be aggressors their own choice of weapons." Disarmament Commission, Official Records, Spec. Supp; No.
z, 2nd Report of the Disarmament Commission (1952.), pp. 144-5. The resort to the unlawful use
of force-aggression-does not thereby serve to justify use by the victims of aggression of
weapons that are otherwise unlawful according to the law of war. If the contrary were true
then it could also be argued that none of the rules regulating war's conduct bind the victims
of aggression. Nor is it easy to understand the objection that the signing of "paper promises"
(i. e., treaties) necessarily invites aggression, if unaccompanied by an effective system of control and inspection. Aggression is "invited" only if the treaty in question forbids the use
and the manufacture of certain weapons without, at the same time, establishing an effective
system of control. This is certainly not true of the 192.5 Geneva Protocol.
20 Of lesser importance is the rule prohibiting the use of poison or poisoned weapons and the
provisions of the 192.5 Protocol of Geneva forbidding the use of gases as well as "analogous
liquids, materials or devices." For a detailed consideration of atomic weapons in the light of
these principles-and the conclusion as to their illegality-see A. N. Sack, "ABC-Atomic,
Biological, Chemical Warfare in International Law," Law_yers Guild Review, 10(1950), pp. I6I-8o.
The preponderant opinion among writers has not been to condemn nuclear weapons as being
necessarily unlawful, however. Where doubt has been expressed it is concentrate~ p~incipally
upon the legitimacy of using such weapons against military objectives located in or near centers
of population and the danger of obliterating completely the already threatened combatant-noncombatant distinction. This is, for example, the burden of Spaight's remarks, op. cit., pp.
2.73-7. On the other hand, it has been recently concluded that "the total elimination or limitation, as a matter of law, of the use of the atomic weapon cannot be accomplished by way of a
restatement of an existing rule of law. Such a restatement denying the legality of the use of
the atomic weapon must, of necessity, be based on controversial deductions frorp. supposedly
fundamental principles established in conditions vastly different from those obtaining in modern-total and scientific-warfare." Lauterpacht, "The Problem of the Revision of The Law
of War," p. 370.
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asphyxiating gases it has been suggested that the practice of states does
point to the existence of a rule of universal validity forbidd ing the use of
such weapons as inhumane. In the case of nuclear weapons the matter is
quite different. The present attitude of most of the major powers is clearly
not that of considering the suffering caused by nuclear weapons as unnecessary, when judged by the military purposes these weapons are designed
to serve.
It is equally difficult to accept the objection that nuclear weapons are
necessarily illegal for the reason that their use must lead to the complete
obliteration of the rule distinguishing between combatants and the civilian
population. It is only when such weapons are used against military
objectives in the proximity of the non-combatant population that this
objection warrants serious consideration. 21 To the extent that nuclear
weapons are used exclusively against military forces in the field or naval
forces at sea, they escape this objection. Nor is there reason to believe
that nuclear weapons cannot be directed exclusively against combatant
forces in the strict sense of the term. To the extent that they are so limited,
their use at present 1nay be considered as permitted by the law of war. 22

C. THE ATTACK AND DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY VESSELS
In the following pages attention is directed to the present status of the
rules governing the liability of enemy vessels-and particularly of enemy
merchant vessels-to attack. It is still customary in treatises on the
law of naval warfare to consider the problem of the liability of enemy
merchant vessels to attack as one largely incidental to, and resulting from
the exercise of, the belligerent right to seize and condemn the vessels and
goods of an enemy. In view of recent developments this procedure bears
a distinct element of artificiality, and this would seem so even though it
be asserted that the traditional rules governing the liability of enemy
merchant vessels to attack retain their validity today. At the very least,
the conditions in which recent hostilities at sea have been conducted no
longer permit considering the liability of enemy merchant vessels to attack
as an exceptional circumstance-save perhaps in the most formal sense.
Indeed, as between belligerents it is the seizure of merchant vessels that
21

There should be little doubt that, as judged by the traditional meaning given to the principle distinguishing combatants from non-combatants, the use of nuclear weapons against
cities containing military objectives must be deemed illegal. However, the same judgment
would probably have to be made in considering the practices of aerial bombardment followed
by belligerents during World War II, though very few writers have condemned these recent
practices as unlawful, and no records of war crimes trials are known in which allegations were
made of illegal bombardment from the air (see pp. 146-9).
22
See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 613 and notes thereto. Paragraph 35 of the U. S. Army
Rules of Land Warfare reads: "The use of explosive 'atomic weapons,' whether by air, sea or
land forces, cannot as such be regarded as violative of international law in the absence of any
customary rule of international law or international convention restricting their employment."
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threatens to become the exception rather than-as it once was-the normal
procedure. In consequence, the once clear distinction drawn between
combatants and non-combatants in naval hostilities has been placed in
serious jeopardy. The events that have led to the present situation warrant
careful consideration.
I. The Traditional Rules Governing the Liability of Enemy Vessels to Attack
In the period preceding the outbreak of war in 1914 the rules governing
the liability of enemy vessels to attack and destruction appeared reasonably
well settled. Enemy warships, that is to say all enemy vessels possessing
the competence to exercise belligerent rights at sea, 23 could be attacked on
sight and, if necessary, destroyed. 24 Privately owned and operated enemy
merchant vessels were liable-with minor exceptions 25-to seizure and
subsequent condemnation in the prize courts of the capturing belligerent. 26
This belligerent right to seize and condemn the privately owned vessels
of an enemy found at sea did not preclude the application in other-and
more important-respects of the principle distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants. In particular, it did not serve to free a belligerent from the obligation to refrain from attacking the merchant vessels
of an enemy so long as these vessels refrained from the performance of
certain acts. It is true that a belligerent was permitted, under exceptional
circumstances, 27 to destroy seized enemy merchant vessels rather than to
conduct the latter into port for adjudication. But in those circumstances
where destruction was permitted it could be carried out only after the
passengers and crew had been removed to a place of safety.
At the same time, it is important to observe that belligerent merchant
vessels were placed under no obligation to submit to visit and search, and
seizure, by an enemy. According to well established custom, belligerent
merchant vessels were at liberty to use the means at their disposal in order
23

See pp. 38-41.
The liability to attack of other public vessels which did not form a part of the military
forces of a state (e. g., customs and police vessels), and which did not fall within the category
of public vessels accorded special exemption from either capture or destruction (see pp. 96-8),
remained uncertain. Some writers assume that the liability to attack of such public vessels
has always been substantially the same as that of warships. For example, Hyde declares that
the "absence of armament on a public vessel (not exempt from capture) has not been deemed
to offer a sufficient reason why an enemy force should not attack it at sight." op. cit._, p. 1993.
In fact, neither Hyde nor many other writers appear to distinguish sufficiently between.unarmed
public vessels which do not form a part of the armed forces of a state and unarmed vessels which
do form a part of these forces. Whereas the latter are always liable to attack on sight, the
liability of the former to attack was not free from doubt. If anything, the preponderance of
opinion seemed to incline to capture, and to attack prior to capture only if resistance we~e
offered. See U. S. Naval War College, International Law Topics, 1914, pp. 1-34.
25 See pp. 86-98.
.
26 A procedure not required in the case of captured public vessels since ownership in such
vessels immediately vested in the government of the captor by virtue of the fact of capture.
~~ The nature of these circumstances is discussed elsewhere (see pp. 106-7).
24
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to avoid seizure. They could refuse to stop upon being duly summoned by
a warship of the enemy. They could, in addition, take ~easures of resistance against enemy warships attempting seizure, and for this purpose were
permitted to carry defensive armament. However, in the event either of
persistent refusal to stop upon being duly summoned or of active resistance
to attempted seizure belligerent warships were permitted to take those measures of force necessary to compel submission. In these circumstances the
rule forbidding the attack upon or destruction of enemy merchant vessels
without first placing passengers and crew in a place of safety ceased to
apply. Immunity from attack also ceased to apply to those merchant
vessels performing acts of direct assistance at sea to the naval forces of a
belligerent.
2. The Experience of World Wars I and II.
The rules outlined above represented the application to naval warfare
of the general principle distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants. When the first World War broke out in 1914 these rules
were accorded general recognition by the major naval powers. It soon
became apparent, however, that not all of the belligerents were prepared
to conduct hostilities in accordance with the traditional law. The most
serious departures from the principle distinguishing between combatants
and non-combatants in hostilities at sea must be attributed to Germany
and to the latter's use of submarines. Despite these departures, the care
with which Germany sought to justify her conduct of submarine warfareprimarily upon the right of reprisaJ28-is not without a certain significance.
It indicated that during the first World War, at least, the conviction
strongly persisted that under normal circumstances the rules distinguishing
between the treatment to be accorded combatants and non-combatants
ought to be respected. The widespread opinion that Germany justified
her conduct of submarine warfare simply by the proposition that new
weapons create new rules must therefore be seriously questioned. 29 It
28 The principal "reprisal" measures resorted to by Germany were declared in February 1915
and January 1917. On the former occasion Germany proclaimed the intention to attack and
to destroy all enemy merchant vessels found within the waters surrounding Great Britain and
Ireland. On January 31, 1917 the German Government announced that henceforth it would
forcibly prevent "in a zone around Great Britain, France, Italy and in the eastern Mediterranean
all navigation, that of neutrals included, from and to England, and from and to France, etc.
All ships met within that zone will be sunk." cited in Hackworth, Digest of International Law
(r943), Vol. VI, pp. 465-Sr. For a further discussion of these measures, see pp. 2.96-305.
29 It is quite true that isolated expressions to this effect may be found. Thus, in a memorandum of March 8, r9r6, from the German Ambassador to the American Secretary of State, it was
noted that: " ... Germany was compelled to resort, in February 1915, to reprisals in order to
fight her opponents' measures, which were absolutely contrary to international law. She
chose for this purpose a new weapon the use of which had not yet been regulated by international law and, in doing so, could and did not violate any existing rules, but only took into
account the peculiarity of this new weapon, the submarine boat.' • cited in Hackworth, op. cit",
Vol. VI, p. 478. It is also true that in 1916 the German Naval Staff concluded that the sub-
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would appear more accurate to state that, apart from reprisals, Germany's
principal argument on behalf of her conduct of submarine warfare was
based upon the contention that the novel circumstances in which that
conflict was being waged justified a policy of attacking enemy merchant
vessels on sight and without warning. One of the principal circumstances
upon which Germany came to rely was the vulnerability of the submarine
in relation to armed British merchant vessels instructed to use their armament against any attempt at seizure by an enemy submarine. 30
The central question raised by the arming of belligerent merchant vessels
concerned the effect this measure could be considered to have upon the
immunity from attack normally granted the latter. 31 The position consistently taken by Great Britain has been that the right of merchant vessels ·
to carry armament to be used for defensive purposes only is one clearly
recognized by customary law, and that so long as merchant vessels restrict
the use of such armament to measures of self-defense they rna y not be
deprived-simply for the reason that they are so armed-either of their
non-combatant status or of their normal exemption from attack. 32 In
marine, being a novel weapon, must provide "its own lines of conduct." Nevertheless, despite
these and other isolated expressions to the contrary, Germany's official position was not based
upon the argument that new weapons must thereby create new rules. Nor-for that matterwas it based upon the closely related argument that ""old rules" cannot automatically bind
!'new weapons" (i.e., the submarine).
30 In the latter stages of World War I, and during World War II, armed merchant vessels were
instructed to use their armament upon sighting an enemy submarine, the assumption being
that unlawful attack by the submarine would-in any event-be forthcoming.
31 This, at least, is the central question raised as hetween belligerents.
A quite different question
concerns the effect the arming of merchant vessels may have in determining the treatment
to be accorded them in the ports and territorial waters of neutral states (see pp. 2.47-51).
32 See Higgins and Colombos (op. cit., pp. 363-9) for a statement of the British position.
Substantially the same position was taken in both World Wars by France, and Article 2. of the
French Naval Instructions of 1934 provided that enemy merchant vessels were not to be attacked
for the sole reason ("le seul motif") that they bore defensive armament.-During World War
I the position finally taken by the United States, while still neutral, was in support of the British
attitude. Earlier, however, the United States had advocated that in return for a pledge that
submarines would adhere strictly to the customary rules in carrying out search and seizure,
merchant vessels of belligerent nationality should be prohibited from carrying any armament.
In the 1939-41 period of neutrality this country refrained from raising any question as to the
belligerent arming of merchant vessels. Finally, as a belligerent in both wars the United
States resorted to the practice of arming its merchant vessels and of manning such armament
with naval gun crews. See, generally, Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 489-503.
It may also be noted that frequently the discussion of the effect of arming merchant vessels
suffers from the endeavor to establish that the carrying of armament does not thereby serve to
confer upon a merchant vessel the status of a warship. In principle, this argument may be
considered to be correct. Defensively armed merchant vessels have rio competence to exercis~
belligerent rights at sea, and if found doing so the officers and crew may be treated-in strict
law-as war criminals. However, this fact does not of itself prove that armed merchaqt
vessels, if refraining from the exercise of belligerent rights at sea, must thereby be accorded
exemption from attack without prior warning . There are two quite different questions involved here, as Hyde (op. cit., p. 1997) correctly observes in stating that the fact that "an
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practice, this position would require a warship to follow the procedure
normally prescribed by the traditional law in attempting to seize an armed
enemy merchant vessel; in the absence of other reasons providing an independent justification for attack 33 force may be resorted to-according to
this view-only if the merchant vessel first makes use of its armament tn
order to resist.
The German view, on the other hand, has been one of refusing to accept
the claim that the arming of belligerent merchant vessels does not result in
rendering such vessels liable to attack on sight. Indeed, the initial German
reaction to the arming of British merchant vessels was to consider the act a
violation of international law on the part of Great Britain, and to threaten
to treat the personnel of vessels making use of their armament-even for
allegedly defensive purposes-as war criminals. But the more consistent,
and more moderate, position has been to consider the carrying of armament
simply as depriving enemy merchant vessels of immunity from attack without warntng and without taking prior precautions for the safety of the
crew. 34
armed merchantman may retain its status as a private ship is not decisive of the treatment to
which it may be subjected." The difficulty involved is due to the frequent use of the term
"legal status" in two different senses. It may refer to the conditions necessary for the conversion of a merchant vessel into a warship. But it may refer to the fact that a merchant vessel
is subject to the same liabilities as a warship although, by retaining its non-combatant character,
it does not possess the competence to exercise belligerent rights at sea.
33 The significance of this qualification ought not to be overlooked.
As will presently be
noted, the "other reasons" that provide independent justification for the attack on sight of
enemy merchant vessels-whether armed or unarmed-have reduced substantially the importance
of the question under immediate consideration. These circumstances not only include the persistent refusal to stop upon being duly summoned and any form of active resistance to
seizure (e. g., the sending in of position reports upon sighting enemy warships, and particularly
enemy submarines) but the integration of merchant vessels in any manner into the enemy's
military effort at sea.
3 4 The German position has never been altogether clear, though, and the statements made in
the text therefore border on over-simplification .. On a number of occasions Germany has
contended that any armed resistance to the regular measures of prize law is forbidden . During
World War I it appeared that this latter position would necessarily lead to treating armed
resistance on the part of enemy merchant vessels as a war crime. But this position was certainly without foundation in the traditional law and-apart from the notorious trial and execution of Captain Fryatt for attempting in 1915 to ram a German submarine that had ordered
h~m to stop-was not seriously pursued by the German Government. In addition, neither
the German Prize Law Code of 1914 nor the preponderance of German writers lent any substantial weight to this extreme claim. Quite different, however, was the contention that
merchant vessels engaged in unlawful behavior if they sought to destroy an enemy warship
(e. g., submarine) before the latter took any steps to effect seizure. And there is no question
but that the so-called "defensive-offensive" action permitted to armed British merchant
vessels came very close to the exercise of forbidden offensive action. Of course, the British
argument was that the persistent unlawful behavior of German submarines permitted British
merchant vessels to anticipate the probability of an unlawful attack and to take "preventive
measures of self-defense.''
On the whole, however, it would appear that the principal German position has been that
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The controversy thus occasioned during the first World War over the
arming of belligerent merchant vessels continued into the inter-war period
and can scarcely be considered as wholly resolved even today. When
judged by the customary law the British position appears, on first consideration, as unexceptionable. The difficulty of this position, however,
is that despite its apparent conformity with the customary law it was
applied during World War I (and during World War II) in both a manner
as well as in circumstances that bore little relation to the circumstances and
manner of employment characteristic of the preceding period.
It has always appeared rather paradoxical that although enemy merchant
vessels were at liberty to resist attempted seizure, and could even carry
armament for this purpose, warships were normally obliged to refrain from
attacking merchant vessels until the latter had first actually resorted to
measures of resistance. If an enemy merchant vessel carried armament
whose sole purpose was evidently to provide means of resistance against
attempted seizure, then it would seem only reasonable to allow a warship-particularly if inferior in defensive power-to attack such armed vessels on
sight. In part, the explanation of this seeming paradox may be attributed
to the carrying over of a practice formed under quite different historical
circumstances. During an earlier period the danger of attack from privateers, or from pirates, served to justify the carrying of arms not only in
time of war but in time of peace as well. As the nineteenth century
progressed this earlier justification for arming belligerent merchant vessels
largely disappeared. At the same time, the rule exempting the merchant
vessels of an enemy from attack gained ground. Indeed, it was only during
while arming of merchant vessels does not serve to transform the latter into warships, it does
justify treating such vessels as liable to attack without warning. The German Prize Law Code
of September 1939 was silent on this matter but on September 30, 1939, the Deutsches Nachrichten
Buro stated that henceforth armed enemy merchant vessels would be treated like warships and
sunk without warning. It was further declared: "Armed resistance to the regular measures
of prize law is not permissible. Arming a merchant ship alone does not make of the latter a
warship, but does justify the adversary in treating the merchant ship as a warship to the same
extent that it is equipped for the use of armed force." cited in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VI,
p. 499· In substance, this has also been the position taken by perhaps the majority of German
writers. Indeed, the view that the presence of armament on board an enemy merchant vessel
served to justify attacking such vessel without warning was urged even prior to World War I.
See, for example, the opinions expressed by Professor Heinrich Triepel before the Institute of
International Law in 1913 (Annuaire de l'lnstitut de Droit International, 2.6 (1913), pp. s16 ff.).
And for the inter-war period see, in particular, P. A. Martini, Reformvorschliige z.um Seekriegsrecht
(1933) and the detailed argument given by Werner Plaga, Das hewaffnete Handelsschiff (1939).
The latter writer argued that the British position was devoid of any-legal foundation even in
the pre-1914 law, and that, in any event, the specific measures taken by the British in arming
their merchant vessels after 1914 served to deprive the latter of immunity from attack.-And
for a recent view, see Professor Verdross, op. cit., p. 389. Though declaring that the carriage
of armament for "mere defense" is admissible, in that it does not serve to turn enemy merchant
vessels into illegitimate combatants, Professor Verdross is not altogether clear as to whether
such carriage may deprive enemy merchant vessels of immunity from attack without warning.
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the course of this past century that the distinction between the treatment
of combatants and non-combatants in warfare at sea became firmly established. The continued retention, on the one hand, of the ancient tule
allowing belligerent merchant vessels to arm in self-defense and, on the
other hand, the growing immunity granted to merchant vessels if they
refrained from measures of resistance, is to be explained, however, largely
by the disparity in power that existed between warship and merchant
vessel.
In retrospect, it is clear that one of the principal reasons for the increased
measure of immunity granted enemy merchant vessels during the nineteenth
century was this very disparity, and that the degree to which this immunity
was observed was roughly proportionate to the difference in power between
warship and merchant vessel. 35 In fact, during the century preceding the
outbreak of war in 1914 the practice of arming merchant vessels was abandoned almost entirely, only to be revived by the announcement of the
British Government in 1913 that in the event of war it would supply its
merchant vessels with defensive armament. Although the initial purpose
of this measure was to provide merchant vessels with the means to defend
themselves against seizure by converted enemy warships it soon became
readily apparent that the principal employment of such armament was to be
directed against enemy submarines (and, during World War II, against
enemy aircraft as well). But in the case of submarines this former disparity
in power between warship and merchant vessel became negligible, provided
that the merchant vessel was armed and the submarine required to attempt
seizure before resorting to force. . Under these circumstances the submarineand any other type of warship not clearly superior in power to the armed
merchant vessel-was almost certain to encounter active resistance if it
attempted to conform with the traditional law. And the instructions
furnished British armed merchantmen in both World Wars, stipulating that
enemy submarines should be attacked on sight, made it difficult-and in
many cases impossible-to draw a clear line between defensive and offensive
action. In any event, it is not easy to see why belligerent merchant vessels
may be armed for the sole purpose of attacking enemy submarines on sight,
35 It is upon this consideration that many writers have placed greatest emphasis. Thus Hyde
(op. cit., p. 1997), in concluding that the carrying of armament by a merchant vessel serves to deprive the vessel so armed of the right to claim immunity from attack without warning, states that
the ''immunity of merchant vessels from attack at sight grew out of their impotency to endanger
the safety of public armed vessels of an enemy, . . . maritime states have never acquiesced in
a principle that a merchant vessel so armed as to be capable of destroying a vessel of war of any
kind should enjoy immunity from attack at sight, at least when encountering an enemy cruiser
of inferior defensive strength." Also, to the same general effect, G. G. Wilson, "Armed Merchant Vessels and Submarines," A.]. I. L., 2.4 (1930), pp. 337-8; Edwin Borchard, "Armed
Merchantmen," A.]. I. L., 34 (1940), p. uo; and J. L. Kunz, Kriegsrecht und Neutralitatsrecht,
pp. u8-35·
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but enemy submarines considered as without a similar right to take "defensive" measures by attacking armed merchant vessels on sight. 36
Perhaps even more important was the manner in which merchant vessels
were armed and directed to use their armament. The traditional law assumed that the owner of a private vessel would decide for himself whether
or not to carry arms, would arm-if at all-at his own expense, and would
determine under what conditions he would choose to make use of such arms.
In short, the fact that a merchant vessel was armed did not mean that it
was in any way incorporated into the military effort of a belligerent, or
that it was acting under the direct control of the state. In World War I,
as in World War II, the manner in which merchant vessels were armed and
were directed to use their armament no longer met these assumptions. The
state decided upon the arming of merchant vessels, providing both guns
and personnel to operate the guns, and directed 1nerchant vessels as to the
manner in which they were to employ their armament. 37
On balance, then, the lengthy dispute relating to the position of armed
merchant vessels, particularly with respect to submarines, appears inconclusive. The real strength of the British position is not to be found in the
clai1n that the arming of merchant vessels was sanctioned by the customary
law. Instead, it must be found in the contention that the effective use of
the submarine was, in the vast majority of cases, incompatible with the
observance of the rules distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants, that Germany had not observed these rules in conducting
submarine warfare, and that the arming of merchant vessels was the only
possible n1eans to be taken against the unlawful use of submarines. Yet
the fact remains that the initial British decision to arm merchant vessels
was taken prior to World War I. More important were the circumstances
in which merchant vessels were armed and directed to use their arms,
circumstances which hardly allowed the assumption that these vessels
retained a peaceful and strictly non-combatant status. It is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that the immunity granted merchant vessels by the
traditional law can be observed only under the conditions that merchant
3 6 In a memorandum of March 25, 1916, prepared by the Department of State for the President,
it was observed that: "A merchantman entitled to exercise the right of self-protection may do
so when certain of attack by an enemy warship, otherwise the exercise of the right would be so
restricted as to render it ineffectual. There is a distinct difference, however, between the
exercise of the right of self-protection and the act of cruising the seas in an armed vessel for the
purpose of attacking enemy naval vessels.'' The German Government in commenting upon
this memorandum observed: "It admits . . . the merchant vessel's right to resort to selfdefense as soon as it is certain of attack by an enemy warship, as otherwise the exercise of th~
right would be so restricted as to be made ineffectual; exactly the same grounds support the
position that a warship that is entitled to exercise the right of capture may use force whert
certain of attack by an armed enemy merchant vessel." cited in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VI,
pp. 497-8.
37 See H. A. Smith, Law and Custom of the Sea, p. 87, and The Crisis in the Law of Nations,
pp. 6o-2..

vessels do not present-in terms of their armament-a serious threat to
enemy warships and that they are in no way integrated into the military
effort of a belligerent. If either, or both, of these conditions do not obtain,
and they were not satisfied even in World War I, warships-whether submarines or surface vessels-cannot be expected to refrain from attacking
enemy merchant vessels.
In the period following the first World War the continued validity of
the traditional rules regulating the attack and destruction of enemy vessels
was reaffirmed on a number of occasions, and in 1930 these rules were given
conventional expression at the London Naval Conference in the Treaty on
the Limitation and Reduction of Armament. Article 22 of the London
Naval Treaty of 1930 declared:
The following are accepted as established rules of International
Law:
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, subtnarines
must conform to the rules of International Law to which surface
vessels are subject.
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop
on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit and search,
a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or
render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having
first placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of
safety. For this purpose the ships' boats are not regarded as a
place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is
assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a
position to take them on board. 38
According to the terms of the 1930 London Naval Treaty, Article 22 was
to remain in force ''without limit of time.'' Upon the expiration of the
remainder of the Treaty in December 1936 this provision therefore remained
38

It should be observed that Article 2.2., insofar as it attempted merely to restate in conven
tiona! form the traditional law, ought not to be interpreted as permitting attack only under
those circumstances to which reference is expressly made. Any such interpretation clearly
would not be in accord with the pre-existing law, which allowed a. belligerent warship to
attack enemy merchant vessels for acts in addition to refusal to stop on being duly summoned
or active resistance to visit and search. The committee of jurists responsible for the formulation
of Article 2.2. of the London Naval Treaty stated in its report on this article: "The committee
wish to place on record that the expression 'merchant vessel', where it is employed in the
declaration, is not to be understood as including a merchant vessel which is at the moment
participating in hostilities in such a manner as to cause her to lose her right to the immunities
of merchant vessels." Proceedings, London Naval Conference, (1930), p. 189. No reference is
made to the treatment to be accorded armed merchant vessels. In fact, the Treaty left this all
important question where it found it. And see U. S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1930, pp. 1-65, for a general review of the 1930 London Naval Treaty in its bearing upon
the conduct of submarine warfare.
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binding upon the contracting Parties. However, in November of the same
year (1936) Article 2.2. of the London Naval Treaty was incorporated verbatim
in the form of a Protocol, the purpose of this being to increase the number of
states accepting the obligations contained therein. At the time of the
outbreak of war in 1939 some forty odd states, including all the major
naval powers, had either ratified, or had expressly acceded to, the 1936
London Protocol, and the provisions of the Protocol were given prominent
place in the naval instructions issued by many governments to their naval
forces. 39 Nor was there any serious question over the applicability of
these rules to military aircraft when used in operations against enemy
merchant shipping. 40
Despite this reaffirmation of the traditional law in the 1936 London
Protocol, the record of belligerent measures with respect to enemy merchant
vessels during World War II fell far below the standards set in the preceding conflict. In the Atlantic Germany resorted to unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against British merchant vessels almost from the
very start of hostilities. 41 Once again the measures taken by Germany
were justified in part as measures of reprisal and in part as resulting from the
See paragraph so of the 1941 Tentative Instructions For the Navy of the United States Governing
Maritime and Aerial Warfare (cited throughout as I94I Instructions). The earlier 1917 Instructions
For the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare (cited throughout as I9I7 Instructions)
did not contain a parallel provision, paragraph 4S providing for the resort to forcible measures
against enemy merchant vessels if the latter resisted or took to flight after once being summoned. Article 2.2. of the London Naval Treaty also formed a part of the German Prize Law
Code of 1939 (Article 74).
40 Distinguish between the diversion of merchant vessels by aircraft and the attack of merchant vessels by aircraft. Although there was a good deal of dispute over the former question
during the inter-war period there was no dispute over the applicability to aircraft of the rulealready applicable to surface warships and submarines-forbidding the attack and destruction
of enemy merchant vessels without having first placed passengers and crew in a place of safety.
41 S. W. Roskill summarizes the German resort to unrestricted submarine warfare in the
following passage:
"On the 2.3rd of September, Hitler, on the recommendation of Admiral Raeder, approved
that 'all merchant ships making use of their wireless on being stopped by U-boats should be
sunk or taken in prize.' As the immediate despatch of a wireless signal in such circumstances
was included in the Admiralty's instructions to merchant ships and was essential-if for no
other reason-to the rescue of their crews, this German order marked a considerable step towards
unrestricted warfare. : . . On the 3oth of September observance of the Prize Regulations
in the North Sea was withdrawn; and on the 2.nd of October complete freedom was given to
attack darkened ships encountered off the British and French coasts. Two days later the
Prize Regulations were cancelled in waters extending as far as IS 0 West, and on the ·17th of
October the German Naval Staff gave U-boats permission 'to attack without warning all ships
identified as hostile.' The zone where darkened ships could be attacked with complete freedom
was extended to 2.0° West on the 19th of October. Practically the only restrictions now placed
on U-boats concerned attacks on liners and, on the 17th of November, they too were allowed
to be attacked without warning if 'clearly identifiable as hostile.' Although the enemy this.
time carefully avoided the expression 'unrestricted U-boat warfare,' it can therefore be said that,
against British and French shipping, it was, in fact, adopted by the middle of November I939·"
30
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circumstances in which hostilities at sea were being conducted . The obligations laid down in the 1936 London Protocol were not denied. Emphasis
was placed rather upon the argument that the methods of warfare employed
by Great Britain, and particularly the measures taken to integrate British
merchant shipping into Britain's military effort at sea, prevented German
compliance with the provisions of the I 93 6 London Protocol. 42
Great Britain refrained during the initial stages of the conflict from
resorting to measures of a similar nature. The British reprisals order of
November 27, 1939, taken in response to alleged unlawful German mine and
submarine warfare, sought instead to cut off all German exports whether
carried in enemy or in neutral bottoms. 43 Indeed, for a substantial period
of time British aircraft were forbidden to attack any enemy ships other than
warships, troopships, and ''auxiliaries in direct attendance on the enemy
fleet.'' 44 As the war progressed certain areas were declared to be ''dangerMilitary History of the Second World War: The War at Sea, I9J9-I945 (I954), Vol. I, pp. I03-4·
This summary follows substantially the evidence brought forward against Admirals Raeder
and Doenitz during their trial before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. See
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (I946), Vol. II, pp. 8I5-76. The German resort to unrestricted
aerial attack on enemy shipping followed almost immediately upon the decision to initiate
unrestricted submarine warfare. Spaight (op. cit., pp. 487-8) lists the date as Deceniber I?,
1939·
42 On September I9, I939, the Commander in Chief of the German Navy, Grand Admiral
Raeder, declared:
"Germany is conducting submarine warfare in accordance with the Prize Laws issued on
August 2.8, 1939. These are strictly in accordance with the acknowledged rules of maritime war.
The provisions of the London Submarine Protocol are taken over in full in them. The submarines have strict orders to comply with these provisions. In harmony with the rules of the
Submarine Protocol they are however justified in breaking armed resistance with all means.
It is obvious that ships which participate in warlike measures or travel in convoy of enemy
warships place themselves in danger and cannot complain when in the course of belligerent
actions they are damaged or destroyed." cited in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 484. Also
the passage from the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal summarizing the testimony of
Doenitz:
"Doenitz insists that at all times the Navy remained within the confines of international
law and of the Protocol. He testified that when the war began, the guide to submarine warfare was the German prize ordinance taken almost literally from the Protocol, that pursuant
to the German view, he ordered submarines to attack all merchant ships in convoy, and all
that refused to stop or used their radio upon sighting a submarine. When his reports indicated
that British merchant ships were being used to give information by wireless, were being armed,
and were attacking submarines on sight, he ordered his submarines on I? October I939, to
attack all enemy merchant ships without warning on the ground that resistance was to be
expected." U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, zg46-47, p. 2.98.
43 See p. 3I2..
44 Roskill states that by this policy "only warships, troopships or 'auxiliaries in direct
attendance on the enemy fleet' could be attacked, and then only if identified beyond doubt.
Even if an enemy merchant ship opened fire with her defensive armament our craft were forbidden to retaliate . . . It will readily be understood how far this policy made air action
ineffective against all types of enemy merchant ships, including, for example, disguised merchant raiders. During the whole of 1940 only sixteen enemy merchant ships, totalling 2.2.,472.
tons, were sunk by air attack and seventeen were damaged." op. cit., p. I44· In March I940
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ous to shipping" and within some of them enemy vessels were liable to
be attacked and sunk on sight. In the final stages of the conflict the
measures taken by Great Britain against enemy shipping wherever encountered were only barely distinguishable from a policy of unrestricted
warfare. 45
In the Pacific no attempt was made by either of the major naval belligerents to observe the obligations laid down by the 1936 London Protocol.
Immediately upon the outbreak of war the United States initiated a policy
of unrestricted aerial and submarine warfare against Japanese merchant
vessels, and consistently pursued this policy throughout the course of
hostilities. 46 Japan, in turn, furnished no evidence of a willingness to
abide by the provisions of the Protocol, and-in fact-Japanese submarines
attacked without warning and destroyed an American merchant vessel
within a few hours following the attack upon Pearl Harbor. 47
these restrictions were relaxed slightly, and in May unrestricted attacks against enemy shipping
were permitted "off the south coast of Norway and in the Skagerrak" (p. 145). Further
relaxations were announced in June and July 1940, but it was not until March 1941 "that

permission was given to attack enemy or enemy-controlled merchant shipping at any time,
whether at anchor or under way, at sea or in port" (p. 337). See also Spaight, op. cit., pp.
48~93. One factor in bringing on unrestricted aerial warfare was the German practice of
scuttling their ships, an act which, in effect, amounted to resistance to seizure.
45 In these latter stages the British practice was to assimilate enemy merchant vessels to the
status of supply or auxiliary vessels. According to custom such vessels are considered as liable
to attack without prior warning.- It is feared that the above summary does less than justice
to the British record at sea, particularly in the first year or so of the conflict. It should be
emphasized that during this period Great Britain clearly manifested a desire not to be drawn
into unrestricted warfare against enemy shipping and, in the end, did so only reluctantly.
46 The U.S. Navy Department despatch of December 7, 1941 to naval forces in the Pacific. read:
" Execute unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan."
In an official survey made following World War II it was estimated that United States forces
sunk 2..,II7 Japanese merchant vessels. Of this number 1,II3 were sunk by submarines. See
Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II by All Causes (Prepared by the
Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, NAVEXOS P-468) (1947), pp. 6-7.
47 No apparent attempt was ever made officially by the United States to base the policy of
unrestricted warfare against Japanese merchant vessels either upon the right of reprisal or
upon the quasi-military character of Japanese merchant shipping. On February 2.., 1946 a curious
statement occurred in a Navy Department Press Release entitled United States Submarine Contributions to Victory in the Pacific. Referring to the despatch of December 8, 1941 to execute unrestricted air and submarine warfare the statement noted:
"It is true that Germany had for years been waging unrestricted submarine warfare in the
Atlantic. It is true that Japanese submarines sank a merchant ship in the Pacific within a few
hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was also true that the conditions under which Japan
employed her so-called merchant shipping was such that it would be impossible to distinguish
between 'merchant ships' and Japanese Army and Navy auxiliaries and these conditions would
sooner or later have forced us to adopt the position which we boldly assumed at the outset."
However, the existing 'Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime.
and Aerial Warfare' were so restrictive as to practically preclude a submarine attack on any:
thing but an unmistakable man of war . . . ''
.
In point of fact, neither the 1936 London Protocol-on which the 1941 Instructions were
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3· The Present Situation.
In its judgment on Admiral Doenitz for charges of violations of the laws
of war the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg declared that it
was "not prepared to hold Doenitz guilty for his conduct of submarine
warfare against British armed merchant ships." In reaching this decision
the Tribunal did not thereby imply that the rules laid down in the 1936
London Protocol were to be considered as no longer binding upon belligerent warships in their behavior toward enemy merchant vessels. 48
There was no indication that, in the Tribunal's opinion, the ineffectiveness
of the Protocol in regulating belligerent conduct had served to deprive it
of its character as law. Indeed, the most reasonable interpretation of this
particular aspect of the judgment rendered by the Nuremberg Tribunal is
that the latter clearly assumed the continued validity of the 1936 London
Protocol as it relates to inter-belligerent measures.
The significance of the Tribunal's judgment must instead be found in the
reasons given for its refusal to hold Doenitz guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare against British armed merchant ships. These reasons are
summarized as follows:
Short! y after the outbreak of war the British Admiralty, in accordance with its Handbook of Instructions of 1938 to the merchant navy, armed its merchant vessels, in many cases convoyed
them with armed escort, gave orders to send position reports upon
sighting submarines, thus integrating merchant vessels into the
warning network of nava.l intelligence. On I October 1939, the
British Admiralty announced that British merchant vessels had
been ordered to ram U-boats if possible. 49
based-nor the traditional law were as restrictive as the above quoted press release appears
to assume. It is probable that the resort to unrestricted submarine warfare could have been
justified in this instance either as a reprisal against similar action by the enemy or as a consequence of the nature of employment of Japanese merchant vessels.
In this connection it is also of interest to note that in testimony submitted to the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz declared that: ''The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered by the Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December
1941 was justified by the Japanese attacks on that date on U. S. bases, and on both armed and
unarmed ships and nationals, without warning or declaration of war." Trials of The Major
War Criminals (1947-49), Vol. XL, p. 111.
48 Though it is true that a number of writers have so interpreted the Tribunal's judgment.
However, for reasons noted in the text above it is believed that this interpretation has little,
if any, support. It is, of course, quite another matter to ask how relevant may be the affirmation of the continued validity of the rules laid down in the 1936 London Protocol, in view of
recent belligerent practices. To this latter question it is hardly possible to reply other than
by stating that given those conditions characterizing the belligerent conduct of naval hostilities
in World War II the traditional rules according enemy merchant vessels immunity from attack
without warning, and without safeguarding the lives of passengers and crew, can have but
limited relevance.
49
U. S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, I946-47, p. 2.99.
399334-57--6
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In this brief passage the Nuremberg Tribunal took cognizance of prac- "
tices that have transformed the character of naval warfare during the past
half century and that have made increasingly difficult the application of the
rules distinguishing between the treatment of combatant and non-combatant
vessels. Although varying in both form and degree, the near universal
tendency in recent maritime warfare has been for merchant vessels to become
a part of the belligerents' military effort at sea. 50
In consequence, the principal assumption on which the traditional law
was based no longer obtains-or, at least, did not obtain during World War
II. This assumption was that a reasonably clear distinction could be drawn
between the naval forces of a belligerent and merchant vessels having no
relation to the belligerent's military operations. 51 It is necessary only to
recall that even under the traditional law the immunity granted merchant
vessels from attack depended upon a strict abstention from all active participation in hostilities, upon refraining from rendering any kind of direct
assistance at sea to the military operations of a belligerent, and upon a refusal to accept the protection of a belligerent's naval forces (e. g., in the
form of a convoy). Failure to place sufficient emphasis upon these requirements of the traditional law may easily lead to the mistaken belief that the
recent claims of belligerents to possess the right to attack enemy merchant
vessels are invariably rooted in the theory that novel circumstances must
It was this common tendency of belligerents during World War II that reduced the importance of earlier controversy over the effect of arming belligerent merchant vessels. Whether
with or without armament merchant vessels were nearly always under instructions to report
the position of enemy warships immediately upon sighting the latter. In effect, this practice
amounted to incorporating merchant vessels into the belligerent's intelligence system, and the
danger that could thereby arise for submarines attempting seizure might easily prove as great
as the danger arising from the carriage of armament. In either case, seizure in accordance
with the traditional methods was normally incompatible with the safety of the warship andindeed-was no longer demanded of the latter. A number of writers-e. g., Guggenheim
(op. cit., pp. 4oo-1) and Castren (op. cit., pp. 2.82.-90)-in continuing to insist upon the validity
of the traditional rules governing the attack and destruction of enemy merchant vessels, and
justifiably so, nevertheless fail to place sufficient emphasis upon the significance of these recent
developments, and their effect in depriving merchant vessels of that immunity formerly enjoyed.
51 It may be noted that the immunity from attack normally granted merchant vessels need
not, and probably should not, be made wholly dependent upon their public or private character.
It is of course true that the distinction drawn by the traditional law between combatant and
non-combatant vessels was heavily influenced by, and largely developed from, nineteenth century
liberalism, with its clear separation between public and private economic activities. It is
also clear that a state which exercises public ownership over all merchant vessels will most
probably integrate these vessels in time of war into its military effort. Nevertheless, it is at
least conceivable that a state might refrain from associating its publicly owned vessels engaged
in trade with its military operations. Under these circumstances-highly improbable though
they may be-there would seem to be no apparent justification for attacking such vessels on·
sight simply by virtue of their public ownership. To argue otherwise is to identify the combatant-non-combatant distinction with an economic system rather than with the nature of.
the acts performed, an identification which is considered erroneous. See Law of Naval Warfare,
section 5oob.
50
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serve to create new rules . These novel circumstances are generally considered to be the effectiveness of the submarine and aircraft as commerce
destroyers and the central importance of the economic objective in modern
war; circumstances which, when taken together, are held to justify the
practice that he who cannot seize (in accordance with the traditional law)
may nonetheless sink. 52 The rejection of this theory, however justified,
ought not to lead to a similar rejection of the quite different contention
that novel circumstances may be considered as permitting the application
of measures which, in an earlier period, found qnly the most infrequent
use. 53 These novel circumstances are-from the present point of viewneither the submarine (and aircraft) nor the central importance of what has
52 It is another matter, however, to argue that while the novel circumstances adverted to
above may not be urged as a legal justification for departing from the traditional law (which
retains its formal validity), they must provide an essential part of the explanation as to why
belligerents did depart from this law and a key to any rational expectations regarding future
belligerent behavior. This is, essentially, Professor Stone's position, op cit., pp. 59~607.
Stone starts from the proposition that naval war law must now be seen as a function of the
economic objective in warfare at sea, which is to shut off completely the enemy's commerce.
" . . . the future of naval war law must be envisaged in the close context of the modern objectives of the economic arm of warfare. The economic and industrial struggle is a main if not
the main conditioning factor . . . "(p. 602.). Hence the central question to Stone is "whether
he who cannot seize may lawfully sink" (p. 6o3), a question applied not only to enemy merchant
vessels but to neutral merchant vessels as well. While not denying the continued validity of
the 1936 London Protocol (at least as "law on paper':) Stone's conclusion is that in view of the
transcendent importance of the economic objective in modern war the "immediate task is to
regulate the future of naval warfare in which submarines and aircraft will join in the attack on
enemy commerce; for it is regrettably clear that no rule purporting to exclude them from this
role, however well grounded in humanity, will be brooked" (p. 6o6). With this change once
made Professor Stone is confident that we may then look forward to the ''growth of real rules
for the mitigation of suffering under modern conditions" (p. 6o7), though no concrete suggestion is given as to the express character these "real rules" might assume.
58 A clear distinction should be drawn, therefore, between the position that the virtual incorporation of merchant vessels into the belligerent's military effort precludes the application
of rules presupposing the possibility of clearly separating combatant from innocent merchant
vessels, and the position that recent belligerent practice in sinking without warning all enemy
vessels has invalidated these same rules. Whereas the former position insists upon the continued validity of the traditional law, under the condition that belligerents refrain from incorporating
merchant vessels in any way into their military effort at sea, the latter position insists that belligerent
practice-and the "necessities" of total war-now permit belligerents to sink enemy merchant
vessels on sight. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht would appear to come very close to endorsing this
latter position when he observes that the London Protocol "remained a dead letter during the
Second World War" and that the problem of unrestricted submarine warfare "is deeper than
that raised by the arming of merchant vessels for defensive purposes and by the interplay of
the operation of reprisals. It touches upon the reality of any solution grounded primarily in
the distinction between combatants and non-combatants." "The Revision of The Law of
War," p. 374· Elsewhere, however, the same eminent writer has observed not only that
Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare was an "illegal practice," but that in acquitting
Admiral Doenitz of this charge-with respect to British merchant vessels-the judgment of the
International Military Tribunal by attaching "decisive importance to the circumstance that
merchant vessels were armed for defensive purposes or engaged in activities and received assist-
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come to be known as economic warfare, but rather the insistence of belligerents upon the resort to measures which have as their direct consequence the
integration of merchant shipping into the military effort at sea. 54
4· Obligations of Belligerents When Attacking Enenzy Ve.rsels.
In view of the present status of the law relating to the liability of enemy
vessels to attack it would appear especially important to place the strongest
possible emphasis upon those few specific rules a belligerent is obligated to
comply with in the course of attacking enemy vessels and personnel. In
the standard treatise on naval warfare it is not uncommon to find only the
briefest reference to these rules. It is probable that most writers have
deemed it superfluous to lay emphasis upon what have heretofore been
regarded as almost self-evident prohibitions, as-for example-the prohibition against firing on unarmed and defenseless survivors. It is also
probable that this relative inattention has been due in the past to the
assumption that only in the most unusual circumstances would enemy
vessels other than warships be made the object of direct attack. Unfortunately, however, the circumstances in which enemy merchant vessels
are now held subject to attack are no longer unusual and the excesses committed by belligerents during World War II no longer allow the sanguine
assumption that some prohibitions are too self-evident (and too deeply
ingrained) to require laboring over.
ance of essentially defensive character . . . is notlikely to command general assent." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 49r-2.. On the one hand, then, the belligerent claim to discard
the fundamental distinction between combatants and non-combatants is very nearly acquiesced
in, and the "necessities" imposed by total war conceded. On the other hand, the belligerent
claim to attack enemy merchant vessels without warning, if the latter have been integrated
into the belligerent's military effort, is largely denied, so long as this integration is justified
as having a "defensive character." It should be apparent that the position taken in the text
above is such as to deny the validity of the former claim while at the same time arguing for the
legitimacy of the latter claim.
54 Law of Naval Warfare, Article so3b (3), reads as follows:
''Destruction of enemy merchant vessels prior to capture. Enemy merchant vessels may be
attacked and destroyed, either with or without prior warning, in any of the following
circumstances:
(r) Actively resisting visit and search or capture.
(2.) Refusing to stop upon being duly summoned.
(3) Sailing under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft.
(4) If armed, and there is reason to believe that such armament has been used, or is intended
for use, offensively against an enemy.
(s) If incorporated into, or assisting in any way, the intelligence system of an enemy's
armed forces.
(6) If acting in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an ~nemy's armed forces."
It is believed that this provision does not substantially depart from the requirements of the
traditional law, although it does focus attention upon those recent practices of belligerents
which serve, and have always served, to deprive belligerent merchant vessels of immunity
from attack.
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Article 23 , paragraphs c and d, of the Regulations annexed to Hague
Convention IV (1907) declare that it is especially forbidden to "kill or
wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer
means of defense, has surrendered at discretion" or to "declare that no
quarter will be given." These rules are applicable to hostilities w herever
conducted. Hence, in warfare at sea, it is forbidden to refuse quarter either
to an enemy vessel that clearly indicates a desire to surrender in good faith
or to fire upon the unarmed and defenseless survivors of sunken enemy
vessels. A belligerent is required to use only that degree of force necessary
in order to compel submission of the enemy, force in excess of this requirement being strictly prohibited. In addition, a belligerent is required,
following every engagement at sea, to take all possible measures to search
for and to rescue the shipwrecked and wounded survivors of an enemy and
to protect the latter, as well as the dead, against pillage and ill-treatment. 55
The rules outlined above have long been considered applicable to warships in their conduct toward the naval forces of an enemy. The same
rules must be considered to be especially applicable to warships in their
conduct toward enemy merchant vessels which are-in principle-liable
to attack. Indeed, it is only reasonable to demand that in the case of
enemy merchant vessels a special effort be made by the attacking warship
to cease the attack once active resistance has come to an end and to exert
the utmost endeavor to search for and rescue shipwrecked survivors. 56
55 See Law of Naval Warfare, Arcicle snb and c. The customary prohibition against the unnecessary use of force has already been discussed (see pp. 46-so). On the duty of giving quarter
to enemy vessels, see note 36 to Chapter 5, Law of Naval Warfare. The prohibition against firing
on unarmed and defenseless survivors of sunken enemy vessels forms a part of the customary law.
The obligation to rescue enemy shipwrecked and wounded survivors may also be considered a
rule of customary law though it has received expression first in Article 16 of Hague X (1907)
and more recently in Article 18 of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. In
both conventions the belligerent obligation to rescue shipwrecked and wounded survivors is
qualified. Article 16 of Hague X uses the phrase "so far as military interests permit" whereas
Article 18 of the 1949 Geneva Convention states that: "After each engagement, Parties to the
conflict shall, without delay, take all possible measures to search for and collect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick, to protect them against pillage and ill treatment, to ensure their
adequate care, and to search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled.''
56 These remarks are considered to apply with even greater force in the case of attacks upon
merchant vessels by surface warships. In the Trial of Helmuth von Ruchteschell, (Law Reports • . .
9 (1949), pp. 82.-90) the accused, a commander of a German armed raider, was charged with
committing the following acts against enemy merchant vessels: continuing to fire after the
enemy had indicated surrender; failure to make any provision for the safety of survivors;
and firing at survivors in liferafts. The British Military Court trying the accused found him
guilty of committing the first and second acts, though not the third. In the notes to this case
the following statement occurs:
"Three propositions seem to emerge, either from the utterances of the Judge Advocate or
from the findings of the Court: (1) no war crime is committed if an unwarned attack is made
upon a merchantman who by reason of arms and wireless communication is part of the war
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The position of the submarine (and, even more, of the aircraft) with
respect to the fulfillment of this latter obligation is admittedly a difficult
one. In normal circumstances the submarine has been unable to take on
any appreciable number of survivors. In fact, even the partial attempt to
fulfill the obligation to search for and rescue survivors may result in subjecting the submarine to serious danger from enemy warships and aircraft.
A submarine (or aircraft) commits no violation of the law of war, however,
if after attacking an enemy vessel 57 it is required by reasons of operational
necessity immediately to leave the scene of the attack. The obligation to
search for and rescue survivors is not an absolute one. A belligerent is
required only to take all possible measures to rescue survivors consistent
with his own security. On the other hand, the prohibition against firing
on the defenseless survivors of sunken vessels is not similarly qualified and,
it is believed, cannot be justified by pleading reasons of operational necessity.
The foregoing considerations were involved in those war crimes trials
conducted after World War II which dealt with charges arising under, or
as a result of, the so-called ''Laconia Order.'' This order, issued September
I?, I942, originated from the German U-boat command and was directed
to all German submarine commanders. It ran as follows:
(I) No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members
of ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water and
putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats and handing
over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary
demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.
(~) Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still
apply.
(3) Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements would be of
·
importance for your boat.
effort of the opposing belligerent; (2.) the impunity of attack without warning on a merchantman in these circumstances forms an exception to the general rules of sea warfare and imposes
upon the attacking warship the duty to use only adequate force and not to kill or wound a
greater number of the crew than is reasonably necessary to secure the defeat of the attacked
vessel; (3) as soon as the attacked merchantman is effectively stopped and silenced, all possible
steps must be taken by the raider to rescue the crew" (pp. 87-8). It was further observed that:
"(r) if the raider is aware of survivors who have taken to their lifeboats, he must make. reasonable efforts to rescue them; (2.) it is no defense that the survivors did not draw attention to their
boats if they had reasonable grounds to believe that no quarter was being given'' (p. 88).
According to S. W. Roskill, with the one exception noted above, the captains of German
armed merchant raiders "generally behaved with reasonable humanity towards the crews of
intercepted ships, tried to avoid causing unnecessary loss of life and treated their prisoners.
tolerably" op. cit., p. 2.79. Attacks upon merchant vessels by German raiders were very frequently the result of the merchant vessel's resort to the use of its defensive armament or to an·
insistence upon making use of its wireless in order to report the raider's presence and position.
Under either of these circumstances attack upon the merchant vessel could be considered justified.
57 It is assumed, of course, that the attack upon the enemy vessel is justified.
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(4) Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy has no regard for
women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities. 58
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg found the Laconia
Order ambiguous, and therefore refused to hold the originator of the orderAdmiral Doenitz-guilty of deliberately ordering the killing of shipwrecked
survivors. 59 The ambiguity of the order apparently was considered to stem
from an uncertainty as to whether its intent was only to forbid submarine
commanders from making any attempt to rescue survivors or was intended
to enjoin them deliberately to kill survivors. The International Military
Tribunal seemed to have been of the opinion that if the former interpretation was intended the order was a lawful one. But even this opinion is
doubtful, since the rule in question allows only for circumstances of operational necessity. The most favorable interpretation of the Laconia Order
was that it laid down a policy of no rescue, not solely-or perhaps not even
primarily-for reasons of operational necessity, but because rescue was
deemed to run ''counter to the rudimentary demands of war for the destruction of enemy ships and crews." On this basis alone the unlawful character of the order would seem to be readily apparent. In any event, in two
reported trials held before the British Military Court at Hamburg it was
amply shown that in the course of interpreting and applying the Laconia
Order its supposed ambiguity was resolved in favor of the killing of survtvors. As such, the illegality of the qrder should be placed beyond
question. 60
58 The order was given orally, never in writing.
In the Peleus Trial (Law Reports . . . 1
(1947), p. 5) and the Trial of Karl-Heinz Moehle (Law Reports . . . 9 (1949), p. 75) the accused
confirmed the contents of the order, reproduced above.
59 On this point the Tribunal's judgment declared: "The Tribunal is of the opinion that the
evidence does not establish with the certaintly required that Doenitz deliberately ordered the
killing of shipwrecked survivors. The orders were undoubtedly ambiguous, and deserve the
strongest censure." U. S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, zg46-47, p. 300.
60 In the Trial of Karl-Heinz Moehle the accused, a senior officer of the 5th U-boat Flotilla,
was charged with giving orders "to commanding officers of U-boats who were due to leave
on war patrols that they were to destroy ships and their crews." Law Reports . . . 9 (1949),
p. 75· The orders were given in the form of briefings and were based upon the Laconia Order.
From the sample briefings furnished as evidence at the trial it appeared clear that the Laconia
Order was interpreted in practice as an order to kill survivors. The British Military Court
found the accused guilty of ordering the commission of acts contrary to the law of war. In
the notes on this case it is observed that: "If a submarine commander can, without danger to
his boat, save or succour survivors, he is no doubt under a duty to do so. If, however, by so
doing he would endanger his boat he cannot be held responsible if he does not save any such
survivors since it is recognized that the safety of his own boat and its crew must be his primary
consideration. It is clearly recognised, on the other hand, that the killing of defenceless
survivors of a torpedoed ship is a war crime" (p. So).
In the Peleus Trial the commanding officer of a German submarine was charged with having
given orders to fire on the survivors of the steamship Peleus. In presenting his defense the accused quoted the Laconia Order, though he did not plead superior orders. The principal
defense plea was that the order to fire on the rafts containing survivors was an operational
necessity, and by destroying all evidence of the sinking pursuit of the submarine was made less
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D. THE SEIZURE OF ENEMY VESSELS AND GOODS
Unless specially protected by a rule of customary or conventional international law all vessels and goods encountered at sea in time of war are
liable to seizure and to subsequent condemnation if impressed with an
enemy character. In this respect the conduct of naval warfare is to be
distinguished from the methods characterizing land warfare, where the
private property of the enemy population may not-as a general rule-be
seized and confiscated. There is no need to deal here with the arguments
both for and against this belligerent right in warfare at sea to seize the
private property of an enemy. It is sufficient merely to note that despite
a substantial opposition during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries to the retention of this right, an opposition led very largely by
the United States, there has been no general disposition on the part of
naval powers to relinquish a practice as old as naval warfare itself. 61 If
probable. In finding the accused guilty the court rejected the plea that the order was operationally necessary under the given circumstances. It is not possible to determine, however,
whether the court was of the opinion that circumstances constituting a condition of operational
necessity could ever serve, in law, to justify the act of killing helpless survivors. In the notes
on this case it is stated that: "The case contains . . . no decision on the question whether or to
what extent operational necessity legalises acts of cruelty such as shooting at helpless survivors of a sunken ship because on the facts of the case this behaviour was not operationally
necessary, i. e. the operational aim, the saving of ship and crew, could have been achieved
more effectively without such acts of cruelty." Law Reports . . . I (1947), p. 16. However
it seems clear that this latter question must be answered in the negative.
61 A useful summary of earlier arguments for and against the retention of the belligerent
right to seize and condemn the private property of enemy subjects may be found in U. S. Naval
War College, International Law Topics, I90f, pp. 9-2.0. Hyde (op. cit., pp. 2.05~63) contains a
brief review of the traditional American position, citing the proposal urged by the American
delegation at the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, which declared that: "The private property
of all citizens or subjects of the signatory Powers, with the exception of contraband of war
shall be exempt from capture or seizure on the sea by the armed vessels or by the military forces
of any of the said signatory Powers. But nothing herein contained shall extend exemption
from seizure to vessels and their cargoes which may attempt to enter a port blockaded by the
naval forces of any of the said Powers." And in a recent review of the inactivity since the
Spanish-American War of American courts sitting in prize it has been stated that: "The history
of the matter shows that the policy of the United States has tended to avoid resort to capture
· and prize, and to substitute for the form, if not always the whole substance of the doctrine,
gentler legal devices, such as requisition for use or title upon promise or payment of just compensation . . . . Thus our country has maintained its position of endeavoring to lead the world
towards a general law or rule of immunity from capture or destruction of peaceful merchantmen
and cargoes not contraband." A. W. Knauth, "Prize Law Reconsidered," Colttmbia Law Review,
46 (1946), p. 86. It may be relevant to observe, however, that the conditions attending American
participation in the two World Wars are not so easily interpreted as 3: reluctance "to abandon
the great reform." The device of requisition for use or title upon promise or payment of just
compensation was used almost exclusively with respect to enemy merchant vessels caught in.
American ports at the outbreak of hostilities-and it may still be contended that such vessels
ought to be given special consideration (see pp. 86-90). With respect to enemy merchant vessels
encountered at sea, any conclusions drawn must be extremely tentative. In both World \\ ars
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anything, recent belligerent practice has moved in the contrary direction
of restricting-and, in certain instances, invalidating entirely-the application of the few rules formed y granting certain enemy vessels and goods
exemption from seizure. However this may be, the liability of vessels and
goods to seizure in naval warfare depends, in the first instance, merely upon
the fact that such vessels and goods possess an enemy character. This
being so, the determination of enemy character in relation to vessels and
cargoes may be taken as the starting point of an inquiry into the nature
and scope of the belligerent right to seize enemy property at sea. 62
German merchant shipping was-by the time America became a belligerent-almost nonexistent
in any event. And during World War II the methods pursued in the Pacific hardly pointed
toward any practice save that of unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against Japanese
merchant shipping (see pp. 661). It may also be noted that in both World Wars neutral shipping no longer remained a major problem by the time America entered as a belligerent. These,
and other, circumstances surely render hazardous any interpretation of the possible lines of
action this country might pursue in the future if involved in hostilities at sea against a major
maritime Power-and given the task of controlling substantial neutral trade.
62 In a broader sense, of course, the belligerent right of seizure in naval warfare also extends
to vessels and cargoes bearing a neutral character. Normally, however, neutral commerce is
exempt from belligerent interference, and liability to seizure arises only from the performance
of acts-contraband carriage, blockade breach, unneutral service-belligerents have a right
to prevent according to international law. In the case of enemy vessels and goods, liability to
seizure and confiscation follows simply from the character of the property, and requires no
further justification (except, perhaps, to establish that the property does not come within a
category given special protection from seizure). The law of prize therefore encompasses the
totality of the rules governing the belligerent right to seize and to condemn privately owned
vessels and cargoes, whether of enemy or of neutral subjects.
Attention may once again be called to a point earlier made in the Foreword, that a detailed
examination of prize law does not form one of the purposes of the present study. In the immediate section (D) of this Chapter, as well as in Chapters IX through XII, the attempt is
made to indicate only in broad outline those rules which determine both the substantive grounds
for capture and what are generally considered the procedural rules regulating the conduct of
visit, search and seizure. No endeavor is made, however, to examine the nature and organization of belligerent prize courts, or the procedural rules applied by these courts-save perhaps
where these rules have had, as in the case of contraband (see pp. 2.7o-6), a marked impact in
extending the belligerent's control over neutral trade. It will also be apparent that emphasis
has been placed primarily upon British Prize Law since 1914-or rather the interpretation
given the law of prize by the British prize courts during the two World Wars. The justification
for this emphasis may be based not only upon the fact that the British decisions have been the
most numerous and by far the most influential but also upon the conjecture that if the United
States should in the future resort to prize proceedings-admittedly an unlikely contingencyAmerican prize courts would in all probability lean heavily upon these decisions.
The principal studies of prize law developments during World War I are J. H. \V. Verzijl,
Le Droit Des Prises De la Grande Guerre (192.4); J. W. Garner, Prize Law During the World War
(192.7); and C. J. Colombos, A Treatise on the Law of Prize (3rd. ed., 1949). The work by Colombos
is particularly useful since it includes the significant decisions of the 1939 War. And on World
War II see also S. W. D. Rowson, "Prize Law During The Second World War," B. Y. I. L.,
2.4 (r947), pp. r6o-2.15 and A. Gervais (for a review of French, British, Italian.,.and German
prize decisions) in Revue Generate de Droit International Puhlic, Vols. 52. (r948), pp.- 82.-161;
53 ( 1949), PP· 2.01-75; 54 (1950), PP· 2.51-316, 453-504; and 55 (1951), pp. 481-546. An
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Enemy Character.
a. Vessels.
Normally, the enemy or neutral character of a vessel is determined by the
flag which she has. the right to fly. A vessel entitled to fly the flag of an
enemy state and therefore having an enemy nationality may be regarded in
every instance as bearing enemy character. But although the owners of a
vessel are always bound by the flag they have chosen to adopt, belligerents
are not so bound in determining the neutral or enemy character of a vessel.
For the practice of states is clear that even though entitled to fly a neutral
flag-and thus possessing a neutral nationality-a vessel may nevertheless
be considered as impressed with an enemy character. 63 The neutral flag
cannot serve as a device to protect vessels from seizure whose actual status.
indicates either continued ownership or control by individuals who themselves possess enemy character. 64
I .

invaluable summary of the more significant World War II prize cases may be found in the
Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases (ed. by H. Lauterpacht), 1938-48.
Finally, among general treatises on the law of war special mention should be made of the
stimulating and thoroughly up to date analysis given in Stone, op. cit., pp. 457 ff.
63 It is therefore important that a clear distinction be drawn between the neutral or enemy
nationality and the neutral or enemy character of vessels. The former-nationality-is determined
by the flag a vessel has the right to fly, and the conditions of this right are directly determined
by the municipal law of each maritime state. But the latter-character-is a matter solely
within the province of international law, and international law may or may not make the
character of a vessel coincide with its nationality. In point of fact, international law does not
identify the two.
In this connection the relevant provisions of the 1909 Declaration of London deserve passing
mention. Article 57 of that unratified instrument declared:
"Subject to the provisions respecting the transfer of flag, the neutral or enemy character of
a vessel is determined by the flag which she has the right to fly.
"The case in which a neutral vessel is engaged in a trade which is reserved in time of peace,
remains outside the scope of, and is in nowise affected by, this rule."
Article 57 thereby made the nationality of a vessel the principal test for determining its
character. Three exceptions were provided for, however. The first concerned the fraudulent
transfer of flag, dealt with in Articles 55 and 56. The second, mentioned in paragraph 2 of
Article 57, refers to the so called "Rule of 1756," which holds that neutral merchant vessels
acquire enemy character if in time of war they engage in a trade the enemy state exclusively
reserves in time of peace to merchant vessels flying its own flag. According to the practice
of several states the neutral vessel accepting this privilege from a belligerent thereby becomes
so closely identified with the belligerent as to lose its neutral character. Finally, and not
mentioned in Article 57, neutral vessels performing certain types of unneutral service~ for a
belligerent thereby became impressed with enemy character-according to Article 46-and
liable to the same treatment as enemy merchantmen.
64 See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 501, which abandons entirely the "right to fly" formula,
it now being clear that flying the enemy flag is conclusive evidence of enemy character regardless
of whether or not a vessel has the right to do so. Of course, the principal defect of Article 57
of the Declaration of London-at least from the belligerents' viewpoint-was the exclusion ·
of ownership as a criterion for the determination of enemy character. During World War I
a number of neutral states, including the United States, nevertheless persisted in considering
Article 57 as accurately reflecting the law governing enemy character of vessels. But the prac-
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In addition, a merchant vessel though entitled to fly a neutral flag may
nevertheless forfeit its neutral character by undertaking to perform any one
of several services on behalf of a belligerent. In a later chapter these actsgenerally considered under the heading of "unneutral service"-are examined in some detail. 65 Here it is sufficient to observe that the more
serious forms of unneutral service may so iden~ify merchant vessels of
neutral nationality with the armed forces of an enemy as to expose such
vessels to the same treatment as is meted out to enemy warships. Thus
merchant vessels of neutral nationality which tak~ a direct part in hostilities on the side of an enemy or act in any capacity as a naval or military
auxiliary to an enemy's armed forces not only acquire enemy character but
are liable to the same treatment as enemy warships. 66 Further, neutral
merchant vessels may acquire enemy character and be made liable to the same
treatment as enemy merchant vessels if found operating directly under
enemy orders, employment, or direction. 67 Finally, it is customary to
rice of belligerents in both World Wars has made sufficiently clear that they are not prepared
to refrain from the seizure and condemnation of vessels whose ownership is vested in individuals
(or corporations) possessed of enemy character.-The attitude of the British Prize Court was
best set forth in the following passage:
"It is a settled rule of prize law, based on the principles upon which Courts of Prize act,
that they will penetrate through and beyond forms and technicalities to the facts and realities.
This rule, when applied to questions of the ownership of vessels, means that the Court is not
bound to determine the neutral or enemy character of a vessel according to the flag she is flying,
or may be entitled to fly, at the time of capture. The owners are bound by the flag which they
have chosen to adopt; but the captors as against them are not so bound." The Hamborn [r9r8],
7 Lloyds Prize Cases, p. 62..
The criteria for determining the enemy character of the owners of a vessel are considered in
connection with the discussion of the criteria for determining the enemy character of goods
generally (see pp. Sr-4).
65 See Chapter XI.
66 Law of Naval Warfare, Article sora.
Also, see pp. 319--2.r, for a more detailed discussion.
67 Law of Naval Warfare, Article sorb. See pp. 32.2.-3 for a more detailed discussion. Parenthetically, it may be noted here, though in later pages this point is developed more fully,
that not all acts falling under the category of unneutral service result in impressing enemy
character upon a vessel. There are certain acts of unneutral service which, when performed by
neutral vessels, result only in a liability to seizure in the same manner as for the carriage of
contraband or breach of blockade (see Law of Naval Wa1jare, Article 503d (3), (4), and also
pp. 32.4-3r). But these acts do not of themselves result in the acquisition of enemy character
on the part of the vessel performing them, just as the acts of contraband carriage and blockade
breach do not of themselves result in impressing an enemy character upon the vessel performing
them.
Now it may be contended-and with a certain merit-that the differences required by the
traditional law in the treatment of vessels bearing an enemy character (see pp. ro2.-8) and the
treatment of vessels retaining a neutral character(see pp. 347-53) are no longer very considerable.
It is true that the treatment of cargo carried on board a seized vessel differed according to whether
the status of the vessel was enemy or neutral, though this difference too is no longer very significant. Even further, although the destruction of neutral prizes following seizure is a far more
serious measure than is the destruction of enemy vessels, the former may admittedly be destroyed
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consider a merchant vessel of neutral nationality as acquiring enemy character if it resists the exercise of the legitimate belligerent right of visit and
search. 68
(i) Transfer of Flag
The imminence of hostilities or the actual outbreak of war is generally
productive of attempts on the part of the owners of vessels possessing
enemy character to avoid the risk of seizure and confiscation by transferring
such vessels to a neutral flag. It is universally acknowledged that although
the transfer of a vessel from an enemy to a neutral flag may take place in
accordance with the municipal law of the neutral state international law
may nevertheless regard the transfer as fraudulent and not serving to divest
the vessel of its enemy character. The general principle involved is clear:
the fraudulent transfer of vessels, a matter determined by international
law, cannot serve to defeat the rights of a belligerent. But the detailed
application of this principle is quite another matter, and states have long
disagreed upon the specific conditions that must be satisfied before vessels
can be regarded as properly divested of enemy character.
It has been observed that the traditional view maintained in this matter
by the United States is that "a neutral national may lawfully purchase a
private ship under a belligerent flag and thereby acquire a title to be respected by the enemy of the State of the vendor, provided the transaction
is a bona fide one, by the terms of which no right to purchase or recover the
vessel is reserved to the seller, and the price paid gives evidence of a reasonable sacrifice by the purchaser. Other considerations, such as the motives
impelling a sale have not been deemed to be decisive of the validity of the
transaction." 69 A substantially similar view, enphasing the bona fide
in circumstances of exceptional·necessity. Hence, the differences in this latter respect, while
not to be lightly brushed aside, should not be exaggerated.
However, the significant and rather unexpected point is that in view of the increasing liability
of enemy merchant vessels to attack (see pp. 67-70), the importance of clearly distinguishing
between neutral merchant vessels acquiring and neutral vessels not acquiring enemy character
becomes even more imperative than previously. For if the law may now be considered as
permitting-under certain circumstances-the sinking without warning of enemy merchant
vessels, special caution must be exercised in making clear precisely those vessels either possessing
enemy character or acquiring such character by the performance of certain acts. The consequences of even a partial abandonment of the heretofore valid rule requiring warships (whether
surface or submarine) to refrain from sinking any merchant vessels without having first placed
passengers and crew in a place of safety are sufficiently grave to warrant a very careful discrimination between enemy vessels, including neutral vessels acquiring enemy character, to· which
this partial abandonment applies, and neutral vessels, which may perform prohibited acts
(e. g., contraband carriage) but which do not acquire by these actions enemy character.
68 Strictly speaking, the act of resisting visit and search does not fall within the category of
unneutral service, though it nevertheless results in a neutral vessel acquiring enemy character;
69 Hyde, op. cit., pp. 2078-9, and sources cited therein.
Paragraph 58 of the 1917 Instructions.
issued to the U. S. Navy declared :
"The transfer of a private vessel of a belligerent to a neutral flag during war is valid if in
accordance with the laws of the State of the vendor and of the vendee, provided that it is made
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and absolute character of the transfer of a vessel from enemy to neutral
ownership, has long been endorsed by Great Britain. 70
On the other hand, the traditional practice of certain of the continental
European states, and notably France, has been to refuse to recognize the
validity of any transfer made from an enemy to a neutral flag in time of
war, though treating such transfers as were made prior to the outbreak of
hostilities as valid merely if carried out in accordance with the laws of the
state of the vendor and vendee.
In retrospect, it is clear that the provisions of the 1909 Declaration of
London relating to the transfer of flag did not successfully meet the difficulties posed by these divergent practices. The relevant articles of that
instrument provided for a distinction to be drawn between the transfer of
an enemy vessel to a neutral flag when effected shortly before the opening
of hostilities and transfer when effected after the outbreak of war. In both
in good faith and is accompanied by a payment sufficient in amount to leave no doubt of good
faith; that it is absolute and unconditional, with a complete divestiture of title by the vendor,
with no continued interest, direct or indirect, of the vendor, and with no right of repurchase
by him; and that the ship does not remain in her old employment."
This provision was substantially repeated in paragraph 64 of the 1941 Instructions. There
is no reason to believe that the above quoted provision does not still remain the position of this
country, the United States having never endorsed the principles-discussed below-concerning
transfer of flag provided for in the Declaration of London. As regards the transfer to a neutral
flag before hostilities, both the 1917 and 1941 Instructions merely declared such transfer to be
valid provided it was made in accordance with the laws of the state of the vendor and the
state of the vendee. But this provision must be considered along with this country 's endorsement-as reflected in earlier manuals-of Article 57 of the Declaration of London. Simply
· stated, this led to the position that so long as a belligerent vessel was transferred to a neutral
flag prior to the outbreak of war, and in accordance with the municipal law of the neutral state,
such vessel enjoyed a neutral character once war broke out. Thus the requirements demanded
of transfer made prior to hostilities were different from, and exceedingly more liberal, than the
requirements made for transfer during war. The present validity of this distinction must be
doubted, however, if only for the reason that Article 57 of the Declaration of London can no
longer be regarded as valid. If anything, it would appear that the test heretofore established
in American practice for determining the validity of transfers made during war is equally
applicable to transfers made immediately prior to the commencement of hostilities.
On October 3, 1939 the Panama meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics
resolved that the latter: ''Shall consider as lawful the transfer of the flag of a merchant vessel
to that of any American Republic provided such transfer is made in good faith, without agreement for resale to the vendor, and that it takes place in the waters of an American Republic."
A.]. I. L., 34 (1940), Supp., p. II. Also see Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 52-4-41.
70 "From the British point of view, transfers of vessels during the war are not per se invalid,
but the belligerent is entitled to inquire into the transaction in order to determine whether it
was made in fraud of his rights and whether there has been an effective divestment of enemy
title and an effective vesting in the neutral owner." Colombos, op. cit., p. 105. In practice,
this has been interpreted to mean that the seller must not retain any interest in the vessel, or
any right to repurchase or recover the vessel following the termination of the war. Still
further, British practice forbids transfer while in a blockaded port or while the vessel is in
transitu (though once having reached port and taken possession of by a neutral owner the
voyage has been regarded as terminated).
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instances transfer from an enemy to a neutral flag was to be considered void
if made ' ' in order to evade the consequences which the enemy character
of the vessel would involve." However, for transfers made immediately
prior to hostilities the burden of proving such a purpose was placed upon
the captors, whereas for transfers made during the period of war the claimant was obliged to displace the presumption that transfer was made in order
to avoid seizure. This principal test was further supplemented by. a number of related presumptions. 71
These provisions constituted an obvious attempt to compromise differences in state practice already noted. However, the manner in which they
were formulated was such as to allow a considerable latitude in interpretation, and during World War I belligerents-or at least those belligerents
professing to follow the Declaration of London-did not hesitate to resort
to that interpretation most nearly in accord with their traditional practice. 72
7l Thus according to Article 55 of the Declaration, an absolute presumption of a valid transfer
was to be made if the transfer was effected more than thirty days before hostilities and was
absolute, complete, conformed to the laws of the countries concerned, and the former owners
were divested both of control and of earnings. But a rebuttable presumption that the transfer
was void resulted if the bill of sale was not found on board a vessel that lost her belligerent
nationality less than sixty days before the opening of hostilities.
According to Article 56 an absolute presumption that transfer-in time of war-was void
followed if the transfer was made during a voyage or in a blockaded port, if the vendor retained
a right of redemption or of revision, or if the requirements for a valid transfer laid down by the
municipal law of the flag state were not observed.
72 A rigorous interpretation of the stipulation that transfer was void if made in order to
"evade the consequences which the enemy character of the vessel would involve" easily served
to render wartime transfers practically impossible. Thus the position of France and Germany
was that this injunction applied to the intentions of both the seller and the purchaser. Since
the motives of the former are necessarily suspect it is at best an extremely difficult task for a
claimant to establish that the transferor's motives were not to "evade the consequences" of
enemy character, particularly when the acts held to constitute an evasion of the consequences
of enemy character were never clarified or made the object of common agreement.-The well
known case of The Dacia, decided by the French Prize Council in August 1915, indicated the
French interpretation of Article 56 of the Declaration of London. The Dacia, a German merchant
vessel purchased by an American citizen, and transferred to American registry while lying in
an American port, was seized by a French cruiser on a voyage from Port Arthur, Texas, to
Rotterdam. The cargo carried was destined for Bremen. Earlier, the French Government had
notified the American Government that it would not recognize the validity of any transfer
of German vessels lying in American ports to American registry. In condemning the Dacia,
the French Prize Council asserted that the American owner had failed to establish-as r~quired
by Article 56-that the German transferor had not sold the vessel in order to "evade the consequences'' of enemy character. Even further, the Prize Council declared that a transfer could
be regarded as valid "only if there was reason to believe that it would have been effected just
the same had the war not occurred . . . . " For translation of The Dacia; see A.]. I. L., 9 (1915),
pp. 1015-2.6. The French Council of State, on appeal, upheld the decision of the Prize Council.
and in doing so made the same point. In effect, then, this interpretation-also made by Ger- ·
many-placed an impossible burden upon claimants. In the case of The Dacia, hmyever, the
Prize Council did lay emphasis upon the additional circumstance that the vessel was engaged
in a trade "for which it had been chartered when it was under the German flag, and in view
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At present, then, the disparate rules governing the transfer of vessels
from an enemy to a neutral flag remain roughly what they had been prior
to the Declaration of London. So far as Anglo-American practice is concerned this would appear to mean that transfers effected either immediately
prior to or following the outbreak of war will be-in principle-recognized
as valid if made in good faith by the purchaser and if resulting in the
complete divestiture of enemy ownership and control. However, it
remains to be emphasized that the very circumstances normally attending
the transfer of vessels in time of war are such that belligerents and belligerent prize courts will subject such transfers to the most careful investigation. It also seems clear that in this process the burden of proving that
the divestiture of enemy ownership in and control over a vessel has been
complete and genuine rests largely upon the claimant. 73
b. Goods (Cargoes)
Whereas in the case of vessels the fact of ownership serves as a supplementary criterion for determining ·neutral or enemy character, in the case
of cargoes ownership becomes the principal test. But although it is
recognized that the neutral or enemy character of goods is dependent upon
the neutral or enemy character of the owners, states have differed in the
tests they have established for determining the enemy character of individuals. The 1909 Declaration of London failed to resolve the traditional
disparities in state practice, being limited to an endorsement of the customary rule that all goods found on board enemy merchant vessels are
presumed to have an enemy character unless proof of neutral character is
furnished by the owners. With respect to the central question, however,
the Declaration merely provided that the enemy character of goods is
determined by the enemy character of the owners, thereby selecting neither
the "territorial" test, adhered to by the United States and Great Britain,
of which it had been transferred to a neutral flag; such transfer to a neutral flag with the object
of carrying on enemy trade and protecting the ship from capture cannot be valid against belligerents.'' This latter point does appear to offer a clear basis for the voidance of transfer and
to provide sufficient indication that transfer was not made in ''good faith. ''-For the diplomatic
correspondence on the Dacia, see U. S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, I9J4,
PP· 7- 17· .
In contrast to France and Germany, Great Britain applied a liberal interpretation to Article 56
and one that accorded with her previous practice. Thus in The Edna, [1919]-(9 Lloyds Prize
Cases, p. 70) the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council declared that Article 56 was intended
to prevent colorable or fictitious transfers and that the only change made by this Article was
to place the burden of proving a bona fide transfer upon the purchaser. But the latter is under
no obligation to establish the motives-innocent or otherwise-of the seller.
73 It should be apparent that the task of ascertaining whether or not a transfer does satisfy
the requirements demanded by Anglo-American practice is one suited to a court of prize and not
to belligerent commanders undertaking visit and search. Save in exceptional circumstances
the latter may treat the fact of transfer from an enemy to a neutral flag as sufficient cause for
seizure, leaving the ultimate determination of the vessel's status to the prize court.
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nor the ''nationality'' test, followed by France and other continental
powers. 74
It has frequently been observed that the true purpose of the belligerent
right to seize enemy goods at sea is to prevent an opponent from retaining
a control over any trade that will serve to augment his economy and thus
enable him the more effectively to conduct war. From this point of view
it is neither the possession of enemy nationality nor the subjective attachment to the cause of an enemy state that-in itself-provides sufficient
reason for the confiscation of an individual's goods on the ground that they
are impressed with an enetny character. Instead, it is the existence of an
objective relationship between the trade of an individual-whatever his
nationality or allegiance-and the territory belonging to or occupied by
the enemy; a relationship the result of which is to subject the property of
an individual to the control of the enemy, thereby increasing the latter's
potential for waging war.
This is, at any rate, the rationale upon which Anglo-American practice
may be said to have developed. The test for determining the neutral or
enemy character of an individual, at least so far as the determination of the
character of goods is concerned, is made dependent upon what is commonly
termed the individual's "commercial (trade) domicile." 75 Even though
of non-enemy nationality, an individual is regarded as having a hostile
commercial domicile if he resides in terri tory belonging to or occupied by
an enemy. In consequence, all goods belonging to the subjects of neutral
states who reside and carry on trade in enemy territory bear an enemy
character; and the same holds true for the goods belonging to the subjects
of a belligerent, or of the belligerent's allies, resident in the territory of an
enemy and remaining there following the outbreak of war. Conversely,
through residence in a neutral state (or in the territory of the belligerent or
of an ally) an individual of enemy nationality may so remove himself and
his commercial activities from enemy territory and control as to obtain a
neutral (or friendly) commercial domicile and to no longer warrant treating
his property as impressed with an enemy character.
Furthermore, it may be that a neutral subject, though residing in neutral
territory, has an interest in a house of trade that is established and doing
business in or from an enemy state. In this event the goods he owns as a
result of such commercial enterprises in the enemy country are impressed
with an enemy character, the neutral owner being considered as acquiring
an enemy commercial domicile with respect to-though only with respect
to-his assets in the enemy house of trade. The enemy character that is
imputed to goods in this instance follows from the connection held to o~
tain between the latter and enemy terri tory; a relationship that is considered
And, by implication, thereby sanctioning both tests.
See Article 633a, Law of Naval Warfare-which follows a parallel provision found in both
the 1917 and 1941 Instructions.
74
75
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to increase the enemy's resources. It is this relationship rather than the
actual residence of the neutral owner that is held to be decisive here. On
the other hand, the converse situation does not hold true, for the doctrine
of commercial domicile does not exempt from enemy character the goods of
individuals permanently resident in an enemy country though having a
house of trade in a neutral state. 76 Last of all, mention should be made of
the special rule relating to articles which form part of the produce of enemy
soil. According to American and British practice goods which are the products of the soil of an enemy country and which are.shipped therefrom after
76 The above remarks constitute no more than the barest summary of the principal lines
of development that the territorial test has taken in its application to cargoes owned by
individual traders. To these remarks some additional observations may be appended in
this note.-In British prize law a distinction is drawn between the acquisition of a neutral
or friendly commercial domicile and of a hostile commercial domicile. With respect to
the former, residence is an essential elemen~, and although it is not possible to lay down
a general rule covering all cases it is at least clear that the residence required must be of a
fairly permanent character. But a hostile commercial domicile may be acquired either by
residing and trading in an enemy state or simply by having an interest in a business established in hostile country. Thus in the Anglo-Mexican [1918], Lord Parker declared on behalf of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that "a neutral wherever resident may,
if he owns or is a partner in a house of business trading in or from an enemy country, be
properly deemed an enemy in respect of his property or interest in such business. He acquires
by virtue of the business a commercial domicile in the country in or from which the business
is carried on, and this commercial domicile, though it does not affect his property generally,
will affect the assets of the business house or his interest therein with an enemy character."
5 Lloyds Prize Cases, pp. 113-14. However, in the case of a hostile commercial domicile acquired by residing and trading in hostile country, enemy character is imputed to an individual's
goods wherever situate (i. e., whether in hostile, neutral or friendly territory). Nor have
individuals acquiring a hostile commercial domicile through residing in enemy territory been
allowed a period of grace, upon the outbreak of hostilities, in which to abandon their acquired
domicile (though such abandonment may be taken by an unequivocal act, following which the
goods of neutral individuals will not be considered as any longer impressed with enemy character
and liable to capture). But in the case of neutral subjects resident in neutral territory and
partners in an enemy house of trade it is only the assets owned as a result of the interest in the
enemy house of trade that have been considered impressed with enemy character. Furthermore,
in this instance practice has been to allow neutral subjects a reasonable period of time in which
to break off their enemy interests. Indeed, it is only by a kind of projection of the concept of
commercial domicile that it is used to cover the case of being a partner in an enemy house of
trade though without being actually resident in hostile country.
Where the ownership of cargoes (and vessels) is vested in a corporate entity rather than in
an individual the application of the territorial test must of necessity undergo certain modifications, and here again it is British practice that has pointed the way. It is clear, to begin with,
that a corporation will be impressed with an enemy character, and its property rendered liable
to seizure, if its place of incorporation is within hostile country. Nor will the imputation of
enemy character to a corporation thus having an enemy nationality be affected by the fact that
those who own or control the enterprise are made up largely of neutral nationals residing in
neutral territory. In addition, a corporation, even though its place of incorporation is within
neutral territory, may be considered as possessing an enemy character if it is substantially owned
and controlled by individuals who themselves bear enemy character-this at least according
to the British view.
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the outbreak of war are impressed with an enemy character even though the
owner of the goods may be domiciled or resident in a neutral country.
In contrast with the territorial test is the test traditionally applied by
France and other continental states which emphasizes the nationality of
the owner of goods as the decisive criterion for determining the neutral or
enemy character of cargoes. In applying the nationality test goods belonging to the subjects of an enemy state are impressed with an enemy
character, despite the fact that the owners may be permanently resident in
neutral territory; and if found on board enemy merchantmen such goods
are always considered liable to capture. Conversely, goods owned by the
subjects of a neutral state normally do not bear enemy character-again
according to the nationality test-despite the fact that the owners may be
residing in enemy territory. 77
It is now generally recognized, however, that the experience of the two World Wars has
demonstrated that the traditional divergence between the territorial and the nationality test
has lost a substantial measure of its former significance. In practice, many of the belligerents
refrained from a rigid adherence to either test, but sought to effect a combination of both.
Nor can it be said that a belligerent acts in violation of international law by applying both
tests, should the particular circumstances attending a war render such behavior expedient.
See, for example, Hyde, op. cit., pp. 2.09o-r. At the same time, the importance that may be
attached to belligerent practice in this respect during the two World Wars is difficult to assess,
since much of the "evidence" that belligerents are in fact abandoning an exclusive adherence to
either the territorial or the nationality tests has been found in belligerent "trading with the
enemy" acts. At the outbreak of war every belligerent is at liberty to prevent its subjects,
as well as other individuals residing within its territory, from carrying on any intercoursecommercial or otherwise-with the enemy. Such prohibition may extend not merely to all
persons residing in the enemy state but to enemy nationals residing abroad in neutral states and
even to individuals-regardless of nationality and residence-found to have an association with
the enemy. During World War I Great Britain's Trading With the Enemy Act authorized
the Government to forbid trade not only with all persons residing in an enemy state but also
with any person not resident in enemy territory whenever such prohibition appeared expedient
"by reason of the enemy nationality or enemy association of such persons." In accordance
with this Act so-called "black-lists" were made up containing the names of individuals, many
of them residing in neutral states, with whom trading was deemed unlawful. As a neutral
the United States protested against the British black-lists, though upon becoming a belligerent
it resorted to similar measures. France, on. the other hand, in addition to forbidding trade
with enemy subjects wherever resident also prohibited trade with non-enemy subjects residing
in enemy territory.-In World War II the belligerents once again resorted to similar measures
in their trading with the enemy legislation. For the text of Great Britain's Trading With
the Enemy Act, 1939, see A.]. I. L., 36 (r942.), Supp., pp. 3-r2.. The United States' Trading
with the Enemy Act, r9r7, is given in A.]. I. L., r2. (r9r8), Supp., pp. 2.74 ff., and the.World
War II amendments in A. ]. I. L., 36 (r942.), Supp., pp. 56-8. In effect, then, these states
adopted both the territorial and the nationality tests for determining enemy character in their
trading with the enemy legislation. Nevertheless, such legislation .is mainly a matter of
municipal law rather than of international law; it places restraints upon the subjects of the·
belligerent and all other persons residing within its territory and provides appropriate penalties .
in the event these restrictions are broken. There is nothing to prevent a belligerent from taking·
such measures. Nor does there appear any solid basis in international law for neutral protests
against these measures simply for the reason that the belligerent has forbidden its subject~
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(i) Transfer of Goods at Sea
Although the character of goods seized at sea is normally dependent
upon the character of the owners, difficulties may frequently arise in determining who are the true owners at the time of seizure. 78 It is generally
acknowledged that with respect to goods sold prior to, and without
anticipation of, hostilities, the question whether or not ownership in the
goods has passed from seller to buyer at the time of seizure is one that may
be determined either in accordance with the municipal law of the parties
involved in the transaction or in accordance with the municipal law of the
captor. 79
Quite different considerations 80 govern the transfer of goods when made
after the outbreak of war or in contemplation of hostilities. Were the
municipal law governing the passing of property to remain applicable to
these latter cases of transfer, and to determine the neutral or enemy character of goods, risk of confiscation would be rendered negligible so long as
ownership in goods being shipped from neutral to enemy or from enemy to
neutral could remain vested in neutral hands. In the case of goods being
from trading with individuals, residing in neutral territory, known to be either of enemy
nationality or to have enemy associations. To this extent American protests against the
British "black-lists" during World War I appear misplaced. Even further, Great Britain was
well within her lawful rights as a belligerent in taking other discriminatory measures against
the vessels belonging to individuals residing in neutral territory though placed on the statutory
lists, e. g., in refusing to allow such vessels to be insured by British companies or in denying
to them the facilities of British controlled ports. But it should be emphasized that the "enemy
character" imputed to individuals in trading with the enemy legislation has been relevant
only for those purposes already noted, not for the purpose of determining whether the goods
of such individuals are impressed with an enemy character and therefore liable to seizure as
lawful prize. In this latter sense Great Britain and the United States have yet to depart from
the territorial test, though it is true that the scope of this test has been limited by virtue of
other belligerent measures.
78 And it is ownership in the goods at the time of seizure that is decisive in determining their
neutral or enemy character. The right of belligerents to confiscate cargoes (and vessels)
thus owned by individuals or corporations endowed with enemy character is not affected by
any special rights that may be attached to the seized enemy property, and recognized by municipal law, e. g., mortgages, liens, etc. On this point the practice of prize courts is uniform,
it being recognized that to allow such special claims by neutrals would doubtless render the
belligerent right to seize enemy property at sea of very little value.
79 The captor may therefore determine the question of ownership by the law of sale applicable
in his own state. Generally speaking, the delivery of goods on board a vessel is normally
considered as equivalent to their delivery to the consignee, the latter thereby accepting the risk
and the right to dispose of the goods. But this need not be the case, and the decisions of
prize courts-particularly the British, which apply the English law governing the sale of
goods-are clear that ownership can be determined only by an inquiry into the intentions of
the parties and the terms governing each particular contract for the sale of goods. For an
enlightening commentary on some of the recent problems arising in English practice, see Stone,
op. cit., pp. 469-70, 475-7·
80
Here again it is British prize decisions that provide the substantial basis for the remarks
to follow, though this practice is shared in varying degrees by other states and particularly
the United States.
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transferred from a neutral to an enemy this result is prevented by the
establishf"d practice of considering such goods as impressed with enemy
character during the entire period of transit. Nor does it matter that
according to the strict terms of the sale the property is not to pass into
enemy hands until the time delivery has been made and actual possession
of the goods has been taken. 81 In addition, there is the principle governing
converse cases involving transfer of propel ty from enemy to neutral, and
according to which a belligerent may seize such goods while in transitalthough title to the goods has already passed to the neutral-if the transfer
is deemed to be fraudulent, i. e., entered into for the purpose of defeating
the rights of the captor. 82 This is almost always considered to be the case
if transfer of title to enemy goods is carried out once the goods ate already
at sea. 83 But quite apart from this special case the transfer of title to goods
in transit from enemy to neutral, however clear, cannot operate against
the captor if fraudulently made. And while it may be open to the neutral
claimant to disprove any presumption o+ fraud against the captor the
practical effect of the foregoing rule, as well as the rule governing the
transfer of goods from neutral to enemy, is to regard all goods in transitwhether from neutral to enemy or from enemy to neutral-as enemy
property. 84
It should be made clear, io conclusion, that the preceding rules are always
relevant to the transfer of title in goods found on enemy vessels. The extent
to which they will prove applicable to the transfer of goods on neutral vessels must depend, of course, upon whether or not the rule of" free ships, free
goods" is being observed by belligerents. 85
2..

Enemy Property Exempt From Seizure

a. Enemy Vessels at the Outbreak of War
During the course of the nineteenth century the practice gradually took
root of granting belligerent merchant vessels caught in enemy ports at the
81 Of course, if title to goods has already passed to the enemy owners then obviously no
problem arises with respect to their character.
82 Again it may be noted that no difficulty arises with respect to the passing of property
from enemy to neutral if the title to the property remains in the vendor at the time of seizurethe goods evidently retain their enemy character. It is only when a neutral title has been
perfected that any problem arises and when the principle that transfers of property cannot
be made in order to defeat the rights of the captor becomes applicable.
83 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 633b. Article 6o of the Declaration of London, the only
provision concerning the transfer of goods upon which the drafters were able to agree, provided
that the "enemy character of goods on board an enemy vessel continues until they reach their
destination, notwithstanding an intervening transfer after the opening of hostilities while the
goods are being forwarded.''
84 But once the neutral buyer has taken actual possession of the goods through their delivery.
the transit is complete and the belligerent cannot seize them-at least not on the basis of the
rules presently considered-unless it can be shown that the enemy seller has nevertheless retained an interest in or control over the property.
Sll As to the present status of the latter rule, see pp. 99-102..
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outbreak of war a period of grace in which to depart unmolested . 83 Exemption from seizure also was frequently accorded to belligerent merchant vessels which left their last port of departure before the outbreak of war and
when encountered on the high seas were unaware that hostilities had
broken out. 87 Hague Convention VI (1907), Relative to the Status of
Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities sought to codify this
practice, and Article I of that Convention provided that in the event a merchant ship belonging to one belligerent is at the commencement of war in
an enemy port'' it is des~rable that it should be allowed to depart freely,
either immediately, or after a reasonable number of days of grace, and to
proceed, after being furnished with a pass, direct to its port of destination
or any other port indicated." A similar rule was provided for a belligerent
merchant ship which, having left its last port of departure before the outbreak of war, entered a port belonging to the enemy in ignorance of the
fact that hostilities had broken out. Merchant ships unable to leave an
enemy port within the allotted period of grace, owing to circumstances of
force majeure, were not to be confiscated, but could eithet be detained, without payment of compensation though subject to restoration at the conclusion of hostilities, or requisitioned, on payment of compensation. Belligetent merchant vessels met at sea and ignorant of the outbreak of war, having
left their last port of departure before war's outbreak, could be seized by an
enemy and either detained or requisitioned in the same manner as vessels
unable to leave an enemy port. Confiscation was, in any event, forbidden.
Finally, the Convention expressly excluded from the benefit of its provisions
those merchant ships whose build indicated that they were intended for
conversion into warships. 88
A large number of states, including the United States, failed to ratify
86

A review of nineteenth century opinion and practice with respect to the status of enemy
merchant vessels at the outbreak of war is given in U. S. Naval War College, International Law
Topics, z9o6, pp. 46-65, where it is concluded that the exemption granted enemy vessels should
be conditioned upon a strict reciprocity of treatment, that it should be subject to the protection
of a belligerent's military i~terests, and that it should not extend to private vessels suitable
for warlike use.-lt should be observed that prior to the middle of the last century the practice
of belligerents had been to seize and confiscate enemy vessels caught in belligerent ports at the
outbreak of hostilities. And there were a number of instances of states placing an embargo
upon the vessels of a foreign state in anticipation of war with the latter.
87 Such vessels, if destined for an enemy port, were usually allowed to enter such port, discharge their cargo, and depart. On the other hand, if seized they were generally not subject
to confiscation but instead to detention or to requisition upon compensation.
88 The foregoing is a brief summary of Articles I, 2., 3 and 5 of Hague VI. Article 4 provided
that in all instances enemy cargo was likewise liable to detention, subject to restoration after
the termination of war without compensation, or to requisition, on payment of compensation.
It should be observed that the exclusion of "potential auxiliary cruisers'' from the protection
of the Convention seriously limited its applicability from the very start. Even then, the only
strict obligation laid down by the Convention was that which forbade confiscation.
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the Convention, however. 89 In addition, among those states ratifying
Hague VI several did so only after attaching certain reservations. During
World War I observance of the Convention by the contracting parties was
far from uniform and in consequence of this failure to secure "either uniformity or liberality of treatment" Great Britain denounced Hague VI in
192.5. 9° Following the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 neither Great Britain
nor France granted any days of grace to enemy merchant vessels caught in
their ports. Instead, such vessels as were found in Allied ports-or encountered upon the high seas-were held liable to seizure and subsequent
confiscation. 91
At the present time, it must be considered very doubtful that in the
absence of specific obligations imposed by treaty a belligerent is required
by customary international law to accord any favorable treatment-in the
form of exemption from seizure and confiscation-to enemy merchant
vessels found in its ports at the commencement of hostilities. Despite the
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The failure of the United States to ratify the Convention was not due to a lack of support
for its purposes. On the contrary, one of the chief complaints made by this country was that
the Convention did not provide sufficient guarantee that enemy vessels would be permitted to
depart from the ports of the other belligerent upon the outbreak of war.
!lo A review of World War I practice is given by A. P. Higgins, "Enemy Ships in Port at the
Outbreak of War," B. Y. I. L., 3 (192.3-2.4), pp. 55-78. Of the British denunciation of Hague
VI, Colombos (op. cit., p. 138) writes that: "This development in the law is to be regretted.
The provisions contained in the Hague Convention appear substantially just and equitable
and deserve to be followed on their own merits." The British decision to denounce Hague VI
was very largely a result of the decision rendered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in The Blonde and Other Vessels, [192.1]-(10 Lloyds Prize Cases, pp. 2.48 ff.), where Lord Sumner
held that during the war of 1914-18 Great Britain had acted on the basis that Hague Convention
VI was in effect. This being so, Article 2. of the Convention-forbidding confiscation-was
regarded as obligatory even though Article 1-concerning the granting of days of grace-was
considered as only optional. ("Ships which find themselves at the outbreak of war in an
enemy port shall in no case be condemned if they are not allowed to leave, or if they unavoidably
overstay their days of grace, but it would be better that they always be allowed to leave, with
or without days of grace.") Thus the argument that the prohibition in Hague VI against
confiscation was dependent upon a prior reciprocal agreement between belligerents on the days
of grace to be granted enemy merchant vessels in which to depart from belligerent ports was
expressly rejected. Such an agreement had not been reached between Great Britain and
Germany in 1914 and consequently each state detained the merchant vessels of the other.
The effect of the decision in The Blonde was to require the British Government either to restore
the detained German vessels to their owners or to requisition the vessels on payment of compensation.
Ill France denounced Hague VI in 1939. Other allied states, e. g., Canada, followed the
same pattern and seized all German ships either found in their ports or encountered upon the
high seas without granting any period of grace. Nor did these states refrain from confiscating
the seized vessels. However, it is true that a number of belligerents retained the provisions
of Hague Convention VI in their prize codes. Thus Article 18 of the German Prize Law Code
of 1939 declared that the provisions of the Convention "remain unaffected." But Article 18 . ·
was interpreted as being conditioned only upon reciprocal treatment by Germany's enemies.
Italy also retained the provisions of Hague VI in her prize code of 1938 and offered to apply
these provisions upon becoming a belligerent in 1940, though nothing came of the offer.
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fairly widespread practice of belligerents in the years prior to World War I
of granting either a period of grace or, in any event, exemption from
confiscation, it is difficult to accept the occasional assertion that this
practice had hardened into a rule of customary law by 1914. 92 A belligerent is, of course, at liberty to refrain from resorting to its customary
right to confiscate enemy vessels found in its ports at the commencement
of hostilities, and to date the United States has chosen to follow the policy
of requisitioning such vessels on payment of compensation. 93 NevertheThis was also the opinion of the British Prize Court in The Pomona [1942.], where Lord
Merriman held that in the absence of reciprocal agreement there was no rule of international
law which exempts from condemnation an enemy ship found in a belligerent's port at the
outbreak of war. See Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases, 1941-42.,
Case No. 159, pp. 50_9-14. The judgment in The Pomona rejected the contention put forward
by the claimants that the provisions of Hague VI were mere! y declaratory of established customary rules of international law. This contention, shared by a number of writers, has been
considered as receiving some support from ·the preamble to Hague VI which stated that the
protection of operations undertaken in good faith and in process of being carried out before
the outbreak of hostilities was "in accordance with modern practice." Hyde (op. cit., pp.
2.045-53), in a review of the subject declares that while there is no obligation to grant a period
of grace, in the absence of treaty, "Provision for the detention or requisition on compensation,
of enemy vessels in port, in lieu of confiscation, is a mark of respect for private property which
should enjoy universal approval." Judicial opinion in the United States, although in general
accord with this view, has nevertheless refrained from declaring that seizure and confiscation
would be contrary to customary international law. In Littlejohn v. United States, (192.6),
2.70 U. S. 2.15. p. 2.2.5, the Supreme Court stated that: "In the absence of convention every
government may pursue what policy it thinks best concerning seizure and confiscation of
enemy ships in its harbors when war occurs.''
With respect to enemy merchant vessels which left their last port of departure before the
outbreak of war, and are encountered at sea, there seems little question but that they are liable
to seizure and confiscation. Even Hague Convention VI exempted them from confiscation
only if ''still ignorant that hostilities had broken out." Developments in communications
render such ignorance highly unlikely today.
93 The United States upon becoming a belligerent in 1917 did not grant to enemy merchant
vessels any period of grace in which to depart freely from American ports. Nevertheless, this
country acted in substantial accord with the injunction contained in Article 2. of Hague Convention VI by refraining from confiscation and by applying instead the principle of requisition.
On May 12., 1917, Congress authorized the President to take "immediate possession and title
of" any enemy vessel within ports under American jurisdiction, and "through the United
States Shipping Board, or any department or agency of the Government, to operate, lease,
charter, and equip such vessel in any service of the United States, or in any commerce, foreign
or otherwise." A decade later Congressional provision was made, through the Settlement
of War Claims Act, for compensating the owners of the requisitioned enemy merchant ships.
See Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 572.-6. Also Edwin Borchard, "The German Ship Claims,''
A. f. I. L.' 2.5 (1931), pp. 101-7.
During World War II a quite different situation arose owing to the fact that foreign merchant vessels-both belligerent and neutral-lying idle in American ports were forcibly acquired
prior to the entrance of the United States in the hostilities. The Idle Foreign Vessels
Act, signed by the President on June 6, 1941, authorized the President-until June 30,
1942.-to purchase, requisition, charter, requisition the use of, or take over the title
to, or the possession of, any foreign merchant vessels lying idle within the jurisdiction of the
92
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less, a policy either of requisition or of detention, while within the discretion of each state, is not demanded by customary international law.
Even clearer is the absence of any rules granting either a period of grace or
exemption from confiscation to belligerent civil aircraft found in the
territory of an enemy upon the outbreak of hostilities. 94
b. Postal Correspondence
Prior to the conclusion of Hague Convention XI (1907) no general rule
existed granting postal correspondence special_exemption from seizure. It
is true, however, that during the nineteenth century a number of treaties
were concluded which provided that in the event of war between the
contracting parties the mail boats as well as the postal correspondence of
the belligerents were to be regarded as immune from seizure. With respect
to the postal correspondence carried on board neutral vessels, there are a
number of impressive precedents that can be drawn from nineteenth century
practice indicating a widespread disposition toward the granting of special
treatment to mails. Not infrequently belligerents exempted neutral mail
bags from search; and even when neutral vessels were seized for carriage of
contraband the mail on board such vessels was often forwarded unopened. 95
At the second Hague Conference in 1907 the problem of postal corresUnited States, the Philippine Islands and the Canal Zone, and which were deemed to be necessary to the national defense. The Act further provided that just compensation must be paid
the owners of such vessels, and specified a procedure for insuring this result. (For similar
action by a number of South American states, see Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 545-9.)
Although at the time the Idle Foreign Vessels Act was passed the United States had openly
abandoned any pretense of conforming to the duties imposed by international law upon neutral
states, this country nevertheless retained the formal status of a neutral (see pp. 197-8). Hence
there is little point in considering the action from the standpoint of the powers a belligerent
may exercise with respect to both enemy and neutral vessels found within its ports. Instead,
the measures taken may simply be regarded as the exercise of the generally acknowledged right
of a state to assume control-subject to compensation-over any property found within its
jurisdiction, when such control is required for a public purpose. In this particular instance
the purpose was that of national defense. And in a review of the Act one writer observed:
"It is generally admitted that a government has supreme sovereign right of control of all
persons and property within its jurisdiction and may exercise this right whenever necessary to
preserve its independence. The exercise of this right in time of peace is generally under the
doctrine of eminent domain, that is, the taking of property for a public purpose upon the payment of just compensation judicially determined. It is submitted that this doctrine is applicable
whether the nation is at war or at peace." L. H. Woolsey, "The Taking of Foreign Ships
In American Ports," A.]. I. L., 35 (1941), p. 502.. Also see, pp. 348 (n).
94 Spaight (op. cit., pp. 397-8) is of this opinion, which appears correct.
95 For a brief review of nineteenth century practice, U.S. Naval War Coltege, International Law
Topics, zgo6, pp. 88-96. A more extensive review, carried through World War I, is given in
U. S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, zg28, pp. 4o-72.. The case for exempting .
postal correspondence found on board neutral vessels is obviously a much stronger one-as seen
from nineteenth century practice-than is the case for according special treatment to mail found . ·
on board enemy vessels. Even so, the opinion that customary law accorded no special exemption
to postal correspondence, but instead regarded it in the same manner as other merchandise, is
believed to be correct.
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pondence was subjected to conventional regulation, Articles I and 2 of
Hague Convention XI providing as follows:
Article I. The postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents,
whatever its official or private character may be, found on the high
seas on board a neutral or enemy ship, is inviolable. If the ship
is detained, the correspondence is forwarded by the captor with
the least possible delay.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph do not apply, in case
of violation of blockade, to correspondence destined for or proceeding from a blockaded port.
Article 2. The inviolability of postal correspondence does not
exempt a neutral mail ship from the laws and customs of maritime
war as to neutral merchant ships in general. The ship, however,
may not be searched except when absolutely necessary, and then
only with as much consideration and expedition as possible. 96
From a formal point of view it must probably be concluded that these
provisions remain binding today upon the parties to Hague Convention
XL 97 On the other hand, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
events of the two World Wars have reduced the significance of these provisions almost to a vanishing point. As between belligerents the Convention presupposes that enemy vessels will be seized and not sunk without
warning. In both World Wars the destruction of the postal correspondence
of belligerents formed only one of the incidental effects of a policy of
unrestricted warfare waged against enemy merchant vessels. 98
As between belligerent and neutral it soon became apparent during the
1914-I8 War that the varying interpretations placed upon Article I of
Hague XI were-for all practical purposes-irreconcilable. In principle,
is clear that the inviolability granted is to postal correspondence, not to vessels. Thus
the liability of enemy mail boats to seizure remains unaffected by the Convention. Similarly,
the liability of neutral mail ships to seizure for any of those acts a belligerent has a right to
prevent when undertaken by neutral vessels-contraband carriage, blockade breach, unneutral
service-also remains unaffected, save for the qualification that search of neutral mail ships
should be. undertaken only when "absolutely necessary"-a phrase that seems to have remained
unclear as judged from the context in which it is used. It does appear though that Article 2.
refers to privately owned neutral mail ships, not to mail ships of a public character.
117 Technically the Convention was not operative in World War I since a number of the belligerents, and particularly Russia, had never ratified it. Hague XI, as the other treaties in this
series, contained the general participation clause. But in neither War did the belligerents
indicate that the Convention was not regarded as operative for that reason.
118 The destruction of Allied mail boats without warning by German submarines was initiated
almost at the start of World War I. In general, the German conduct of submarine warfare
against enemy merchant vessels-and, for that matter, neutral ships as well-requires no
further comment with respect to the German record in meeting the requirements of Articles 1
and 2. of Hague XI. As to the Allied record, there is little information regarding the disposition
made of mail found on board seized enemy vessels, though it is hardly hazardous to assume
that such postal correspondence was not considered "inviolable."
116It
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agreement proved wanting both as to the meaning of " postal correspondence," considered as inviolable, and the construction to be given the phrase
"found on the high seas." The initial neutral position, as might be expected, was to insist that postal correspondence be understood to refer to
all sealed envelopes, regardless of contents. 99 In turn, the injunction of inviolability was interpreted as forbidding the opening of sealed mails for any
reason, an interpretation that would evidently exclude application of the
principle of contraband to the mails. Still further, the neutrals contended
that the scope of Article I of Hague XI extended inviolability to postal correspondence on board neutral vessels, even after such vessels had been
seized and conducted into belligerent ports (and particularly if merely diverted into belligerent ports for the purpose of searching the cargo). In
opposition to the foregoing, belligerents insisted that "postal correspondence" did not include contraband materials, and refused to regard letters
containing such materials as "genuine" correspondence entitled to receive
special protection. Thus bonds, stocks, securities, checks and money
orders were considered, among other articles, as constituting contraband
merchandise which, if destined to neutral territory, a belligerent had the
right to seize even though contained in sealed correspondence. This claim
to apply the principle of contraband to the mails was accompanied by the
further assertion of the right to search neutral mail bags and the contents
contained therein, whether at sea or following diversion to a neutral port. 1
99

It has always been understood that the inviolability granted to postal correspondence in
Hague XI does not extend co parcels or packages sent by parcel post.
1 The correspondence occasioned between neutral apd belligerent-and particularly between
the United States and Great Britain-over interference with mails is reviewed in Hackworth,
op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 6o8--2.2.. As judged by both the actual wording of Article I of Hague XI,
and the known intention of the drafters, it is difficult to deny the force of the initial neutral
position. Quite briefly, the inviolability of postal correspondence guaranteed in Article I
meant that sealed envelopes could neither be opened nor their contents seized nor censored in
any way by belligerents. It may of course be asked why prospective belligerents were prepared
to grant such a substantial concession for future conflicts. In part, the answer is to be found
in the fact that the attention of the drafters was concentrated largely upon the effect. that new
means of communication would have upon the continued importance of the mails in transmitting
intelligence of value to an enemy. It was thought that the importance of mails as a mean's
for conveying intelligence would prove small enough to warrant the concessions made in
Hague XI. In part, the answer is to be found in an underestimation of the possible importance
of the mails as a means for conveying contraband merchandise of value to an enemy. But
despite these assumptions, which later proved to be largely misplaced, Article I must be seen
as part of the compromise between the conflicting interests of neutral and belligerent-and the
devitalization of Arricle I of Hague XI must therefore be seen as only one rather limited development in the much larger process whereby belligerents have severely restricted, if not invalidated
entirely, traditional neutral rights. Thus it is, at best, misleading to- argue, as did the Inter-.
American Neutrality Committee in its recommendation of May 3I, I940 on the inviolability of
postal correspondence (A.]. I. L., 34 (I94o), Supp., pp. I35-9), that by Article I of Hague XI·
the recognition of the inviolability of postal correspondence "was made necessary in order to
give the greatest possible scope to the right of immunity and privacy of postal communications,
even in time of war, and in view of the grave injuries resulting from the examination of corre-
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Whatever the respective merits of these opposed positions, both World
Wars provide abundant evidence that belligerents are not prepared-in any
event-to exempt mails from the application of the principle of contraband.
Nor, for that matter, have neutrals been either united or consistent in
adhering to their initial position that the inviolability of mails must be
interpreted as forbidding the opening of sealed envelopes whatever the
contents of the latter. 2 But once it is admitted that the principle of
contraband applies to postal correspondence it is obviously incongruous
to deny belligerents the right to open and scrutinize mail whose ultimate destination may be to enemy territory; for without this right
there can be no meaningful application of the principle of contraband to
the mails. No less incongruous is the recognition of the belligerent
right to divert neutral merchant vessels into port in order to conduct search
for contraband among the cargo and the denial of the same right of diversion
for the purpose of screening postal correspondence. 3
spondence, which injuries are unjustly disproportionate to the military advantages derived
from the seizure of any contraband found in this correspondence . . . " This may reflect the
viewpoint of neutrals, but it is clear that belligerents did not consider the military advantages
disproportionate to the injuries inflicted. Nor, apparently, did the Committee so believe since
it went on to declare "that the principle of inviolability, by its nature and object, may be
completely applied only to the protection of epistolary correspondence, properly so called, and
may not be extended to protect the transmission of goods or things of value ordinarily senr by
postal means . . . " Yet this concession to belligerent interests, by conferring inviolability
only upon "epistolary correspondence," and thus excluding postal correspondence containing
goods or things of value, has no evident foundation in the wording of Article 1.
2 As a neutral the United States conceded in 1916 that the principle of contraband was
. applicable to the mails by declaring that letters containing articles of merchandise-understood
to include stocks, bonds, coupons and similar securities, money orders, checks, drafts, notes
and other negotiable instruments-were liable to seizure by belligerents.
3 In reply to an American protest of December 2.2., 1939, that British authorities had removed
from American and other neutral ships American mails addressed to neutral countries, and
had opened and censored sealed letter mail sent from this country, particularly after having
compelled neutral vessels to call at designated British control bases, the British Government
declared (January 16, 1940) that "in the case of merchandise, His Majesty's Government are
entitled to ascertain if it is contraband intended for the enemy or whether it possesses an innocent character, and it is impossible to decide whether a sealed letter does or does not contain
such merchandise without opening it and ascertaining what the contents are." cited in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 62.o-1. In commenting upon this exchange Clyde Eagleton has
noted that: "If ... the principle of contraband is to be applied to the mails, it makes little
difference whether they are searched upon the high seas or in port. It is not the fact that they
have come into port, willingly or unwillingly, and therefore under British jurisdiction, which
gives to the British Government the claim to search mails; it is the admission that mails may
have a contraband character which gives the authority to search, whether upon the high seas
or in port, and to seize contraband contained found therein . . . At this point, the debate
ceases to be one of inviolability of mails; it now becomes part of the controversy over visit,
search, and seizure of contraband goods." "Interference With American Mails," A.]. I. L.,
34 (1940), pp. 317-9. Eagleton's conclusions are reflected in Hyde's (op. cit., p. 1979) comment
that the "real basis" of the American complaint "was the British action that caused mails
on board of neutral ships, and having an immediate or direct neutral destination, to be carried
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Nor has the belligerent's position been limited only to the assertion of a
right to prevent contraband merchandise from being sent to an enemy
through the mails. The much broader claim has been made of a right to
screen all postal correspondence carried on board neutral vessels entering
belligerent ports-whether voluntarily or involuntarily-with a view to
the removal of any materials or information which is judged as providing
some assistance to an enemy in the conduct of war. 4 Goods of enemy
origin as well as of enemy destination have been seized. Information
destined to an enemy and instructions sent out by the latter to its agents
abroad have been censored. 5 In these circumstances, it need hardly be
pointed out that the'' inviolability'' of postal correspondence, even though
still proclaimed by belligerents, no longer retains its former meaning. In
effect, postal correspondence has been made subject-at least when judged
into belligerent ports and there be subjected to a rigid censorship. It was the abuse of a belligerent privilege revealed in the method by which it was applied which was the chief ground for
objection." On this view, the issue is no longer the "inviolability" of mails but the methodse. g., diversion into port-a belligerent uses in preventing "letter mail that might by reason
of its contents or character be fairly assimilated to contraband from reaching the enemy."
On diversion of neutral vessels generally, together with related problems, see pp. 338-44.
4 Thus in the "long distance" blockades imposed against Germany in both World Wars (see
pp. 305 ff.) Great Britain and her Allies made liable to detention (and later to seizure) all goods
of enemy origin. In practice, the control exercised over enemy exports was employed as a
means for screening outgoing postal correspondence. During World War I the "blockade"
system-whose legal basis rested upon the right of reprisal-finally required all neutral merchant
vessels sailing to or from neutral ports providing access to enemy territory to call at British or
Allied ports. Failure to do so resulted in a liability to seizure. Once in British ports the
mail carried on boa.rd was subject to censorship. During World War II, the Order in Council
of July 31, 1940 (see pp. 313-5) resulted in an even tighter control over postal correspondence
carried to or from neutral ports providing access to the enemy. In consequence, many neutral
vessels ceased carrying any mails, and for those vessels that continued to do so "mailcerts"
were introduced as a part of the navicert system.
5 It should be noted that the term "censorship," frequently used in diplomatic interchanges
as well as in academic discussions over belligerent interference with mails, has partially confused the relevant issues due to its ambiguous use. More often than not it has been used as a
general term to indicate any form of belligerent interference with mails regardless of the specific
objective. But belligerent censorship of mails in order to prevent the import to, or export
from, an enemy of merchandise is a quite different matter than the exercise of censorship in
order to prevent the enemy transmission of information of a political or military nature. In
practice, belligerents have sought to prevent the latter as well as the former, and in the British
reply of January 16, 1940 to the American note of December 22, 1939, regarding inte~ference
with mails on neutral ships, it was observed: "Quite apart from transmission of contraband,
the possibility must be taken into account of the use of the letter post by'Germany"'to transmit
military intelligence, to promote sabotage and to carry on other hostile acts. It is in accordance
with international law for belligerents to prevent intelligence reaching the enemy which might
assist them in hostile operations." Cited in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 62r. As judged
by Article r of Hague XI this last contention has an even more doubtful basis than the claim to·
apply the principle of contraband to the mails. For while the drafters of Hague X:I perhaps
paid insufficient attention to the possibilities of using the mails for contraband carriage, a good
deal of attention was devoted to the possibility of using the ordinary mails for conveying
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by recent practice-to practically the same restrictions that belligerents
have imposed upon neutral commerce generally in time of war.6
c. Coastal Fishing Boats and Small Boats Engaged in Local Coastal
Trade
Article 3 of Hague XI provides that:
Vessels used exclusively for :fishing along the coast or small
boats employed in local trade are exempt from capture, as well as
their appliances, rigging,. tackle, and cargo.
They cease to be exempt as soon as they take any part whatever
in hostilities.
The contracting powers agree not to take advantage of the
harmless character of the said vessels in order to use them for
military purposes while preserving their peaceful appearance.
The exemption from seizure accorded to coastal :fishing boats is founded
upon the conviction that considerations of humanity warrant the absence
of belligerent interference with a class of men normally felt to be both
inoffensive and of no material importance to the military effort of an
enemy. Their immunity from seizure, though provided for by conventional rule, has been considered by many states-including the United
States 7-as resting upon well established custom. Whether or not a
vessel falls within this exempted category depends primarily upon the use
to which it is put rather than to its size or mode of propulsion. Thus it
is clear that immunity from seizure does not extend to vessels engaged in
deep sea :fishing or to vessels which do not bring :fish fresh to the market .
.military intelligence. Despite this consideration it was decided to exempt mails from seizure,
even though containing military intelligence. The British claim, therefore, cannot possibly
find support in the "international law" of Hague XI. Instead, it is an open disavowal of the
continued validity, in this respect, of the clear intent of Hague XI. Nevertheless, Great
Britain (as well as other belligerents) sought to, and did, exercise this right of censorship over
mails on neutral vessels that entered (whether voluntarily or involuntarily) British territorial
waters and ports.
6 In this general connection brief attention may be directed to another formrof neutral intercourse with a belligerent-i. e., intercourse through submarine telegraph cables. The comparison frequently drawn between neutral mail boats and cables is, as Higgins and Colombos
(op. cit., p. 38o) point out, hardly sound. The only conventional rule on the subject is that
contained in Article 54 of the Regulations attached to Hague IV (1907), which reads: "Submarine cables connecting an occupied territory with a neutral territory shall not be seized or
destroyed except in case of absolute necessity. They must likewise be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made." It will be readily apparent that the severance of an enemy's
communications forms an essential object in the conduct of hostilities, and belligerent practice
is clear that cables connecting two points in enemy territory, or connecting the territory of two
enemies, may be severed. So also the cables connecting enemy and neutral territory, though
only in case of necessity. On the other hand, cables connecting two points in neutral territory
must be held inviolable. See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 52.ob.
7
The Supreme Court in the Paquete Habana (19oo), 175 U.S. 677, considered the immunity of
coastal fishing boats as based upon custom-though it was made clear that the rule applied
only to coastal fishing vessels and not to those engaged in deep sea fishing.
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The test is that the fishing should serve a purely local need, and that it must
not be deep sea fishing. On the other hand, there is no indication that
coastal fishing boats must remain strictly within territorial waters or that
they must refrain from fishing off the coasts of third states (the latter so
permitting).
Similarly, in the case of boats engaged in coastal navigation it is local
trade only that is permitted by Hague XL Steamers engaged in general
coastal trade, i. e., cabotage, are not accorded immunity from seizure.
Furthermore, with respect to this latter category of boats it is not only the
character of the trade that is restricted but the size of the boats as well.
The Convention does not accord protection to large boats even though
engaged only in local trade.
The special protection granted to coastal fishing boats and small boats
engaged in local coastal trade has always been dependent upon an abstention
from any kind of participation in the conduct of hostilities. In addition, it
is only reasonable that belligerent naval forces operating in the vicinity of
these craft should be able to insure their security by requiring such vessels
and boats to conform to the regulations of the belligerent naval comtnander
operating in the area. 8 The movements of such vessels and boats may be
restricted as military operations require, and immediate identification must
be provided upon demand. The necessity for emphasizing these latter
points is due to the ubiquity of radio-telephonic apparatus in even the
smallest of boats and the ease with which coastal craft may be integrated
into the intelligence network of an enemy. Indeed, recent experience
points to the increasing use by belligerents of coastal craft for intelligence
purposes. It should be clear that this development can only result in an
increased liability to seizure or destruction of vessels and boats formerly
exempt from such treatment.
d. Vessels Engaged in Missions of a Religious, Scientific or Philanthropic Character
Article 4 of Hague XI states that exemption from capture is to be accorded "vessels charged with religious, scientific, or philanthropic missions.'' 9 The value of this provision has been found to be extremely limited
in practice. During World War I the question arose on several occasions
as to the definition of a "philanthropic mission," the conduct of which
would exempt an enemy vessel from seizure. 10 In the absence of special
See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 503c (6).
See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 503c (3).
10 So far as vessels charged with religious or scientific missions are concerned the present
significance of these exemptions is practically negligible. It is difficult to conceive of a "sci- ·
entific" mission belligerents would now be prepared to accept and grant immunity to-except
on the basis of a specific agreement. Earlier scientific missions generally were voyages of·
discovery, and on several occasions such missions were granted special protection. Thus
Article 13 of the U. S. Naval War Code of 1900 exempted from capture public vessels of the
enemy engaged in "scientific pursuits, in voyages of discovery . . . " In the Naval War
8

9
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agreement on specific voyages, and the consequent issuance of safe conduct
passes, belligerents indicated that they were prepared to allow only the
most narrow of interpretations. 11 This has meant, however, that the basis
for the immunity granted enemy vessels performing humanitarian functions
has not depended primarily upon the general rule contained in Article 4 of
Hague XI but-in almost every instance-upon the express agreement of
the belligerents. 12
e. Hospital Ships, Medical Transports and Medical Aircraft
The 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces At Sea provides that belligerent hospital ships, medical transports and medical aircraft are, when properly marked and duly notified to the other belligerents,
immune from either attack or seizure. A more detailed analysis of the provisions of this recently concluded Convention, which replaces for the Contracting Parties Hague Convention X (1907), is presented in later pages. 13
f. Cartel Ships
Ordinarily the term cartel is used to indicate an agreement concluded
between belligerents for the purpose of regulating the exchange of prisoners
College commentary to Article 13 of the Code the opinion is expressed that private vessels
engaged in religious, scientific or philanthropic missions are liable to capture: "the difficulty of
responsible control is so great that these (private) vessels should be exempt only by grace of
the commander in the immediate region, not by general rule." U. S. Naval War College, International Law Discussions, I90J, pp. 51-2.. But Article 4 of Hague XI does not require that
vessels so exempted be of a public character, and it is the general opinion that the immunity
provided for extends either to public or to private vessels.
. 11 Thus the transport of women and children refugees by an enemy vessel has not been
construed as a philanthropic mission which, in the absence of a safe conduct pass, may result
in exemption from seizure. Nor has the carrying of supplies for the purpose of succoring
starving women and children. See Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 543-6.
12 Of course, the source of the special agreement may be a convention to which the belligerents are contracting parties. Thus the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War provides in Article 59 that an occupying power shall agree to
relief schemes on behalf of the population of an occupied territory that is inadequately supplied,
and shall facilitate such schemes by all the means at its disposal. Accordingly, the Contracting
Parties to the Convention are obligated to permit the free passage of consignments of foodstuffs,
medical supplies and clothing to occupied territory and to guarantee their protection. Article 59
further declares that a state "granting free passage to consignments on their way to territory
occupied by an adverse Party to the conflict shall, however, have the right to search the consignments, to regulate their passage according to prescribed times and routes, and to be reasonably satisfied through the Protecting Power that these consignments are to be used for the
relief of the needy populations and are not to be used for the benefit of the Occupying Powers.''
It will be apparent that although the Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons establishes a general obligation for the Contracting Parties to grant exemption to vessels carrying
those supplies noted above, and for the relief of occupied populations, the immunity granted to
specific voyages must rest upon prior and express agreement between the belligerents (and-in
all probability-upon the issuance of safe conduct passes).
13
See pp. 12.3-34. The practice of belligerents during World War II, while still governed
by Hague X (1907), is also discussed in these later pages.
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of war. In a broader sense, however, the term has been used to refer to
agreements permitting various kinds of non-hostile relations between
belligerents, e. g., the exchange of official communications. 14 Vessels
(and aircraft) engaged in carrying out the terms of such agreements, and
particularly when engaged in the carriage of prisoners of war, must be
regarded as inviolable. 15 But this inviolability is to be guaranteed only
so long as cartel vessels (and aircraft) confine themselves strictly to those
services for which they have been engaged. According to custom they
must not carry any cargo-unless such carriage has been expressly permitted. Nor can they carry ammunition or other instruments of war. It
is also customary to furnish cartel vessels with documents testifying to
their character and to the missions upon which they are engaged.
In addition to cartel vessels (and aircraft) belligerents may agree to
extend safe conduct passes to enemy vessels (and aircraft) in order that the
latter may perform any of various services bearing a humanitarian character. Here, as elsewhere, exemption from either attack or seizure is
guaranteed only so long as the vessel (or aircraft) strictly confines itself
to the performance of those functions for which it has been engaged. 16
14 .. In its narrower sense a cartel is an agreement entered into by belligerents for the exchange
of prisoners of war. In its broader sense it is any convention concluded between belligerents
for the purpose of arranging or regulating certain kinds of non-hostile intercourse otherwise
prohibited by reason of the existence of the war. Both parties to a cartel are in honor bound to
observe its provisions with the most scrupulous care, but it is voidable by either party upon
definite proof that it has been intentionally violated in an important particular by the other
party." U. S. Army Rules of Land Warfare, paragraph 469.
15 And this inviolability extends to return voyages or flights as well as to voyages or flights
to ports or airfields in which the duties of a cartel vessel or aircraft are to be taken up.
16 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 503c distinguishes among the following categories of enemy
vessels and aircraft exempt from destruction or capture:
.. I. Cartel vessels and aircraft, i. e. vessels and aircraft designated for and engaged in the
exchange of prisoners.
4· Vessels and aircraft guaranteed safe conduct by prior arrangement between the belligerents.
5. Vessels and aircraft exempt by proclamation, operation plan, order, or other directive."
Whereas the first two categories enumerated (rand 4) depend upon the prior agreement of the
belligerents, the third category (5) does not. A belligerent is, of course, at liberty to grant any
exemptions he may desire to vessels or aircraft otherwise subject to either attack or seizure.The distinction normally drawn between cartel vessels and vessels granted safe conduct
passes is not entirely free from obscurity. In either case the immunity of the vessel has as its
basis an agreement concluded by the belligerents. It is also true that both categories of vessels
are usually provided with special documents testifying to their character and innocent employment. It would appear that the distinction has its basis partly in the fact that cartel vessels
are engaged in the performance of particular kinds of missions, and especially in the carriage
of exchanged prisoners of war, that they are especially commissioned as cartel ships, and that
the services performed generally extend over the period of hostilities and not merely a voyage •.
On the other hand, vessels may be granted-by prior arrangement-safe conduct passes in
order to perform any type of humanitarian service. The period during which the pass is valid. ·
may cover only one voyage and return or a number of voyages.
During World War II the incident involving the sinking of the Awa Maru illustrated some of
the problems involved in the satisfactory execution of agreements, concluded between bellig-
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g. Enemy Goods Under a Neutral Flag
At the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 the principle that free ships make
free goods had been accepted by the overwhelming majority of states for
well over a half a century. Article 2. of the Declaration of Paris of 1856
had provided that" the neutral flag covers enemy goods, with the exception
of contraband of war." 17 The rule constituted the most important exceperents, providing for the safe conduct of enemy vessels. By prior agreement the Japanese vessel
Awa Maru had been designated to carry relief supplies to Allied nationals held in Japanese
custody and for this purpose had been granted Allied safe conduct. On the evening of April r,
1945, the Awa Maru was torpedoed and sunk by an American submarine while returning from
a voyage to Hong Kong, Singapore and other ports, on which relief supplies furnished by the
Allied Governments had been carried as part of the cargo. At the time of the sinking the Awa
Maru was carrying a large number of Japanese nationals evacuated from danger zones, and
although the United States questioned the propriety of utilizing the ship for this purpose the
point was not pressed since Japan had earlier notified this country that the Awa Maru could not
be used for the sole purpose of carrying relief supplies. Japan charged that the sinking represented a deliberate violation of the agreement and demanded that the United States apologize
to the Japanese Government for the sinking, punish those responsible, and indemnify the
Japanese Government for the loss incurred. In reply, this Government categorically denied
that the sinking had been either willful or deliberate, though it acknowledged-following an
investigation-responsibility for the sinking and expressed its "deep regret." Disciplinary
action was promised against the commanding officer of the submarine, and a promise of indemnification was deferred until the termination of hostilities. Later, however, the United States
offered to replace the Awa Maru, not as indemnification but in order that there might be no
impediment placed in the way of shipping and distributing relief supplies to Allied nationals.
For the diplomatic correspondence on the Awa Maru sinking, see U. S. Naval War College,
International Law Documents, I94r45, pp. 12.5-38. The incident of the Awa Maru is indicative
of the responsibility a belligerent must accept in guaranteeing safe conduct to enemy vessels.
Although the Awa Maru had deviated slightly from her prescribed course and the visibility
was low (though later investigation indicated she was showing the prescribed lights), it was
clearly the burden of the commander of the American submarine to establish the identity ot
the vessel prior to attacking it. The failure to have done so placed responsibility for the incident
squarely upon the United States. It may also be observed, however, that the sinking of the
Awa Maru is suggestive of the possible consequences following upon the waging of unrestricted
submarine (or aerial) warfare.
17 The other provisions of the Declaration of Paris are dealt with elsewhere.
Article r,
abolishing privateering, is considered in connection with the naval forces of belligerents, see
pp. 4o-3. Article 3, declaring that neutral goods-contraband excepted-are not liable to
capture under the enemy's flag is referred to in earlier pages (8s-6) of this chapter. Article
4, requiring that blockades must be effective in order to be binding, is discussed in Chapter X,
pp. 2.88-9. Prior to the Declaration of Paris the principle that free ships make free goods
had not enjoyed general acceptance. Great Britain, in particular, had never accepted it,
maintaining instead the position that enemy goods were liable to seizure if found under a
neutral flag. France, on the other hand, followed the practice of condemning neutral goods
if found under an enemy flag. During the Crimean War both states abandoned their previous
practices, though intending this only for the hostilities then being carried out. However, in
the years immediately following the Crimean War the pressure of neutral interests became very
strong and led to the Declaration of Paris. In effect, the Declaration represented a far reaching
concession to neutrals, and British writers never tire in pointing out that from the viewpoint
of British interests the :peclaration represented a bad bargain. In surrendering the right as
a belligerent to seize enemy goods even though under a neutral flag Great Britain received
399334-57--8
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tion to the principle that a belligerent may seize and condemn enemy goods
found at sea.l 8 Indeed, the significance once attached in many quarters to
this acceptance of the principle of "free ships, free goods" was such that
it was used in support of the argument that the belligerent right to seize
and confiscate enemy property at sea ought to be generally abolished, the
expectation being that a belligerent could-in any event-transfer his trade
to neutral vessels and thereby secure immunity from seizure. Given these
circumstances the advantage enjoyed by belligerents in retaining the right
to seize enemy property at sea was considered to be substantially diminished.19
This expectation has never materialized, however. In both World Wars
the Declaration of Paris, though remaining formally binding upon the
belligerents, was nevertheless rendered ineffective-largely through the
resort to reprisal measures. 20 But even apart from reprisals belligerents
sought to reduce the possible scope of application of the principle that free
ships make free goods. Thus belligerent prize courts have interpreted
Article 2. of the Declaration of Paris as failing to provide protection to
enemy goods when found under the flag of the captor state or of his allies.
Further, immunity from seizure has been extended to enemy goods only
while on board the neutral vessel; once unloaded, whether afloat or on
shore, liability to seizure applies. Nor have goods transshipped from an
enemy to a neutral vessel been regarded as entitled to the protection afforded
by the Declaration of Paris.
Still more important inroads upon Article 2 have followed from the
nothing comparable in return. Article I of the Declaration did provide for the abolition of
privateering-a practice from which Great Britain had seriously suffered during the Napoleonic Wars-but by I856 privateering was already on its way out. Even then, the small advantage accruing to Great Britain was further reduced by Hague Convention VII (I907 ), allowing
as it did the conversion of merchant vessels into warships though failing clearly to forbid
such conversion on the high seas. The United States refused formally to adhere to the Declaration of Paris-for reasons now no longer relevant-though in practice this country followed
the provisions of that instrument, and in I9I4 considered them binding upon all belligerents.See H. W. Malkin, "The Inner History of the Declaration of Paris," B. Y. I. L., 8 (I9:2..7 ),
pp. I-44; and for a brief summary of the American attitude both prior to and following the
Declaration, see Hyde, op. cit., pp. 2.o4I-5.
18 Of relatively minor significance is the practice, generally regarded as forming a part of
customary law, of restoring to master and crew of seized enemy vessels their personal effects.
19 Thus in I905 the Naval War College concluded: "The Declaration of Paris of I856 . ·.. has
made possible the transfer of a large portion of the enemy sea commerce to neutral "flag in
time of war. The absence of risk under neutral flag will also make possible cheaper rates under
neutral flags. Under ordinary economic laws commerce would thus go to neutrals in time of
war." U. S. Naval War College, International Law Topics, I90J, p. IS_. This conclusion was
offered in support of the recommendation that "innocent enemy goods and ships"-i. e.,·
goods not constituting contraband of war and ships not engaged either in contraband carriage .
or blockade breach-be made immune from capture.
20 See pp. 2.96 ff., for a review of these reprisal measures and their effect upon Artic~e 2.. of
the Declaration of Paris.
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changes that have since occurred in the law of contraband. Article 2
specifically deprives enemy goods of the protection otherwise afforded by
the neutral flag if such goods have the character of contraband of war.
Aside from certain peripheral questions arising in the interpretation of this
exception the main intent was simply to provide that the "neutral flag
covers enemy's goods, with the exception of such as would, if neutral, be
contraband of war.'' 21 In practice, the importance of this exception must
be found to be proportionate to the degree to which belligerents have
expanded the list of goods regarded as susceptible of use in war as well as
the destination required of goods in order to justify their seizure and condemnation as contraband. Modern developments in the law of contraband
are dealt with elsewhere; 22 here it is sufficient to note that these developments have operated drastically to reduce the significance formerly attributed to Article 2 of the Declaration of Paris. 23
Formally, the Declaration of ~aris may be regarded as retaining its
validity even today. In neither the decisions of belligerent prize courts
nor the policies expressed by belligerent governments is there to be found
evidence of a formal abandonment of that instrument. 24 In practice, how21

U. S. Naval War College, International Law Topics, zgo5, p. II8. This is, in fact, the only
plausible interpretation since, as Stone (op. cit., p. 467) points out: "Strictly, the doctrine of
contraband is inapplicable to enemy goods found at sea, since these are in any case confiscable
as enemy goods. Presumably then the term refers to goods which, if owned by a neutral or allied
trader would be contraband.'' The same writer further points out (p. 468) that although
Article 2. expressly excepts only contraband from the immunity otherwise granted enemy goods
covered by a neutral flag, "it is difficult to see why blockade-running goods should be immune
when contraband is not; and the contrary seems to be generally assumed. "-Belligerent prize
courts have also applied the so-called doctrine of infection (see p. 2.76 (n)) to enemy goods
carried in neutral bottoms. Thus goods otherwise immune from seizure have been held liable
to condemnation if belonging to the same enemy owner of contraband goods and carried on
the same neutral vessel along with the contraband cargo.
22 See, generally, Chapter IX.
23 At least so far as the import of goods to an enemy state under a neutral flag is affected.
With respect to enemy exports under neutral flags, belligerents have sought to rely primarily
upon reprisal measures (see pp. 2.96 ff.).-Still other questions have arisen in the interpretation
of Article 2., which deserve some attention. Although it is clear that the neutral shipowner
as well as the private enemy owner of goods were intended to benefit from Article 2., it is not at
all clear whether this benefit is to extend to goods owned by the enemy state. The Declaration
itself speaks only of enemy goods (la marchandise ennemie) without further qualification as to
private or public ownership. Nevertheless, the purpose of the provision-and of the Declaration as a whole-was to apply to the private property of an enemy and to private transactions.
It has therefore been contended that goods owned either in whole or in part by the enemy state
need not be given the protection of the Declaration. See H. A. Smith, "The Declaration of
Paris in Modern War," Law Quarterly Review, 55 (r939), pp. 2.37-49. In principle, this position
appears sound, though the practice of states affords no sufficient indication of the attitude
taken on this point. Nor is there likely to be any further development in this respect, given
the other belligerent measures which have practically done away with the protection granted
by Article 2..
24
None of the prize codes issued by belligerents in the 1939-45 war denied this continued
formal validity. And see Article 633c, Law of Naval Warfare.
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ever, Article 2 of the Declaration has been deprived of material effect upon
the conduct of hostilities by the interpretation given it by the belligerents,
by the changes wrought in the law of contraband, and by its subordination
to belligerent reprisal measures. It may of course be argued that these
latter measures provide no sufficient reason for questioning the continued
significance of Article 2; that, on the contrary, the fact that belligerents
felt compelled to resort to reprisals in order to override the rule that free
ships make free goods itself testifies to its continued validity-and significance. As already observed, the merit of this particular argument-while
not to be dismissed-ought not to be overestimated. It would, in fact, be
much nearer the mark to state that in departing from Article 2 of the
Declaration of Paris through the device of "reprisal measures" taken
against allegedly unlawful behavior of an opponent belligerents found a
ready instrument for preventing what they were in any event determined
to prevent-if need be by the formal denunciation of the Declaration. In
a word, the present significance of the Declaration of Paris in general, and
Article 2 of that instrument in particular, must be further assessed in the
light of the common belligerent determination to destroy the whole of an
enemy's seaborne trade, whether carried in enemy or neutral bottoms. 25
3. The Conduct of Seizure
The seizure-or capture 26-of enemy merchant vessels as prize, being a
hostile operation exercisable only during the existence of a state of war, 27
For further reflections on this point, see pp. 2.84-7, 315-7.
For further observations on the use of the terms "capture" and "seizure," seep. 105 (n).
27 It remains the prevailing consensus of states, prize courts and writers on the law of war
that the seizure of enemy vessels and goods as lawful prize (and, of course, the right of seizure
as exercised against neutral vessels and cargoes, see pp. 332. ff.) can only be exercised during a
formal state of war and not during a period of armed conflict in which the parties involved do
not admit-either explicitly or implicitly-that war as such exists. To this extent the law of
naval warfare-at least so far as the right of prize is concerned-must be excepted from the
more recent trend, noted in an earlier chapter (see pp. 2.3-5), of applying the law of war to
situations of armed conflict held-for varying reasons-not to constitute a state of war.
(Though it may be noted that during the period of hostilities (1947-48) between certain Arab
states and Israel, Egypt exercised the right of seizure and established a prize court to pass upon
the validity of maritime captures. At the time Israel was not considered as constituting a
state in the sense of international law.)
Even so, there is some question as to the period in which the right of prize is applicable.
Its starting point may be taken as from the time a state declares war. But a declaration of
war may be-and occasionally has been-made retroactive, though such retroactive declarations may prove to be only a device whereby a state resorts to an .. anticipatory embargo,"
in substance if not in form. Still further, it is in all cases true that in the absence of express
treaty provision to the contrary the seizure of enemy property after the conclusion of peace
is forbidden (though the decisions of prize courts upon vessels and goods seized prior to this ·
time are valid). Some difficulty, and uncertainty, does arise, however, with respect to .
the effect of a general armistice upon the right of prize. In principle, the conclusion of an·
armistice seems to have the effect of suspending the right of prize unless the armistice agree25

26
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is forbidden within neutral jurisdiction.28 But apart from the inviolability
of neutral jurisdiction enemy property may-if not accorded special protection-be seized anywhere upon the high seas, within the territorial
waters, harbors and ports of either the captor or the enemy state, and even
upon rivers, inland seas or lakes. The subjects of the right of seizure are
normally the units which comprise the naval forces (i. e., warships and
military aircraft) of belligerents, although exceptionally the seizure of
enemy vessels and cargoes may be undertaken by the civil authorities of a
belligerent and even by private individuals. 29
The act of seizure itself consists essentially in the taking of effective
control over an enemy vessel; from the time such effective control is exercised the vessel is regarded as seized. 30 In the past, the effective control
required ·was normally accomplished through the sending of a prize crew
on board the captured enemy vessel following visit and search. In the
circumstances presently characterizing the conduct of warfare at sea this
procedure must frequently prove· impracticable, however, and there is
nothing to prevent the captor from seizing and maintaining effective
control through other methods. There is no legal requirement that the
act of seizure be preceded by the visit and search of the enemy merchant
ment itself provides to the contrary. During World War I the armistice of November n,
1918 declared that the so-called "blockade" of Germany continued in force and that German
merchant vessels met at sea remained liable to seizure. See Garner, op. cit., pp. 204-6. Thus
the law of prize-both in its application to enemy as well as to neutral vessels-remained in
effect as far as the Allies were concerned. Germany, on the other hand, was required not only
to renounce the right of seizure but to release all neutral vessels already seized. World War
II practice, in this respect quite varied, is reviewed by S. \V. D. Rowson, op. cit., pp. 172-4.
28 See pp. 219-23, 259-60 for a discussion of the nature and scope of the prohibition against
resorting to seizure-or to visit and search-within neutral jurisdiction.
29 "The persons effecting a capture may in fact belong to the military, naval or other public
service, or they may be private citizens. They may even be occupants of the ship that is seized.
Thus the crew of a captured vessel, in charge of a prize crew of inferior strength, may rescue
the ship from those asserting control over it, and so capture it. The work of capture, save when
such action takes the form of rescue by occupants of a captured ship, or is the consequence of
resistance to capture, should be confined to the public, and preferably the naval forces of a
belligerent." Hyde, op. cit., p. 2023.
30 As to what constitutes capture the most frequently cited statement is that given in the
judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in The Pellworm:
"In principle it would seem that capture consists in compelling the vessel captured to conform
to the captor's will. When that is done deditio is complete, even though there may be on the
part of the prize an intention to seize an opportunity of escape, should it present itself. Submission must be judged by action or by abstention from action; it cannot depend on mere
intention, though proof of actual intention to evade capture may be evidence that acts in
themselves presenting an appearance of submission were ambiguous and did not result in a
completed capture. The conduct necessary to establish the fact of capture may take many forms.
No particular formality is necessary." The Pellworm and Other Ships [1920], 9 Lloyds Prize Cases,
p. 175. In this instance it was decided that hauling down the flag did not result in capture
unless the enemy merchant vessel actually submitted to the captor's will.
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vessel, although the contrary opinion still finds frequent expression. 31 Nor
is it necessary to send a prize crew on board. Instead, enemy vessels may
simply be ordered to proceed under escort of a belligerent warship, or
belligerent military aircraft, 32 to one of the belligerent's ports or to the port
of an ally. 33
a. Destruction of Enemy Prizes
In a general sense the act of seizure in naval warfare, and hence the
effects of seizure, may be considered in relation to all the vessels and goods
of an enemy, whether public or private in character. Although the warships of an enemy are always liable to attack and destruction, they may in31 The statements made in the text above raise several points which deserve additional comment. The traditional procedure for effecting seizure had been the same for both enemy and
neutral vessels. Visit and search preceded seizure, and the latter was normally effected through
sending a prize crew on board the vessel. In the case of enemy vessels armed resistance might
well be offered, but in this circumstance the vessel had to accept the consequences of its action.
It will be apparent that this traditional procedure can no longer be regarded as wholly compatible with naval warfare as presently conducted, given the dangers presented by armed enemy
merchant vessels, submarines and aircraft. (Of course, in the improbable case of belligerent
military aircraft attempting seizure of enemy vessels it is normally absurd even to contemplate
visit and search at sea, let alone to provide prize crews.)-It is entirely doubtful, though,
whether this traditional procedure was ever strictly required. The purpose of visit and search
has always been-in principle-to determine whether sufficient cause for seizure exists. In the
case of enemy vessels such cause will always exist unless the vessel falls in one of the categories
granted special protection. In the case of neutral vessels the matter is admittedly different
since the latter are liable to seizure only if engaged in certain acts (contraband carriage and
blockade breach); and the seizure of neutral vessels without sufficient cause gives rise to a
liability of the captor for losses incurred by the owners of the vessel as a result of wrongful
seizure. But certainly the seizure of an enemy vessel or of a neutral vessel for sufficient cause
has never been questioned by prize courts simply because not preceded by visit and search. Nor
have neutrals complained if seizure was not preceded by visit and search, so long as legitimate
cause for the seizure of a neutral vessel could later be established in a court of prize. Besides, if
belligerents wish to take the risk of illegal seizure they may clearly do so. See, generally,
U. S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, I9JO, pp. 2.5 £f.-From a rather abstract
point of view, therefore, it may be said that visit and search forms no part of the act of seizing
enemy merchant vessels, such vessels always being liable to seizure. From a practical point of
view, visit and search may of course prove necessary if positive identification of enemy character
cannot be made by other methods. See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 502.a. In the main, however, visit and search may properly be regarded as a procedure relevant to the seizure of neutral
merchant vessels and as such is considered in a later chapter (Chapter XII).
32 In the case of enemy merchantmen, readily identified as such, the scope of action permitted
to belligerent military aircraft is certainly no less than that granted to belligerent warships.
The right of the latter to seize enemy vessels without prior visit and search must be accorded
equally to belligerent military aircraft. On the quite different question of the diversion of
neutral merchant vessels by belligerent military aircraft, see pp. 342.-3.
33 Still further, the belligerent may compel the enemy prize-if need be by measures of forceto accede to such orders as are given her. In the event a prize crew is sent on board the prize the
master and crew may be requested to assist the captor, although they cannot be compelled to
do so. The act of seizure is signified by ordering the captured enemy vessel to lower her flag,·
the captor's flag being flown at the usual place (peak or staff) over the enemy flag.-Dn the
ultimate disposition of the officers and crews of captured enemy merchant vessels, see pp. III-6.
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stead be captured. Where enemy warships are captured title to such vessels
immediately vests entirely in the captor state by virtue of the fact of capture. 34 In this respect, however, the consequences following upon the
taking of effective control over an enemy warship differ from the consequences following upon the seizure of privately owned enemy merchant
vessels. Title to the latter does not finally vest in the captor state until
the vessel has been brought before a prize court and duly condemned as
lawful prize. 35 In the case of cargo carried on board seized enemy merchant vessels the need for adjudication is clearer still, since part of the cargo
may well be owned by neutrals. 36 For these reasons, among others, it
Law of Naval Warfare, Article 503a (2.).
Simply Stated, the function of a prize court is to pass upon or to confirm the validity of
all maritime captures, and title to the privately owned vessels or goods of an enemy (or of a
neutral) seized in prize does not finally pass to the captor until adjudication by a court of prize.
Hence, even if an enemy vessel has been destroyed following capture, adjudication remains
necessary. Occasionally, however, it has been contended that as between the belligerents
title to privately owned enemy vessels normally vests in the captor state by virtue of the fact
of capture. Thus Hyde (op. cit., p. 2..383) observes that: "As long as the law of maritime war
permits a belligerent to appropriate generally enemy ships and enemy property thereon, both
private and public, the State of the captor would seem to be justified in claiming that the fact
of capture vests title in itself as against the enemy." (And see Law of Naval Warfare, Chapter
5, note 19.) At the same time Hyde goes on to declare that to establish "an indefeasible title
to an enemy prize as against the legitimate claims of neutral States or persons, condemnation
is regarded as necessary. This circumstance together with other practical considerations
render it highly expedient that enemy prizes should always be made the subject of adjudication
with a view to condemnation." This view is clearly a minority one, though, since the prevailing opinion-shared by the great majority of writers and frequently endorsed by prize
courts-is that every enemy prize ought to be judged, that a valid title cannot arise simply from
the military act of seizure, and that title passes only with the condemning judgment of a court
of prize.
36 This for the reason that neutral goods-contraband excepted-on enemy ships ordinarily
are not liable to condemnation, at least if the neutral owner can clearly establish their innocent
character .-AI though the distinction drawn above in the text is an old one, and in itself raises
no novel questions, there is a certain difficulty-or at least an ambiguity-involved in the
terminology used to describe acts of varying legal significance and involving different legal
consequences. Thus H. A. Smith (The Law and Custom of the Sea, p. Ioo) criticizes the "indiscriminate" use of the terms "capture" and "seizure," suggesting instead that capture be used
' 'to indicate those cases in which the act of taking control immediately transfers the full legal
ownership of that which is taken" (e. g., warships, enemy vessels in the public service and
state owned property) and seizure to indicate "these cases in which the act of taking control
does not by itself change the ownership, but is merely provisional, the final change of ownership
being conditioned on what is called 'condemnation' by a court of prize" (e. g., privately owned
enemy vessels and goods, neutral vessels seized for unneutral service, blockade breach and
contraband carriage). It must be observed, however, that general usage has been, and will
probably continue to be, to use the terms interchangeably. Nor is there any real harm in this
so long as it is understood that there is a distinction to be drawn between the appropriation of
state owned property- which falls to the captor as legitimate booty of war- and the appropriation of privately owned enemy property-which comes under the right of prize and is therefore
governed by the law of prize, including the necessity for adjudication.-In this connection one
further point should be noted. The traditional law is clearly based on the assumption that
34

35
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is considered desirable that-circumstances permitting-enemy merchant vessels once seized should either be sent or conducted into port for
adjudication. 37
Occasions frequently arise, however, when the sending of an enemy prize
into port proves either impossible or highly inconvenient. The condition
of the prize may be such as to prevent her further navigation. The captor
may be unable to spare a prize crew and unwilling to conduct the enemy
prize into port if such action would thereby interfere with the military
operations upon which he is engaged at the time of seizure. Rather than
release the prize the practice of belligerents in these-as well as in still
other-circumstances has been to resort to the destruction of the vessel and
cargo; and-in principle-the belligerent license to destroy enemy prizes in
certain circumstances is firmly established in law, despite continued controversy as to the precise nature of the circumstances in which belligerents may
resort to destruction. Although the assertion is still made by some writers
that the destruction of enemy prizes is permitted only where circumstances
render any other course impossible, it now appears reasonably clear that this
warships apart (and certain other limited categories of vessels in the enemy's public service)
the vessels and goods of an enemy will be privately owned. But what of publicly owned
vessels engaged solely in commercial activities? Is their seizure, as well as the seizure of state
owned cargoes, to be regarded as the taking of legitimate booty of war, and therefore outside
the law of prize? Or is their seizure to be assimilated to the act of seizing privately owned
enemy vessels and goods? Belligerent practice to date hardly furnishes a clear answer in this
regard, though on principle the former alternative would appear correct. See, for example,
Rowson, op. cit., pp. 175-7. Even so, a clear distinction would still be warranted between the
liability of state owned vessels-engaged in commercial activities-to seizure as booty of war
and their liability to attack in a manner similar to warships. As already pointed out (seep. 68
(n)), there appears to be no justification for making such vessels liable to attack simply by
virtue of their public ownership.-As to the quite different question of the applicability of
prize law to neutral state owned vessels and cargoes, see pp. 2.13-4, 335-6.
37 State practice is equally clear, however, that a belligerent may convert captured enemy
merchant vessels to his immediate public use should circumstances so require. In American
law the procedure to be observed when sending in enemy and neutral prizes for adjudication is
set forth in the text of the Prize Statutes, U. S. Code, Title 34, Chapter 2.0, Sees. 1131-67. Prior
to World War II the requirement had been that in order for a Federal District Court to obtain
jurisdiction to entertain prize proceedings a seized vessel had to be brought to the United States.
During World War II amendments to the prize law were made in order to allow such juris;diction to Federal Courts if a prize ''was brought into the territorial waters of a co-belligerent
(the latter so consenting) or into a locality in the temporary or permanent possession or occupation of the armed forces of the United States." In addition, the World War II amendments
extended prize law to aircraft. Finally, the procedure for making immediate use of captured
vessels, and avoiding the necessity for applying to the Prize Court for requisition of the prize,
was broadened. See, generally, the publication Instructions For Prize_Masters and Special Prize
Commissioners (NAVEXOS P-82.5), Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the
Navy, (1949). Also, Law of Naval Warfare, Article 502.b (8) and notes thereto. See also Chapter.
XII, pp. 344-8, for further discussion of these and related points as they apply to neutral prizes.
And on the taking of prizes-whether enemy or neutral-into neutral ports, see pp. :45-7·
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formula is much too restrictive. Instead, it would seem that the w idespread practice followed by belligerents is indicative of the conviction that
the destruction of enemy prizes is permitted whenever military necessitya term which, in this context, must have broad application-so requires. 38
Before resorting to the destruction of enemy prizes the captor is obliged
to remove the passengers and crew, as well as the ship's papers, to a place of
safety. 39 And despite the practices pursued by many of the belligerents
during the two World Wars there is as yet insufficient warrant for denying
the continued validity of obligations established by custom and subsequently reaffirmed by convention. No doubt it is true that in the past submarines (and aircraft) have been-in nearly every instance-incapable of
38 Distingui~h, though, between the destruction of enemy prizes and the destruction of
neutral prizes. The conditions permitting the destruction of neutral prizes are considerably
more restrictive and are examined in a later chapter (see pp. 34~53). (It should be made clear,
however, that in referring to the destruction of enemy prizes, neutral vessels acquiring enemy
character are included.) See Article 503b (2.) Law of Naval Warfare. The formula of "military
necessity" given in the initial sentence of Article 503b (2.) follows earlier Instructions and
represents the traditional policy of this country. British practice has been interpreted as permitting destruction of enemy prizes in two cases " ... first, when the prize is in such a condition
as prevents her from being sent to any port of adjudication; and, secondly, when the capturing
vessel is unable to spare a prize crew to navigate the prize into such a port.'' OppenheimLauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 487-8. In effect, however, British practice has allowed destruction
in other cases of "military necessity." Thus Higgins and Colombos (op. cit., pp. 6o7-8) point
out that the British Prize Court has permitted destruction of enemy prizes when "the capturing
British warship was engaged in pursuing the enemy fleet and could not stop for the purpose
of taking the vessel into port." Article 72. of the 1939 German Prize Law Code declared that
captured enemy vessels may be destroyed "if it appears to be inexpedient or unsafe to bring
them into port." In both wars German surface warships, even when first seizing enemy vessels. and not resorting to sinking without warning-nearly always resorted to destruction.
It remains disputed whether or not the captor state is obliged to render compensation to the
neutral owners of goods on board an enemy vessel that has been lawfully destroyed. The
opinions of writers are sharply divided on this point, and the practice of states is none too clear.
German prize courts during World War I denied nrutral owners any right of compensation.
Before the British Prize Court the matter was never clearly adjudicated upon, though nineteenth century decisions can be cited on behalf of a right of compensation. Nor is there any
clear indication as to what the position of the United States may be on the matter. Hyde (op.
cit., p. 2.2.2.9) contends that there ought to be no right of compensation to neutral owners, that
neutral cargo on board enemy vessels ought not to become a shield to protect such vessels from
the lawful act (i. e., destruction) of the captors. This may well be, but it is equally true that
if this opinion is accepted Article 3 of the Declaration of Paris is rendered practically worthless.
For the latitude now given belligerents in destroying enemy prizes would amount to granting
belligerents an equal latitude in destroying innocent neutral goods when carried on board.
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the view holding that no compensation need be accorded
the neutral owners of cargo is much more in accord with the over-all recent trends of belligerent practices.
39
An obligation which is not fulfilled merely by allowing passengers and crew to take to
the ship's boats unless the safety of the latter is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to
take them on board.
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satisfactorily fulfilling these obligations . But the fact that the captor may
be unable to provide for the safety of passengers and crews of enemy merchant vessels cannot be regarded as a justification for non-compliance with
the law. 40 Indeed, to argue otherwise must logically involve the further
assertion that he who cannot seize may nonetheless sink. It has been previously urged that the law of naval warfare has still to condone the latter
doctrine. 41 There is no more reason to believe that this law as presently
constituted has accepted the doctrine that he who cannot provide for the
safety of passengers and crew following seizure rna y nonetheless destroy.
E. THE SEIZURE AND DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT

It remains uncertain to what extent the rules regulating the seizure and
destruction of enemy merchant vessels are applicable-by analogy-to
enemy civil aircraft. 42 Quite apart from the fact that the rules governing
the treatment of enemy merchant vessels are themselves in an unsettled
state, the attempt to adopt rules operative in naval warfare to the seizure
and destruction of aircraft presents obvious difficulties. At the same time,
it is clear that in many respects belligerent practice in conducting aerial
warfare is so sligJ"lt at present as to provide no real guidance to that behavior belligerents may consider as both obligatory and right. Nor is it
very useful-in the absence of such practice-to continue to place undue
emphasis upon the 1923 Rules of Aerial Warfare, drafted by the Commission
of Jurists at The Hague. Though undoubtedly a significant contribution
at the time, these draft rules provide today little more than a landmark to
40

Though in the circumstances presently characterizing the conduct of naval warfare it has
been argued that the equities of passengers and crew may be affected by the nature and conduct
of their own ship. Thus, Hyde (op. cit., p. 2.02.6) declares that in the case of an armed
merchant vessel "which in consequence of resistance or otherwise has become unseaworthy,
the duty to offer safe accommodation to persons on board would appear to be dependent upon
the military requirements of the captors." Strictly speaking, though, there is no apparent
basis for this opinion in the traditional law. Undoubtedly acts of resistance render enemy
merchant vessels liable to attack and possible destruction. But once the vessel had been
seized, and the captor had asserted his effeCtive control, no discrimination was made toward
crews for having offered resistance prior to capture. It may well be claimed, however, that
it is no longer reasonable that captors be expected scrupulously to fulfill the obligation of
ensuring the safety of crews of enemy merchant vessels when such vessels are-for all.practical
purposes-integrated into the enemy's military effort at sea and have offered acts of r~sistance
prior to capture; and in these circumstances a captor unable to take officers and crews on board
before resorting to the destruction of enemy prizes nevertheless fulfills his duty by permitting
the latter to take to the ship's boats. Certainly, there is much force to this argument, even
though it is still unrecognized in law.
41 See pp. 67-70.
42 On the classification of enemy aircraft, see Law of Naval Warfare, Section soo. The term
" civil aircraft," as used in the text above, is intended to include the same aircraft as are included
in Section soob.

108

one phase in the historic development of juristic thought on the regulation
of aerial warfare. 43
On one central issue state practice does appear to be reasonably well
settled. The liability to capture and confiscation of enemy civil aircraft,
and of enemy goods on board, now enjoys general support, and it is not
likely that this adaptation of the practice operative in warfare at sea rather
than the practice governing seizure of property on land will be reversed. 44
43 For a general discussion and analysis of the problems dealt with in this section, see Spaight,
op. cit., pp. 394-4I8. The attempt to apply maritime practices to aerial warfare formed the
basis of much earlier speculation, and the influence of the maritime analogy was apparent in
the work of the Commission of Jurists. For the text of the I92.3 Rules of Aerial Warfare,
together with the general report of the Commission of Jurists, see U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, z924, pp. Io8-54· With respect to the seizure and destruction of enemy
civil aircraft it is difficult to estimate the effect of the I92.3 Rules upon later belligerent practice,
if only for the reason that this later practice has been so slight. If the deference shown to the
provisions of the I92.3 Rules dealing with aerial bombardment are to be regarded as generally
indicative of the degree to which belligerents may be expected to follow the other prescriptions
of this draft code, then rhe I92.3 Rules hardly retain more than an historic interest. However,
the fate suffered by the I 92.3 Rules of Aerial Warfare does not justify their characterization as
"examples of a high-water mark in legal fantasy" (C. P. Phillips, "Air Warfare and Law: An
Analysis of the Legal Doctrines, Practices and Policies," George Washington Law Review, 2.1
(I953), p. 32.6), unless the excesses of modern-and total-war are to be regarded as an entirely
normal state of affairs. The mistake-though hardly a fantasy-of the Commission of Jurists
was in assuming that belligerents would not look upon the practices of World War I as a desirable standard for the conduct of future wars. On this assumption-however sanguine it may
now appear with the advantage of hindsight-the I92.3 Rules were quite realistic.
In the absence either of conventional regulation or of belligerent practice constitutive of
customary rules it has been contended that the general principles of the law of war place re. strictions upon the seizure and destruction of enemy aircraft, and that "whenever a departure
from these principles is alleged to be necessary, its cogency must be proved by reference either
to express agreement or to the peculiar conditions of aerial warfare." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht,
op. cit., p. 52.0. No doubt this opinion may be considered as justified-in theory at least. Yet
it would serve little purpose to ignore the obstacles encountered in applying the general
principles of the law of war to aerial warfare. In the case of aerial bombardment these difficulties have long been painfully apparent (see pp. I46-9). If they are less apparent with respect
to seizure and destruction of enemy aircraft this may be attributed largely to the peripheral
importance of this problem alongside the momentous issues posed by aerial bombardment.
The dearth .of actual practice relating to seizure and destruction of enemy civil aircraft is a
further reason for continued speculation that may prove to have little relevance to actual
practice. The unfortunate truth is that in the absence of customary or conventional rules
effectively regulating the conduct of aerial warfare in some detail, the invocation of general
principles has a distinctly limited utility, particularly when these general principles are themselves subject to varying interpretations (see pp. 46-5o).
44 Article 52. of the I 92.3 draft Rules, in following maritime practice, provided that enemy
private aircraft "are liable to capture in all circumstances." Article 55 declared that the
capture of aircraft or goods on board ''shall be made the subject of prize proceedings, in order
that any neutral claim may be duly heard and determined."-During World War II a number of
belligerents-including Great Britain and the United States-amended their prize legislation
so as to include aircraft and goods carried on board. (SeeS. W. D. Rowson, op. cit., pp. 2.o9-I3
and A. W. Knauth, op. cit., pp. 76-7.) The American Prize Act of June 2.4, I94I (55 Stat. 2.6I;
34 U.S. Code Sec. II3I) does not specify where aircraft may be captured, though the capturing
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But belligerent practice has not yet given rise to any definite procedure governing the conduct of seizure in the case of enemy civil aircraft. 45
No particular problem would appear to arise with respect to the destruction of enemy aircraft once seizure has been made and the captor has been
able to remove passengers and crew to a place of safety. In these circumstances the capturing belligerent must be regarded as having at least the
same discretion as he already possesses in destroying enemy merchant
vessels. Of critical importance, however-and as yet far from resolvedis the question of the occasions in which enemy civil aircraft may be fired
upon while still in flight. In principle, the rule granting non-combatants
immunity from direct attack must be regarded as applicable to hostilities
wherever conducted. There is no apparent reason why aerial warfare
should be thought of as an exception, and-in fact-belligerents have never
contended that in the air they may discard a distinction long operative
in hostilities on land and at sea. At the same time, it has frequently been
contended that given the special circumstances attending aerial hostilities
the scope of the immunity from direct attack granted non-combatants
necessarily must prove more restricted than elsewhere. 46
In earlier pages attention has been directed to those acts which when
performed by enemy merchant vessels serve to deprive the latter of immunity
agency appears to have been limited to the Navy. The British Prize Act of 1939, in extending
prize law to aircraft, is quite clear that the capture of aircraft may occur even though the
aircraft is over land.-Presumably, the rules governing the enemy character of vessels will
apply by analogy to aircraft. On the question of belligerent aircraft in enemy territory at the
outbreak of war, see p. 90. On the rules governing the use of medical aircraft and transports
under the 1949 Convention on the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, see pp. 12_9-31. And, finally, on the application
of prize law to neutral aircraft, see pp. 354-6.
45 No doubt it is true that as in the case of enemy vessels so in the case of enemy aircraft the
act of seizure must consist in the assertion of effective control over the aircraft. Assuming
that the place of encounter is over the high seas a belligerent may use any convenient method
to signal to the enemy civil aircraft and to order her to proceed to one of the belligerent's landing fields (on the rarest of occasions landing at sea may even prove feasible). Failure to carry
out such orders will constitute sufficient reason for employing forcible measures. But what
course of action is permitted to a belligerent aircraft (or, for that matter, to a belligerent warship) against enemy civil aircraft that lack the fuel to carry out the belligerent's directions?
The problem has no parallel in naval warfare. For suggestions on the conduct of visit, search
and seizure of aircraft see U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, zg38, pp. 15-25.
46 The nature of these circumstances are sufficiently apparent and need not be examined once
again in these pages. Spaight (op. cit., pp. 398-9) points out that although the attack of
civil aircraft results in a more serious danger to the individual occupants than does similar
action when directed against merchant vessels, nevertheless, "the military necessity for warlike action that may involve loss of innocent life is greater in the fmmer case, for the speed
of an aircraft, its ability to elude siezure, and its capacity for damaging action (either by bomb~
dropping or by observing important movements), render it a more dangerous potential enemy
than a sea vessel; and there is always the possibility that an apparently non-military aircraft
may be a combatant one disguised.''

110

from attack. 47 There is little question but that the same acts if performed
by enemy civil aircraft may result in a liability to attack. Thus any
attempt by enemy civil aircraft to resist the orders given by belligerent
aircraft, or to flee upon being duly summoned by a belligerent, will justify
the use of force. Similarly, civil aircraft found flying under escort of enemy
military aircraft may be fired upon. Liability to attack may also result
from the carriage of armament. 48 Finally, if the civil aircraft of a belligerent are integrated in any way into the military effort of the state they
need not be accorded immunity from attack on sight. 49

F. THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY SUBJECTS
Prisoners of War
It has always been clear that the combatant personnel of belligerent warships, whether vessels of the line or auxiliaries, who fall into the hands of
an enemy during the course of naval hostilities are to be accorded the status
of prisoners of war. The same status has been held to attach to the noncombatant members of a belligerent's naval forces, unless granted special
exemption, as well as to those persons who officially accompany the naval
I.

See pp. 56 ff.
Quite apart from military consideration, which would clearly dictate attacking any enemy
aircraft found to be bearing armament, there is no practice to which belligerents can turn to
justify the "defensive" arming of civil aircraft. Any attempt to apply here the practices of
naval warfare would not bear serious scrutiny, and belligerents have never suggested otherwise.
49 In the circumstances enumerated above the liability of enemy civil aircraft to attack does
not succeed in raising serious question. In warfare at sea it has always been true that the immunity from attack granted belligerent merchant vessels is dependent upon the abstention from
all acts of force against a captor as well as upon the absence of any relationship to the military
operations of a belligerent. The fulfillment of the same general conditions must be regarded
as even more mandatory in the case of aerial warfare. It is beyond this point, however, that
uncertainty persists. To what extent does the nature of aerial warfare, and the potential danger
posed by enemy aircraft, permit the resort to measures that are yet to be accepted in naval
warfare? (Of course, if the position is accepted that belligerents are now at liberty to attack
enemy merchant vessels without warning, and to destroy them without first insuring the safety
of passengers and crew, then no problem arises in the case of aerial warfare. What is permitted
atainst merchant vessels is equally permitted-from this point of view-against civil aircraft.)
In this respect, Spaight (op. cit., pp. 4oo--2.) suggests that belligerents may close limited aerial
zones over the high seas to both enemy and neutral aircraft, and attack any aircraft thereafter
entering these aerial enclosures. Nevertheless, he insists that the belligerent in establishing
such a zone must be able to show "concrete grounds for his action, e. g., to operations actually
in progress on the spot, or important concentrations therein for pending operations, to the
constant patrolling of the zone by his aircraft in the search for enemy submarines, to the regular
passing of transports over a line of communications, or to some other form of military activity
which differentiates the area in question from the ordinary high sea." There can be little question but that as against belligerent civil aircraft the closure of such restricted aerial zones
over the high seas-and their rigid enforcement- does not raise any substantial question. As
to the operation of these zones with respect to neutral aircraft, see pp. 3oo-1.
47

48
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forces without actually being members thereof. 5° In an even broader sense,
the status of prisoners of war has been customarily conferred upon the
personnel of all the public vessels of a belligerent. 51
With respect to the officers and crew of a captured private enemy merchant
ship, the traditional practice of belligerents prior to this centuty had generally been to make them prisoners of war. 52 But a quite different procedure
was provided for in Hague Convention XI (1907). In the event of capturing
an enemy merchant ship the parties to that Convention were obliged not
to make prisoners of war those members of the crew who were nationals of
a neutral state. The same rule applied in the case of the captain and officers,
likewise nationals of a neutral state, if they promised formally in writing
not to serve in an enemy ship for the duration of the war. 53 Nor were the
captain, officers, and members of the crew who were nationals of the enemy
state to be made prisoners of war, if they undertook, on the faith of a formal
written promise, not to engage, while the hostilities lasted, in any service
connected with the operations of the war. 54 In each instance a pledge was
given, the captor was to notify the other belligerent, and the latter was forbidden knowingly to employ the said persons. 55 The preceding provisions
were qualified, however, by the stipulation that they did not apply to
ships "taking part in the hostilities," 56 a phrase which was given from the
very start the broadest possible interpretation.
In the light of belligerent practice during the two World Wars it is hardly
useful to continue to accord any significance to these provisions of Hague
XI, at least to the extent that they concern the status of enemy subjects
50

See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 5IIa, which reflects the customary international law
applicable to hostilities whether conducted on land, at sea or in the air. As between the parties
to the I949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, the categories
of individuals entitled to that status are enumerated in Article 4· The other I949 Geneva
Convemions For the Protection of War Victims are: The Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick Armed Forces in the Field, the Convention For the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea, and the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War. For a detailed treatment of the Convention governing treatment of wounded, sick and
shipwrecked at sea, see pp. II7-38. The United States ratified the four I949 Geneva Conventions in August I95 5.
51 Even though not forming a part of the naval or military forces of a belligerent-e. g .•
customs and police vessels. Exemption must of course be made for the personnel attached to
those public vessels granted special immunity from either attack or seizure.
52 Article II of the u.s. Naval War Code of I900 provided that: "The personnel of a merchant vessel of an enemy captured as a prize can be held, at the discretion of the captor, as
witnesses, or as prisoners of war when by training or enrollment they are immediately available
for the naval service of the enemy, or they may be released from detention or confined."
53 Article 5·
54 Article 6.
55 Article 7.
56 Article 8.
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making up the crews of enemy merchant ships captured by a belligerent. 57
They clear1y were not in tended to apply to the personnel of publici y owned
and controlled belligerent merchant vessels. It seems equally clear that
they were never designed to apply to the officers and crews of enemy merchant vessels which, though privately owned, operate under the instructions of the state and-for all practical purposes-are integrated into the
military effort at sea. Certainly they ought not to apply, and in fact have
not been so interpreted as applying, to enemy merchant ships offering-or
intending to offer-forcible resistance to capture .. Such intent to offer
forcible resistance, and thus to "take part in the hostilities," may not
improperly be imputed to any enemy merchant ship bearing "defensive"
armament. 58
Hence, the present character of naval hostilities hardly permits the
expectation that belligerents will give any greater effect in the future to
these provisions of Hague XI than they have in the past. Instead, the
expectation must be that enemy nationals making up the crews of belligerent merchantmen will be detained by the captor as prisoners of war, and
as between the parties to the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War this is a status which-if detained-they
are now entitled to receive. 59 Similarly, the officers and crews of enemy
merchantmen who are nationals of a neutral state may also be detained as
the provision that members of the crew who were enemy subjects might only be
made prisoners if they refused to give parole was ipso facto modified by the practice followed
during the First World War, according to which all enemy civilians of military age could be
prevented from returning home, and could be interned. Accordingly, all the belligerents interned the enemy crews of captured enemy merchant-vessels." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit.,
p. 467. A similar practice obtained throughout the 1939 war, though the detention of enemy
crew members of captured belligerent merchant vessels frequently resulted in their receiving
the status of prisoners of war rather than that of interned enemy aliens. In the past the problem
of the status to be accorded d~tained enemy merchant seamen has frequently been complicated
by the fact that in some states the merchant marine may be taken over by the state, and the
personnel may even be included within the armed forces. In this latter case the status of the
individuals when captured is clear-i. e., they are entitled to the protection accorded prisoners
of war. But in those states where the personnel of the merchant marine remained civilians the
captor has been free to treat them simply as interned enemy aliens. Even further, the civilian
personnel of the merchant marine have been frequently deprived of the protection accorded by
Hague Convention X (1907) to the sick, wounded and shipwrecked at sea. As will presently
be noted, the 1949 Geneva Conventions have altered this situation.
58
None of the observations made in the text above are immediately apparent from the actual
wording of Articles 5-8 of Hague XI, for these articles speak only of "enemy merchantships"
and of the deprivation of the benefits contained therein when "taking part in the hostilities."
Yet it seems clear that the Convention was to apply only to privately owned merchant ships
of the enemy. Furthermore, belligerents have interpreted-and not unreasonably-any of the
acts indicated above as indicative of taking part in the hostilities. See also, in this connection,
pp. 57-70.
59
Article 4A (5) of that Convention provides that among the categories of individuals
entitled to receive the status of prisoners of war are: "Members of crews, including masters,
pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties
to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of
57 ". • •
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prisoners of war if the vessel on which they are serving has taken any part
in the hostilities prior to capture. But if the enemy merchantman has
abstained from any participation in the hostilities prior to capture, and in
particular has not attempted to offer any resistance to the captor, the
officers and crew who are nationals of a neutral state normally are not to
be made prisoners of war. 60
The civilian passengers carried on board enemy merchant vessels may be
composed of nationals of the enemy state as well as of neutral states. If
they are nationals of the enemy state, and have refrained from any participation in the hostilities prior to the capture of the vessel, they are normally
not to be made prisoners of war. However, as enemy nationals they are
subject to detention by the belligerent into whose hands they fall; and
under exceptional circumstances they may even be treated as prisoners of
war. 61 On the other hand, the nationals of a neutral state on board capinternational law. "-The "other provisions of international law" is a reference to Articles 5-8
of Hague XI. In view of the doubtful validity today of the latter articles, at least as they apply
to enemy nationals, it may be assumed that the status of prisoners of war will prevail with
respect to enemy nationals making up the personnel of enemy merchant ships. It should also
be pointed out that Article 4A (5) of the 1949 Convention on prisoners of war deals with the
personnel of enemy civil aircraft in the same manner as with the crew of enemy merchant ships.
Unless entitled to more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law
the crew of enemy civil aircraft are to be made prisoners of war. In this instance, however,
the "other provisions of international law·· are non-existent. For this reason it may be contended that, in principle, the rules governing the status and treatment of individuals taken
from enemy merchant vessels apply, mutatis mutandis, to the personnel taken from the civil
aircraft of an enemy (see Law of Naval Warfare, Article 512.). At the same time, it may be noted
that the 192.3 Rules of Aerial Warfare (Article 36) would have granted belligerents substantially greater power over the crew and passengers of enemy civil aircraft than had theretofore
been accorded in the case of enemy merchant vessels. Not only would these draft rules have
permitted making prisoners of war of all enemy nationals composing the crew, but neutral
nationals making up the crew of enemy civil aircraft would also be liable to detention as prisoners of war unless signing a written undertaking not to serve in any enemy aircraft while hostilities lasted. Passengers found to be of enemy nationality and fit for military service could be
made prisoners of war. In addition, passengers found to be in the "service of the enemy"
could be made prisoners of war, regardless of nationality. Finally, a belligerent could hold
as prisoner of war any member of the crew of an enemy civil aircraft or any passenger whose
service in a flight had been of special and active assistance to the enemy (and see generally,
Spaight, op. cit., pp. 4n-4).
60 In practice, belligerents have not detained-either as prisoners of war or as "civil prisoners"-nationals of neutral states serving as crew members on board enemy merchantmen, if not
found to have participated in acts of hostilities against the captor. But it is fairly" well established that release is dependent upon the abstention from committing hostile acts or from participating in such acts. On the other hand, it follows from Article 4A (5) of the 1949 Convention on prisoners of war that if the nationals of neutral states_ serving on board belligerent
merchantmen are detained they are to receive the status of prisoners of war.
61 E. g., if officials of the enemy state.-As between the parties to the 1949 Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons it would appear that such enemy nationais as
are found on board captured enemy merchant vesesls as private passengers are 'entitled to the
status of "protected persons." The first paragraph of Article 4 of the Convention on civilian
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tured enemy merchant vessels as passengers are not to be made prisoners of
war unless they have previously participated in acts of hostility against
the captor. Nor are they to be detained by the captor any longer than
proves necessary, the captor being under the obligation to release such
nationals of neutral states as expeditiously as is possible. 62
It has already been observed that neutral merchant vessels may acquire
enemy character by undertaking to perform any one of several services on
behalf of a belligerent. In the more serious forms of unneutral service,
where the neutral vessel takes a direct part in the hostilities or acts in any
manner as a naval auxiliary to an enemy's forces, it may be assimilated to
an enemy warship and rendered liable to attack on sight. There can be
little question that if the personnel of such vessels fall into the hands of
the other belligerent they are subject to detention as prisoners of war. 63
persons states: "Persons protected by the Convention are those who at a given moment and
in any manner whatsoever, find themselves in.case of a conflict_or~occupation in the hands of
a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.'' The same
article goes on to declare that persons protected by the prisoners of war Convention or the Convention relating to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea ''shall not be considered as protected persons within the meaning of the present Convention."
62 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 512..
In addition to participation in acts of hostility committed against the captor prior to seizure, it seems reasonably clear that nationals of a neutral
state on board a captured enemy merchant vessel as passengers may be made prisoners of war
if found to be in the service of the enemy.
63 It has occasionally been urged that the crews of neutral vessels taking a direct part in the
hostilities may even be liable to punishment as war criminals. But this opinion would seem
justified only where such vessels undertake offensive operations directly aimed against the warships or merchantmen of an enemy-and this will prove exceedingly rare. Hyde (op. cit., p.
2.066) distinguishes between neutral vessels "primarily devoted to the military service of a
belligerent" and those neutral vessels taking part in hostilities but "not given over to a belligerent service." Whereas the crews of the former may be treated as prisoners of war Hyde
would permit the crews of the latter to be dealt with "summarily"-presumably meaning as
war criminals. The distinction is not easy to follow, since a vessel of neutral registry that
takes part in the hostilities is always acting-in a broad sense-in the "military service of a
belligerent''-unless, of course, it is undertaking purely private acts of depredation in the manner
of a pirate vesseL-In any event, a distinction should be carefully drawn between neutral
merchant vessels acquiring enemy character through acts of unneutral service, and whose crew
members ar~ liable to treatment as prisoners of war, and neutral vessels acquiring enemy
character-whether by committing acts of unneutral service or other acts-but whose crew
members are not subject to detention as prisoners of war. The acquisition of enemy character
on the part of a neutral merchant vessel does not necessarily mean that the captor has a right
to treat members of the crew bearing neutral nationality as prisoners of war. Indeed, it is
only exceptionally that such treatment may prove warranted, i. e., when the neutral vessel
has by its actions identified itself with the armed forces of a belligerent. Acts of unneutral
service which do not result in such identification may nevertheless result in the neutral vessel
acquiring enemy character and rendering it liable to capture. But a neutral vessel acting
under belligerent orders or direction does not, for that reason alone, give the belligerent
capturing it the right to make prisoners of war those members of the crew as are nationals
of a neutral state. In short, the imputation of enemy character to neutral merchant vessels
is not to be taken as an indication that the officers and crews of such vessels, when captured,
may therefore be made prisoners of war.
399334-57--9
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There is surprisingly little guidance of a specific character for the treatment of prisoners of war while detained on board a belligerent warship.
The customary rule that they must be treated in a humane manner fails to
indicate with any precision the specific duties and rights of the captor.
For those states that are parties to the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War it is apparent that the general obligations
laid down for the protection of prisoners of war in Articles 12. through 16
must be complied with, at least to the degree that these obligations are
relevant to the circumstances attending internment on board belligerent
warships. 64 But these latter provisions are of a very general character and
consequently leave unanswered many questions that may well arise in the
course of operations at sea. Doubtless a belligerent must refrain either
from imposing unnecessary hardships upon prisoners of war interned on
board his warship or from subjecting prisoners to unnecessary danger.
Nevertheless, the fulfillment of these obligations, given the facilities of
warships and the circumstances characterizing naval operations, may
present numerous difficulties. 65 Of course, once prisoners of war are landed
they immediately become subject to the detailed provisions relating to
prisoners of war as are set out in the relevant Geneva Convention of 1949.
il4 In general these Articles provide that prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy power
though not of the individuals or military units who have captured them, that they must be
humanely treated, that no act must be taken against them which would cause death or seriously
endanger their health, that they must not be made the object of measures of reprisal, that they
are entitled to respect for their persons, honour, and sex, that they must be accorded proper
maintenance and medical attention, and that they must be granted equality of treatment without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions.
6 5 These difficulties are hardly met by the observation that "the propriety of exposing prisoners taken at sea to great personal danger or hardship would depend upon whether, under the
particular circumstances, the captor had the right to deprive them of the safeguards of their
own craft without substituting others of substantial value, a question of which the solution
might hang upon the propriety of the measures by which capture was effected." Hyde, op.
cit., p. 2.067. In the case of enemy warships that have been destroyed there is no question of
the right of a belligerent to deprive enemy personnel "of the safeguards of their own craft
without substituting others of substantial value." The question does arise, however, with
respect to enemy merchant vessels. In a strict sense the obligation of the captor to place the
crews of such vessels in a "place of safety" prior to destroying enemy prizes may be interpreted
as forbidding destruction when the warship itself does not constitute a place of safety-due
either to the operations upon which it is engaged or to the nature of the warship itself. Even
so, this is surely a counsel of perfection and one which belligerents can hardly be expected to
follow, even under far more ideal conditions than those presently characteriZing naval warfare.-It is, in fact, hard to avoid the conclusion that what is "unnecessary" (hence forbidden)
in the hardships or dangers imposed upon prisoners of war carried on board warships must,
largely be judged by the facilities of the particular warship and the military operations it may
be required to complete prior to landing the prisoners of war. In a way, this is only to say ,
that at sea the military necessities of the belligerent may take priority over the comfor:t and
safety of prisoners of war. These remarks are themselves far too broad for the kind of guidance
that may be considered useful, though more pointed observations on the duties of the captor
at sea do not appear possible.
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2. Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked (The 1949 Geneva Convention For
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea).
Prior to the conclusion in 1949 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea the rules relating to the protection of the sick and
wounded at sea were contained in Hague Conventions III (1899) and X
(1907). 66 On the whole, it was the latter Convention that was recognized
by the belligerents as applicable in the two World. Wars. However, dissatisfaction with a number of the provisions of Hague X, and an awareness
of the necessity for its revison and expansion to account more satisfactorily
for changing conditions, had been expressed even before the close of the
1914 war. 67 During the second World War this need for revising and expanding the provisions of Hague X became even more clearly apparent,
despite the efforts already made by the belligerents to interpret and adapt
the Convention to some of the novel circumstances characterizing modern
naval warfare.
As between the states that are parties to the 1949 Convention, the latter
replaces Hague Convention X. 68 Although a number of the provisions of
the 1949 Convention closely adhere to the rules laid down in the preceding
convention, many significant modifications have been made and entirely
new provisions added which reflect recent experience. An analysis of the
present legal regime governing the protection of the sick, wounded and
shipwrecked at sea must properly concentrate upon these changes. At the
same time, it would appear only reasonable-and realistic-to avoid treating the 1949 Convention quite apart from the experience of the two World

66

The 1899 Convention represented the first successful adaptation to naval warfare of the
principles of the 1864 Geneva Convention for the Relief of the Wounded and Sick of Armies
in The Field. In 1906 the Convention of 1864, applicable to land warfare, was revised and, as
a consequence, in the following year (1907) the 1899 Convention dealing with sea warfare was
also revised to bring it again into accord with the more recent Convention on the sick and
wounded in the field. As between the parties to the tenth Hague Convention of 1907, the latter
served to replace the earlier convention concluded in 1899· But some states-e. g., Great
Britain-remained formally bound by the earlier convention, though in practice it was accepted
that the 1907 Convention was authoritative for the belligerents.
67 In 1929 the 1906 Geneva Convention on the wounded and sick in the field was revised, but
the revision of the 1907 Convention dealing with naval warfare never got beyond the stage
of draft proposals by the rime World War II broke out.
68 Article 58 of the 1949 Convention declares that in relations between the High Contracting
Parties ••the present Convention replaces the Xth Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, for
the adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1906 . . . " To date the most detailed analysis of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea is that of
Raoul Genet, .. La Revision de la X Convention de La Haye Relative a la Guerre sur Mer,"
Revue lnternationale Francaise de Droit des Gens, Vols. 18 (1949), pp'. 3o-4o, 16o-6, 19 (1950), pp.
46-6o, 231-43, 20 (1951), pp. 32-7, 181-8, 332-40, 21 (1952), pp. 31-40·
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Wars, and the extent to which belligerents have indicated that they are
willing to subordinate possible military advantage to a humanitarian
cause. 69
a. The Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
One of the principal assumptions upon which Hague Convention X
(1907) had been based vvas that only those combatants sick or wounded as
a result of hostilities at sea need be protected. 70 On this assumption the
chief function of hospital ships was to accompany the warships of belligerent fleets and to provide assistance at the scene of action to rescue
survivors and to treat the wounded. In modern naval warfare this function-while not yet obsolescent-has become subordinated to the task of
transporting casualties suffered as a result of operations on land. 71 It has
therefore become increasingly important to redefine-and, in so doing, to
broaden-the categories of sick and wounded combatant personnel entitled
to receive the benefits conferred by convention upon the sick and wounded
at sea. In addition, the attack and destruction of enemy merchant shipping
no longer permits the sanguine assumption that the vvounded and shipwrecked at sea will be confined to the combatant naval forces of belligerents. 72
69 "It is axiomatic," one writer has observed in a survey of hospital ships during World War
II, "that in the present state of international law it is essential to preserve some balance between
the humanitarian benefit to be gained by an alteration in the law and the military advantage
thereby conferred on one of the belligerents: if this balance is seriously disturbed the other side
will certainly seek and find a pretext for denunciation." J. C. Mossop, "Hospital Ships In the
Second World War," B. Y. I. L., 2.4 (1947), p. 400. These words, written in the context of
proposals for a new convention to replace Hague X, are relevant to a consideration of the 1949
Convention. Doubtless, the provisions of the 1949 Convention are binding upon the states
that ratify ic, whatever the military advantages that may be sacrificed by its observance, and
Article r declares that: ·'The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to insure respect
for the present Convention in all circumstances." Nevertheless, the clarity of the legal obligation not to depart from the Convention for reason of military advanrage does not detract from
the possibility-and that is all it can be regarded-that belligerents may be reluctant to meet
certain duties laid down in the Convention when such duties press hard upon considerations
of military advantage. The occasions when this may be so can be surmised only on the basis
of known experience. Besides, a substantial number of the provisions themselves permit the
operation of military necessity as a justification for departing from behavior that must otherwise be observed. Finally, it need hardly be pointed out that in the interpretation of the provisions of the 1949 Convention-a number of which are far from being as clear 3:nd specific as
is to be desired in an international convention-belligerents will not be unmindful of their
respective military requirements. The latter reason alone constitutes sufficient justification
for bearing in mind the experience of the two World Wars in considering the 1949 Convention.
70 See Mossop, op. cit., pp. 398-4oo, for a lucid analysis of the outlook of the framers of Hague '
Conventions III (r899) and X (1907).
.
71 A task in which the great majority of hospital ships were engaged in the two World Wars.
72 The civilian at sea was altogether excluded from the benefits of Hague X, which applied
only to "sailors and soldiers on board, when sick or wounded, as well as other persons officially
attached to fleets or armies . . . "-It is of course true that even prior to the 1949 Convention
belligerents had recognized the necessity of expanding the categories of sick and wounded
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The 1949 Convention clearly abandons the assumption which underlay
the earlier Convention and recognizes that the most important function of
hospital ships will be the transport of casual ties resulting from warfare on
land. The individuals who are therefore entitled to receive the benefits of
the new Convention include the following categories: 73 members of the
armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces; members of other militias
and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements which belong to a Party to the conflict and which comply
with certain conditions; 74 members of regular armed forces who profess
allegiance to a Government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
Power; persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being
members thereof, provided they have received authorization from the
armed forces which they accompany; and members of the crews of the
merchant marine and the crews of ciyil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict
who do not benefit by more favorable provisions of international law. 75
So far as warfare at sea is concerned, the last of the above categories may
be regarded as the most significant of the extensions made by the 1949
Convention. (However, it may be pointed out that during World War II
the belligerents were already allowing the carriage of sick and wounded
members of the merchant marine in hospital ships.) On the other hand,
Article 13 of the 1949 Convention fails to include civilians among those
entitled to receive the benefits of the Convention, though this omission is
tempered by a later provision, Article 35, that hospital ships shall not be
deprived of the protection due to them for the reason that the humanitarian
entitled to be carried on board hospital ships. Nevertheless, the evolution that accompaniedin this respect-the two World Wars still left unsettled many and controversial questions, even
as regards individuals claiming to be assimilated to the armed forces of belligerents.
73 Article 13. This article makes the same enumeration as is made in Article 4 (A) of the
Prisoners of War Convention. Apart from the categories enumerated in Article 4 (B) of the
Convention relating to prisoners of war, which are not relevant to the present analysis, it
will be apparent that any individual entitled to the status of prisoner of war is entitled to
receive the benefits of the Convention on the sick, wounded and shipwrecked. In a formal sense
the converse appears equally true (since Article 16 provides that "the wounded, sick and shipwrecked of a belligerent who fall into enemy hands shall be prisoners of war''), though as will
presently be seen the Convention seems to provide that persons other than those entitled to the
status of prisoners of war may be accorded at least certain benefits granted the wounded and
shipwrecked.
74 These conditions are: that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; that of carrying arms openly;
and that of conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
75 One further category not listed above includes individuals making up a so-called levee en
masse. The naval equivalent of a levee en masse has been thus defined in the Oxford Manual of
Naval Warfare, I9IF "The inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied who, upon
the approach of the enemy, spontaneously arm vessels to fight him, without having had time
to convert them into war-ships . . . shall be considered as belligerents, if they act openly
and if they respect the laws and usages of war."
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activities of such vessels have been extended to the ' ' care of wounded, sick
or shipwrecked civilians.'' 76
According to Article 12. the categories of individuals to whom the Convention is applicable ''who are at sea and who are wounded, sick or shipwrecked, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances, it being
understood that the term 'shipwreck' means shipvvreck from any cause
and includes forced landings at sea by or from aircraft." 77 The Parties to
the conflict in whose power such persons may be are obliged to care for
them and to treat them in a humane manner, without any adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions, or any
other similar criteria. 78
In a general sense, almost all of the detailed rules laid down in the 1949
Convention may be considered as the application of the general duty torespect and protect the wounded, sick or shipwrecked. Thus the rules relating to the respect and protection that must be accorded hospital ships
(which make up the heart of the Convention) can have no other purpose
Does this refer to civilians wounded, sick or shipwrecked because of action at sea, or to
civilians wounded and sick from any cause, or to both? It is surely reasonable to assume that
civilians-of whatever nationality-wounded, sick or shipwrecked as a result of naval action
are entitled to receive the benefits of the humanitarian activities of hospital ships, even though
this is not expressly provided for in the Convention. More debatable, however, is the presence
on board hospital ships of sick or wounded enemy civilians that have been taken on in port.
Mossop (op. cit., p. 4oo) states that during World War II the protection of hospital ships was
extended to the sick and wounded wives and dependents of members of the armed forces, and
goes on to suggest that "it is essential as a matter of both logic and common humanity to
extend the protection offered by hospital ships to sick and wounded civilians when the Convention is next revised.'' Yet it seems clear that the 1949 Convention has not been so extended,
save perhaps through the backdoor of Article 35· And Article 35 is itself, in this respect,
somewhat anomalous. For if civilians are not included within the categories entitled to receive the benefits of the Convention then what is the precise meaning of the stipulation that
hospital ships carrying wounded, sick or shipwrecked civilians are not to be denied the protection normally due to them? May a belligerent at least object to such carriage, and ultimately
take some sort of action if it nevertheless continues as a regular practice? This ambiguity
and potential source of confusion with respect to a highly important matter must be regarded as
a serious defect in the drafting of the 1949 Convention.
77 But the passage cited above is preceded by the words "members of the armed forces and
other persons mentioned in the following Article (i. e., Article 13)." Thus Article 12. does
not formally extend the benefits of the Convention beyond those categories earlier enumerated.
The fact that "shipwreck" is defined as meaning "shipwrecked from any cause" does not alter
this situation, since whatever the cause it still applies only to the persons mentioned in Article
13. And here again the restrictiveness of the wording so far as wounded, sick or shipwrecked
civilians are concerned must be noted.
78 The care and humane treatment to be accorded the sick, wounded and shipwrecked is
further elaborated in Article 12. as follows: "Any attempts upon their lives, or violence to
their persons, shall be strictly prohibited; in particular, they shall not be murdered or exterminated, subjected to torture or to biological experiments; they shall not wilfully be left without
medical assistance and care, nor shall conditions exposing them to contagion, or infection be
created.- Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment to be
administered.- Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex."
76
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than that of insuring the respect and protection of the wounded, sick or
shipwrecked. Nevertheless, it is useful to distinguish-if only for reasons
of convenience-between the rules directly applicable to, and enjoining the
respect and protection of, the wounded, sick or shipwrecked, and the rules
designed to accomplish this same end by en joining the respect and protection of hospital ships, sick bays, medical transports and the religious, medical and hospital staffs of captured vessels. Within the former category
may be placed the obligation of the parties to the 1949 Convention to take
all possible measures after each engagement at sea-.and without delay" to search for and collect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick, to protect
them against pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to
search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled.'' 79 For this purpose
the Parties to the conflict may appeal to the charity of commanders of
neutral merchant vessels, yachts or other craft, to take on board and care
for wounded, sick, or shipwrecked persons, and to collect the dead; and
neutral vessels responding to this appeal shall enjoy special protection and
facilities to carry out such assistance. 80
The respect and protection owed to the wounded, sick or shipwrecked
does not extend to immunity from capture, however. In the 1949 Convention, as in the earlier Convention (X) of 1907, 81 all warships of a belligerant have the right to demand that the wounded, sick or shipwreckedregardless of nationality-on board hospital ships, as well as merchant vessels and other craft, shall be surrendered. 82 In the 1949 Convention,
though, the belligerent right of removal has been qualified by the stipulation that removal is justified ''provided that the wounded and sick are in a
fit state to be moved and that the warship can provide adequate facilities
for necessary medical treatment." 83 Apart from this, it should be made
79

Article 18. On the above obligation, also see pp. 71-3. Article 19 details the procedure
to be followed in establishing the identification-as soon as possible-of each shipwrecked,
wounded, sick or dead person of the adverse Party. This information is to be recorded and
forwarded to the information bureau described in Article 12.2. of the prisoners of war Convention. Article 2.0 contains further prescriptions regarding the handling of the dead and the
conduct of burial at sea.
80 Article 2r. At the same time Article 21 goes on to provide that although neutral vessels
may not be captured on accoum: of such transport, "in the absence of any promise co the contrary,
they shall remain liable to capture for any violations of neutrality they may have committed."
81 Article 12.
82
Article 14. It is of interest to observe that Article 14 speaks of the right of "all warships
of a belligerent Party," whereas most of the other provisions of the Convention speak only
of "Party to the conflict." Presumably the reason for the different wording of Article 14 is
that the right of removal extends to neutral vessels as well (neucral warships and military
aircraft, of course, being excluded) and that in order to interfere in such manner with neutral
vessels a formal state of belligerency is required. But as between the "Parties to the conflict"
this formal condition is not required for the operacion of the Convention (see pp. 134-5).
83 This qualification, it will be noted, does not extend to the shipwrecked. How effective
the qualification contained in Article 14 will prove in practice is quite another question.
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clear that the belligerent right of removal 84 applies to all hospital shipswhether belligerent or neutral-as well as to all other vessels and aircraft
which may be carrying the sick, wounded or shipwrecked, the only exceptions being neutral warships and neutral military aircraft.
The wounded, sick and shipwrecked of a belligerent who fall into enemy
hands shall be considered, in accordance with Article r6 of the 1949 Convention, ''prisoners of war, and the provisions of international law concerning prisoners of war shall apply to them.'' 85 The captor may-according to circumstances-hold them, convey them to his own country, to a
neutral port, or even to an enemy port. But if returned to their home
country they may not serve for the duration of the war.
The disposition of the wounded, sick or shipwrecked who are landed in
neutral territory either by neutral warships (and neutral military aircraft)
or by belligerent warships-with the consent of the local authorities-is
dealt with in Articles 15 and 17. 86 In both cases, the neutral state must
insure, where so required by international law, that these persons take no
84 The objection occasionally taken in the past to the belligerent right of removal has been
based, in part, upon the contention that it is both unnecessary and inhumane. Belligerents
apparently made no use of it during World War I, but in World War II the German hospital
ships Tiibingen and Gradisca were taken in to Allied ports, and the enemy individuals carried
on board made prisoners of war. The vessels had earlier been permitted to pass through
Allied lines in the Adriatic in order to take on sick and wounded in Salonica, the diversion taking
pbce on the outward voyage. See Mossop (op cit., p. 405), who, in relating this incident,
declares that "a high percentage were only slightly wounded and the great majority were
considered likely to be fit for active service within twelve months. This action brought forth
no protest from the German Government, who considered it justified by the terms of the Convention." In the Pacific theatre no similar incidents appear to have occurred.-Qbjection to
the belligerent right to remove the sick, wounded and shipwrecked from neutral vessels has
been-in the past-merely one facet of the broader objection made against the removal at sea
of any enemy persons from neutral vessels, a problem that is dealt with later (see pp. 32.5-9).
It is sufficient to observe here that the belligerent right to remove the sick, wounded and shipwrecked from neutral vessels is firmly established in law.
ss Following Anic1e I4 of the I907 Convenrion, Article I6 of the I949 Convention is a further
indication-if such were needed-that the intent was to make the categories of individuals
to which the Convention shall apply identical with those individuals liable to treacment as
prisoners of war. It is true that Article I6 is prefaced by the words "subject to the provisions
of Article I2.," but this seems only for the purpose-as Genet (op. cit., 2.0 (I95I), p. I85) points
out-of defining with greater precision the extent of protection due the sick, wounded or shipwrecked who fall into the hands of an enemy. Yet it is difficult-for reasons already notedco take Article I6 quite literally, since hospital ships may be carrying sick, wounded or shipwrecked who are not entitled to the status of prisoners of war, and a belligerent in receiving such
enemy individuals need not-and perhaps even ought not-treat them as such.
86 Articles IS and I?, concerning the problem of neutral asylum to naval forces, may be cited
in full:
"Article I5· If wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons are taken on board a neutral warship
or a neutral military aircraft, it shall be ensured, where so required by international law, that
they can take no further part in operations of war.
·
Article I?. Wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons who are landed in neutral ports with the
consent of the local authorities, shall, failing arrangements to the contrary between the neutral
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further part in operations of war. But the Convention does not provide
for the disposition to be made of the wounded, sick or shipwrecked who are
brought into neutral ports by neutral merchant ships. Nor does it provide
for the disposal of shipwrecked members of armed forces who reach a
neutral coast by their own efforts. This silence in the 1949 Convention
may be taken as reinforcing the opinion-which is believed to be correctthat the neutral state is under no obligation to resort to internment in these
two latter cases. 87
b. Hospital Ships
The 1949 Convention permits the use of three types of hospital ships.
and the belligerent Powers, be so guarded by the neutral Power, where so required by international law, that the said persons cannot again take pan in operations of war.
The costs of hospital accommodation and internment shall be borne by the Power on whom
the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked persons depend.''
In principle, Articles I) and I7 follow Articles I3 and IS of Hague X, save for the introduction
of the phrase "where so required by international law." The meaning of the latter phrase is
not free from a certain ambiguity, however. The traditional rules governing neutral asylum
to naval forces are clear to the effect that the neutral state has a duty -co intern combatant
personnel that are either brought into neutral ports by its own warships or by the warships of
a belligerent (the neutral so consenting). But Professor Kunz has suggested that in this phrase
we see "the impact of changes in the law of neutrality, brought about by treaties such as the
United Nations Charter." "The Geneva Conventions of August I2., I949," in Law and Politics
in the World Community, p. 2.90. If this suggestion is correct, then these traditional rules governing neutral asylum are subject in their operation to a significant qualification. Genet (op. cit.,
2.0 (I9SI), p. I84) interprets the phrase as resulting from the unresolved question as to whether
or not the duty of internment should extend only to the sick, wounded or shipwrecked picked
up by neutral warships on the high seas, though not within the territorial waters of the neutral
state. In opposition to the view that the duty of internment applies wherever such persons
are rescued by neutral warships, it has been held that once within neutral territorial waters the
wounded or shipwrecked have escaped the risk of being taken by the enemy and hence if then
taken on board neutral warships need not be interned. If this controversy is in fact the reason
for inserting the phrase "where so required by international law' in Articles IS and I?, all
that can be said is that these articles have left the controversy where they found it.
87 To this effect see, for example, Oppenheim-Lauterpacht (op. cit., pp. 734-s), where the
further case is included of belligerent vessels unlawfully attacked in neutral territorial waters,
and the combatant personnel of these vessels reach the neutral shore. Also Higgins and
Colombos, op. cit., pp. 432.-3, and J. A. C. Gutteridge, "The Geneva Conventions of I949,"
B. Y. I. L., 2.6 (I949), p. 309. It must be acknowledged, however, that on the basis of the
two \Vorld Wars neutral states have demonstrated no unanimity with respect to the disposition
of the two cases cited in the text above. Yet this very disparity of state practice would appear
itself as a further indication that there is no recognized neutral duty of internment. And the
fact that the I949 Convention does not specifically provide for these cases-despite the questions
raised since the conclusion of Hague X-only serves to add further support to this conclusion.
Nor is it useful, in this respect, to examine Hague Convention XIII (I907 ), since this instrument
also fails to provide any guidance to the cases under consideration. But it is essential to distinguish these cases from the situation in which a belligerent warship, carrying enemy wounded
or shipwrecked aboard as prisoners of war, is interned by a neutral state for having failed to
leave one of the latter's ports in due time. In this instance the internment of the officers and
crew of the warship must be accompanied by the internment of the prisoners of war carried
on board.
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First and foremost are military hospital ships, defined as ships specially
built or equipped by the Powers solely to assist, treat and transport the
wounded, sick and shipwrecked. It is declared that military hospital
vessels may" in no circumstances be attacked or captured, but shall at all
times be respected and protected, on condition that their names and descriptions have been notified to the Parties to the conflict ten days before those
ships are employed." 88 The notification must include the following
characteristics: registered gross tonnage, the length from stem to stern,
and the number of masts and funnels. 89 The same protection and exemption
from capture is accorded to private enemy hospital ships-utilized by
National Red Cross Societies, by officially recognized relief societies or by
private persons-on condition that they have been given an official commission by the Party to the conflict on which they depend and have complied with the provisions concerning notification applicable to military
hospital ships. 9° Finally, the protection and exemption granted to military
hospital ships are likewise granted to private neutral hospital vesselsutilized by National Red Cross Societies, officially recognized relief societies,
or private persons of neutral countries-on condition that they have placed
themselves under the control of one of the Parties to the conflict, with the
previous authorization of their own government, and have complied with
the provisions concerning notification applicable to military hospital
ships. 91
Although the tenth Hague Convention permitted-at least by implication-the conversion of merchant vessels into hospital ships, it contained
no provisions concerning the case in which a belligerent might reconvert a
hospital ship, that had earlier been a merchant vessel, once again to its
88

Article 2.2.. The corresponding provision of Hague X, Article 1, mere! y required notification
to the adverse Party before use. Genet (op. cit., 2.1 (1952.), p. 31) points out in criticism of
Article 2.2. that with the speed of communications today, ships can be transformed into hospital
vessels very quickly in order to carry out errands of mercy. The ten-day requirement may well
mean that hospital ships converted and ready for use in a shorter period would have to suspend
operations of a humanitarian character while waiting for a time limit to expire.- The respect
and protection to be accorded hospital ships is extended, by Article 2.3, to shore establishments
entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention for Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Bombardment or attack from the sea against
such establishments is prohibited.
89 A new provision, designed to facilitate identification.
90 Article 2.4- which further declares that these ships must be provided with certificates from
the responsible authorities, stating that the vessels have been under their control while fitting
out and on departure.
91 Article 2.5. With respect to the protection of sick bays Article 2.8 of the 1949 Convention
states: "Should fighting occur on board a warship, the sick-bays shall be respected and spared
as far as possible. Sick bays and their equipment shall remain subject to the laws of warfare,
but may not be diverted from their purpose so long as they are required for the wounded and
sick. Nevertheless, the commander into whose power they have fallen may, after insuring
the proper care of the wounded and sick who are accommodated therein, apply them to other
purposes in case of urgent military necessity."
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original use. Nor did Hague X deal with the problem regarding the
places where conversion of vessels into hospital ships might legitimately
be accomplished. A still further question left open by the tenth Hague
Convention related to the minimum tonnage that might be required of
hospital ~hips. During the two World Wars each of these questions
provided ground for controversy between the belligerents. 92 The 1949
Convention takes a long step forward in clarifying hitherto disputed issues.
With respect to the tonnage required of hospital ships Article 26 of the
Convention expressly extends protection to hospital ships "of any tonnage
as well as to their lifeboats, wherever they are operating." Nevertheless,
in order to insure the maximum comfort and security, the Parties to the
conflict "shall endeavor to utilize, for the transport of wounded, sick and
shipwrecked over long distance and on the high seas, only hospital ships
of over 2ooo tons gross." 93 Earlier controversy over the question of
reconversion is resolved in Article 33 of the new Convention by the stipulation that merchant vessels "which. have been transformed into hospital
ships cannot be put to any other use throughout the duration of hostilities." 94 No indication is given, however, as to the possible restrictions
upon the places where the conversion of vessels into hospital ships might
legitimately be carried out. It would appear that, in principle, the latter
question must be governed by the consideration that belligerents need not
recognize such conversion when it has clearly been effected for the purpose
See Mossop (op. cit., pp. 403-4) for a consideration of these matters in World War II. Great
Britain announced a lower limit of 3000 tons on hospital ships, though in practice it enforcedover German and Italian protests-a limit of 2.000 tons. However, in the case of the 1500 ton
German hospital ship Freiburg the British Government, after first seizing the vessel, released
her on the apparent ground that she was a bona fide hospital ship. In fact, Hague X did not
provide any lower limit, and the British position appears to have been very doubtful on this
point. In the Pacific theatre no lower limit was placed on the tonnage required of hospital
ships in order to enjoy protection. As will be noted shortly in the text above, the question
as to where conversion might legitimately take place is really a part of the larger question
concerning conversions that have been made merely to avoid capture. The British Prize Court
has long held that conversion made merely to avoid capture may nevertheless result in the
seizure of a hospital ship so converted and her condemnation as lawful prize. In this connection
Mossop cites the cases of the Ramb Wand the Rostock. The former, an Italian merchant vessel
converted into a hospital ship while lying blocked in Massawa, was seized by British forces
and taken into an Allied port. Later, however, the conversion was recognized as having been
genuine and not made simply to avoid capture. The seizure of the Rostock, a German warship
hastily converted into a hospital ship, was clearly a different matter. Not only was the vessel
converted while lying in the besieged port of Bordeaux, but when intercepted was found to be
carrying codes and engaging in weather reporting-activities which deprived her of the right
of continued protection.
93 This provision is purely optional.
94 The widsom of this provision has been questioned by Genet (op. cit., 2.1 (1952.), p. 38) as
placing an undue restriction upon belligerents, who-instead-should be allowed to convert
merchant vessels into hospital ships-and reconvert them back again-as the necessities of war
may require. And Mossop (op. cit., p. 404), looking at World War II experience, expresses
the opinion that .. a prohibition against denotification is of little practical value."
92
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of avoiding capture. 95 If this position is correct the decisive consideration
will concern the purpose of conversion rather than the place where conversion is actually carried out, though the place of conversion may frequently provide an important indication of purpose (e. g., if conversion is
carried out in a besieged port).
By a novel provision in the 1949 Convention-Article 27-the respect
and protection accorded to hospital ships is further extended-subject to
~ the requirements of notification-to ''small craft employed by the State or
by the officially recognized lifeboat institutions for coastal rescue operations.'· But this extension of protection to coastal rescue craft is expressly
subordinated to the "operational requirements" of the belligerents, a
qualification that is not unlikely to limit severely the practical significance
of the provision. 96
It is not only at sea that hospital ships are granted exemption from
capture. Article 29 of the 1949 Convention provides that exemption from
capture shall be granted hospital ships caught in a port that has fallen into
the hands of the enemy. "Any hospital ship in a port which falls into the
hands of the enemy shall be authorized to leave the said port.'' 97
The protection given hospital ships has always been dependent upon their
not being used for any purpose other than to "afford relief and assistance to
the wounded, sick and shipwrecked without distinction of nationality." 98
To undertake to use hospital ships for what is clearly a military purpose
would obviously constitute a serious breach of faith on the part of a belligerent sanctioning such a practice. 99 Experience has shown, ho,;vever,
that the problem of defining those acts forbidden to hospital ships is not
always an easy one. Not only is it difficult on occasion to determine the
extent of the acts which, if performed, could be regarded as serving a
9 5 Though even this principle-whose soundness ought not to be questioned-is not expressly
enumerated in the 1949 Convention. In part, of course, it is met by the stipulation that hospital
ships shall be "built or equipped . . . specially and solely with a view to assisting the wounded,
sick and shipwrecked."
ll6 On the small craft used for air-sea rescue purposes by the German Government off the British
coast in 1940, and the refusal of the British Government to extend immunity to these craftas well as to ambulance aircraft-see Mossop, op. cit., p. 403. The British argument that airmen shot down over the sea could not be considered as "shipwrecked" would no longer hold,
since the 1949 Convention includes this newer category. But the British refusal to assimilate
light craft engaged in rescue operations to hospital ships-thereby granting them special
protection-for fear of intelligence activities, would still be clearly permissible und.er Article
2.7 of the 1949 Convention.
97 Article 2.9 has no counterpart in Hague X.-Article 32. of the 1949 Convention declares:
"Vessels described in Articles 2.2., 2.4, 2.5 and 2.7 are not classed as warships as regards their stay
in a neutral port." On the conditions governing the stay of belligerent warships in neutral
ports, see pp. 2.40-5.
98 Article 30.
99 And Article 30 of the 1949 Convention obligates the contracting parties "not to use these
vessels for any military purpose."
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military purpose-hence forbidden; even more difficult rna y be the determination of acts which, though not supporting a military operation, are
nevertheless forbidden to hospital ships. In an attempt to reduce future
uncertainty in this regard Article 3 5 of the 1949 Convention lists certain
conditions which shall not be considered as depriving hospital ships or
sick bays of vessels of the protection due to them. These conditions are:

(I) The fact that the crews of ships or sick bays are armed for
the maintenance of order, for their own defense or that of the sick
and wounded.
( 2.) The presence on board of apparatus excl usi vel y in tended to
facilitate navigation or communication. 1
(3) The discovery on board hospital ships or in sick bays of
portable arms and ammunition taken from the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked and not yet handed to the proper service.
(4) The fact that the humanitarian activities of hospital ships
and sick-bays of vessels or of the crews extend to the care of
wounded, sick or shipwrecked civilians.
(5) The transport of equipment and of personnel intended
exclusively for medical duties, over and above normal requirements.2
Clearly, the presence on board hospital ships of any arms or communications apparatus in excess of that allowed above will give rise to suspicion
of abuse. Furthermore, equipment of any kind, save that intended exclusively for medical duties, ought not to be carried, however innocent it may
appear. Nor should hospital ships be used to carry convalescent personnel.
And although hospital ships are not to be considered as deprived of protection because their humanitarian activities have been extended to wounded
and sick civilians, it remains true that Article 35 does not contemplate such
carriage as a regular practice. Finally, even though not being used for any
military purpose, hospital ships must not act in such a manner as to hamper
the movements of the combatants. It is probably due to the latter consideration that the removal of the wounded and sick by sea from a besieged or
encircled.area, and the passage of medical and religious personnel and equip1 Paragraph 2. of Article 35 must be read with the second paragraph of Article 34, which declares that hospital ships ''may not possess or use a secret code for their wireless or other means
of communication.''
2 Both paragraphs 4 and 5 are novel, having no counterpart in Hague X.
In practice, belligerents have permitted the carriage of medical and religious personnel as passengers, whether
going to or from the forces in the field. So also in the case of medical supplies and equipment
intended for armies in the field, the practice appears to have been to allow hospital ships to
carry such supplies and equipment on their outward voyage. Article 35 now formally sanctions
these activities.
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ment to such an area, is made dependent upon the express agreement of the
parties to the conflict. 3
In order to ensure that hospital vessels and small craft are not being used
improperly, as well as to guarantee that the movements of the combatants
will not be hampered even by legitimate activities, the Parties to the conflict are given the right to control and search these vessels and small craft.
Article 3 I declares that the Parties to the conflict ''can refuse assistance
from these vessels, order them off, make them take a certain course, control
the use of their wireless and other means of communication, and even detain them for a period not exceeding seven days from the time of interception, if the gravity of the circumstances so requires." A commissioner
may be placed on board for a temporary period in order to see that the orders given hospital ships are carried out. Provision is also made in Article
3I for placing neutral observers on board hospital ships, and this may be
done either unilaterally or by agreement between the Parties to the conflict.
It has always been true that if hospital ships are used to commit acts
harmful to an enemy, and outside their humanitarian duties, the protection
to which they are otherwise entitled ceases. Article 34 of the I949 Convention reaffirms this rule, but at the same time provides that protection
may cease'' only after due warning has been given, naming in all appropriate
cases a reasonable time limit, and after such warning has remained unheeded.'' The procedure thus laid down in Article 34 constitutes an innovation upon Hague Convention X (I907), which merely provided-without
further qualification-that hospital ships were no longer entitled to
protection if employed for the purpose of injuring the enemy. 4
Article 18, paragraph 2.: "Whenever circumstances permit, the Parties to the conflict shall
conclude local arrangements for the removal of the wounded and sick by sea from a besieged
or encircled area and for the passage of medical and religious personnel and equipment on their
way to that area." Mossop (op. cit., pp. 405-6) relates two occasions during the 1939 war in
which the German High Command sought to send a hospital ship through Allied patrol lines
to a besieged port. In one of these instances the request was granted, though in the ocher it
was denied for the reason that it would hamper the movements of the attacking forces.-No
doubt belligerents will also be reluctant to grant removal of wounded and sick from a besieged
area if the result will be to ease noticeably the burden of the defenders.
4 Article 8.-The meaning of Article 34 is not altogether free from doubt, however.
Presumably, neither attack nor capture is permitted under Article 34 without prior "due warning."
In the case of a hospital ship found-after search-to be carrying signalling equipment in excess
of a reasonable need Article 34 would prohibit seizure of the vessel-at least it the phrase "only
after due warning has been given" is to be interpreted literally. If so, this clearly represents
a change from previous practice, and-it is submitted-an undesirable change. On the other
hand, the effect of Article 34 need not prove to be a substantial deterrent to a belligerent intent
upon avoiding its obligations. Article 34 does not render any more difficult the manufacture
of unfounded charges; and these charges apparently may be followed by the sternest of measures-including attack-provided only that a "reasonable time limit" is permitted in "appropriate" cases. Paradoxically, the effect of Article 34 could very well be to forbid the immediate
seizure of hospital ships, even though found upon search to be performing acts harmful to an
enemy, hue at the same time to provide no insurance against unwarranted attacks upon hospital
3

128

c. Religious, Medical and Hospital Personnel
The religious, medical and hospital personnel of hospital ships and their
crews must be respected and protected; they may not be captured during
the time they are in the service of the hospital ship, whether or not there
are wounded and sick on board. 5 If such personnel fall into the hands of
the enemy they must be respected and protected, and the captor is to permit
them to carry out their duties as long as is necessary for the care of the
wounded and sick. They shall afterwards be sent back as soon as the
commander-in-chief, under whose authority they tl:re, considers it practicable; and on leaving the ship rnay take with them their personal property.
However, should it prove necessary to retain some of these personnel owing
to the medical or spiritual needs of prisoners of war, everything possible
shall be done for their earliest possible landing. 6
d. Medical Transports
Among the provisions of the 1949 Convention that have no counterpart
in the earlier tenth Hague Convention of 1907 are those dealing with
medical transports and medical aircraft. Ships may be chartered for the
purpose of transporting equipment exclusively intended for the treatment
of wounded and sick members of armed forces or for the prevention of
disease, provided that the particulars regarding their voyage have been
notified to the ad verse Power and approved by the latter. In order to
ensure that these ships are not being misused the adverse Party retains the
right to board them, though not to capture them or seize their equipment.
Further, through prior agreement, neutral observers may be placed on board
such ships to verify the equipment carried. 7
Medical aircraft are defined in Article 39 of the 1949 Convention as
ships by a belligerent that has been careful to observe the form of Article 34· Admittedly, these
critical remarks would prove unjustified if, together with Article 34, adequate provision were
made for an effective procedure whereby all charges of abuse could be made the subject of inquiry
by an impartial third party. As will be seen (pp. 137-8), the 1949 Convention establishes a
procedure of inquiry that may easily be frustrated by an unwilling belligerent.
It is difficult t:0 ascertain, therefore, to what extent Article 34-and other relevant provisions
of the 1949 Convention-will succeed in altering those practices built up during the two World
Wars, and which have received the support of the majority of states. These practices may be
summarized briefly. Save in the most exceptional of circumstances hospital ships suspected
of abusing their privileged status were not to be attacked but racher to be visited and searched.
If the result of visit and search was ro confirm suspicions of abuse the vessel could be seized and
taken into port for adjudication. Attack upon a hospital ship proved justified only if the
attempt to visit and search was met by acts of forcible resistance on the part of the hospital ship
itself.
5 Article 36.
6 Article 37.
7 Article 38.
A distinction must be drawn between the conditions governing the use of
hospital ships in Articles 2.2., 2.4 and 2.5 of the Convention and the conditions governing the
use of medical transports in Article 38. With respect to the use of the latter there must be in
each instance a special agreement concluded between the Parties to the conflict, whereas no
such agreement is required in the case of hospital ships.
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''aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked, and for the transport of medical personnel and equipment."
The strict conditions governing the use of medical aircraft are not to be
confused, however, with the far more liberal provisions governing the use
of hospital ships. 8 The former are to be respected, and not to be made the
object of attack, ''while flying at heights, at times and on routes specifically
agreed upon between the Parties to the conflict concerned." In each instance, therefore, the use of medical aircraft is made dependent upon a
prior agreement whose purpose is to ensure that the adverse Party may
exercise close control over such aircraft. 9 This control is further ensured
by requiring medical aircraft to be clearly marked with the distinctive
emblem provided for in the Convention, together with their national
colors, on their lower, upper and lateral surfaces. Additional markings
may be made the subject of agreement. Special precaution is taken in
Article 39 to prohibit flights of medical aircraft over enemy or enemyoccupied territory, unless otherwise agreed. Finally, medical aircraft are
obliged to ''obey every summons to alight on land or water,'' 10 but in the
event of alighting involuntarily on land or water in enemy-occupied territory, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, as well as the crew of the aircraft-medical personnel excepted-are to be made prisoners of war.
The strict rule forbidding belligerent aircraft to fly over or land in
neutral territory is mitigated in the special case of medical aircraft. Article
40 of the 1949 Convention permits the medical aircraft of the Parties to
the conflict to fly over the territory of neutral Powers, land thereon in case
of necessity, or use it as a port of call. But every flight over neutral terri8 It is readily apparent from Article 39 that the inclusion of medical aircraft in the 1949
Convention was-ar best-done only reluctantly. To what extent belligerents will be able to
utilize medical aircraft in future hostilities remains to be seen, though if Article 39 is any
indication of future developments in this respect such use will certainly be very sparing.
9 There is nothing in Article 39 or in the other provisions of the 1949 Convention which
expressly prevents medical aircraft from being used to rescue the wounded and shipwrecked
at sea-particularly such personnel as have been forced into the sea by or from aircraft. But it
is quite clear that if medical aircraft are allowed to perform the function of so-called "seaplane
ambulances" they are subject to the same strict conditions laid down for medical aircraft engaged in any OLher tasks. Hence, the recurrence of a controversy-between parries to the 1949
Convention-similar to the controversy that took place between Germany and Great Britain
in 1940 regarding the use by Germany of seaplane ambulances to rescue German airmen shot
down at sea, would still support the position taken by Great Britain. At that time tP.e British
Government insisted that the use of seaplane ambulances was subject to the prior .approval
and control of the adverse Power, an approval that was not given by Great Britain after it had
been ascertained thac some of these aircraft were being used for intelligence activities.
10 The relevant paragraph of Article 39 reads: "Medical aircraft shall obey every summons
to alight on land or water. In the event of having thus to alight, the·aircraft with its occupa~ts
may continue its flight after examination, if any. "-It is not unreasonable to assume that the
power thus given belligerents to compel medical aircraft to alight is to be exercised with ~ue
discretion (e. g., having regard to the availability of safe landing facilities), though no such
phrase is contained in Article 39·
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tory must be preceded by notice given t o the neutral state concerned, and
every summons to alight, on land or water, must be obeyed. In addition,
the immunity of medical aircraft from attack is guaranteed "only when
flying on routes, at heights and at times specifically agreed upon between
the Parties to the conflict and the neutr~l Pow er concerned.l 1
e. The Distinctive Emblem; Th e Problem of Identification
The distinctive emblem to be displayed on the flags, armlets and all
equipment employed in the medical service is th e red cross on a white
ground. However, Article 41 of the 1949 Convention permits, in place
of the red cross, the red crescent or the red lion and sun on a white ground,
though only for those countries which already use these emblems. In the
case of medical, religious and hospital personnel a w ater resistance armlet
bearing the distinctive emblem is to be worn, and the armlet is to be issued
and stamped by the competent military authority.l 2 In addition, such
personnel are to wear an identity disc and to carry a special identity card
bearing the distinctive emblem and .described in Article 42.. 13
The effectiveness of the protection from attack granted to hospital ships
quite naturally depends very largely upon the ease with which belligerents
can make the proper identification. In practice, the problem of insuring
the proper identification of hospital vessels proved quite difficult during
the 1939 war, and it is widely agreed th at in the all too numerous cases of
attacks made upon hospital ships the cause was nearly alw ays attributable
to a failure- particularly on the part of aircraft-to make the proper
identification. 14 The 1949 Convention has sought to ensure that instances
11 The second paragraph of Article 40 goes on to declare-though somewhat redundantlythat: "The neutral Powers may, however, place conditions or restrictions on the passage or
landing of medical aircraft on their territory. Such possible conditions or restrictions shall be
applied equally to all Parties w the conflict."-Apparently these conditions or restrictions are
ot a special character and in addition to the restrictions governing routes, heights and times
mentioned in paragraph r of Article 39· Finally, Article 40 provides that: "Unless otherwise
agreed between the neutral Powers and the Parties to the conflict, the wounded, sick or shipwrecked who are disembarked with the consent of the local authorities on neutral territory by
medical aircraft shall be detained by the neutral Power, where so required by international law,
in such a manner that they cannot ag<J.in take part in operations of war. The cost of their
accommodation and internment shall be borne by the Power on which they depend."
12 Article_ 42..
13 The card is to be water resistant, of pocket size, and should bear- at the very least-the
name, date of birth, rank and service number of the bearer, in what capacity he is entitled to
receive protection, the bearer's photograph, fingerprints and stamp of the military authority.
In no circumstances are personnel to be deprived of their insignia or identity cards or of the
right to wear the armlet. In case of loss they shall be entitled to receive duplicates of the
cards and to have the insignia replaced.
14 Article 5 of Hague X provided that military hospital ships were to be distinguished by
being painted white outside with a horizontal band of green about a metre and a half in breadth.
Private (enemy or neutral) hospital ships were to be painted white outside with a horizontal
band of red about a metre and a half in breadth. In addition, Hague X declared that in order
to ensure by night freedom from interference, hospital ships must- with the belligerent's
consent- take the necessary measures to render their special painting sufficiently plain. Mossop
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of mistaken identification will be reduced to a m1n1mum, and to this end
prescribes-in Article 43-that hospital ships shall be distinctively marked
as follows:
(a) All exterior surfaces shall be white.
(b) One or more dark red crosses, as large as possible, shall be
painted and displayed on each side of the hull and on the horizontal
surfaces, so placed as to afford the greatest possible visibility from
the sea and from the air. 15
Further provisions of Article 43 are directed toward providing more
accurate identification of hospital ships, though apart from the specific
provision regarding the use of flags on hospital vessels 16 they are stated in
the most general terms. Thus it is declared that hospital ships "which
may wish to ensure by night and in times of reduced visibility the protection to which they are entitled, must, subject to the assent of the Party
to the conflict under whose power they are, take the necessary measures
to render their pain..ting and distinctive emblems sufficiently apparent."
(op. cit., p. 401), points out that: "During the 1939 war additional markings on the sides, stern,
and deck of hospital ships to aid identification by day, and illumination at night with a band
of green lights on the sides and red crosses on the sides and deck picked out with red lamps,
were adopted by common consent and provide a high degree of protection against underwater
attack-although errors are not unknown in practice."-Spaight (op. cit., pp. 49o-1) writes
that despite these efforts toward better identification the instances of air attacks on hospital
ships were numerous-on both sides-and that the record of World War II is, in this respect,
.. not a happy one." But Spaight observes, as does Mossop, that in all probability these
attacks from the air were accidental and not deliberate.
In World War I, however, German attacks upon Allied hospital ships were deliberate,
though Germany defended these attacks by the claim that Allied hospital vessels were being
used for military purposes (a charge denied by the British Government). An account of the
World War I controversy is given in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 46o-3. Among the
British vessels sunk by German submarines were the Dover Castle and the Llandovery Castle,
and the sinkings provided the occasion for two of the well-known trials held after World War I
before the Reichsgericht. In the one case the commander of the submarine which sank the
Dover Castle was found not guilty because he had acted under superior orders. In the second
trial the Reichsgericht found the accused guilty of a violation of the law of war in having fired
upon the survivors of the torpedoed Llandovery Castle who had taken to the lifeboats.
15 In this connection Article 44 declares that the distinguishing signs referred to in Article 3and cited above-" can only be used, whether in time of peace or war, for indicating or protecting the ships therein mentioned, except as may be provided in any other international
Convention or by agreement between all the Parties to the conflict concerned."
16 .. All hospital ships shall make themselves known by hoisting their national ·flag and
further, if they belong to a neutral state, the flag of the Party to the conflict whose direction
they have accepted. A white flag with a red cross shall be flown at the mainmast as high as
possible." In case hospital ships are provisionally detained by an enemy they must haul
down the flag of the Party to the conflict in whose service they are or whose direction they
have accepted.-The identification system provided for hospital ships is, in general, applicabl~
as well to the lifeboats of hospital ships, coastal lifeboats and all small craft used by the medical
service.
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And in an even more general way the Parties to the conflict are directed
to endeavor at all times'' to conclude mutual agreements in order to use the
most modern methods available to facilit ate the identification of hospital
ships."
Despite the improved system of marking hospital ships, provided for in
the 1949 Convention, and the exhortation made to facilitate further the
proper identification of such vessels by the use of modern devices, it seems
altogether likely that the difficulties attending identification in World
War II will remain largely unsolved. It is only to be expected that belligerents will refrain from facilitating the identification of hospital ships
if in so doing they run the risk of endangering the safety of their combatant forces. Illumination at night of hospital ships has proven feasible
when such vessels travel alone upon the high seas. But belligerents have
been understandably reluctant to illuminate these vessels when in port or
when accompanying combatant forces at sea. In these latter situations
hospital ships-though, of course, not liable to direct and deliberate
attack-must accept the risk attendant upon their presence in the immediate
area of legitimate military objectives. 17
It may be, however, that through the use of modern devices belligerents
will be able to resolve at least some of the past difficulties encountered in
the identification of hospital ships. The suggestion has been made that
radar could be effectively used to facilitate proper identification. But the
ease with which this device, as well as others, could be misused by belligerents presents an obstacle to future developments along this line, particularly in a period that is not marked by a high degree of mutual trust between belligerents. At the very root of the problem, it would seem, is
the difficulty of reconciling the belligerent practice of waging unrestricted
warfare upon enemy merchant shipping with the precautions that are
normally required if hospital ships are to be ensured against accidental
attack as a result of faulty identification. In large measure, therefore, the
problem of ensuring the proper identification of hospital ships must be
17

To this extent it is hardly adequate that the r949 Convention repeats in Article 30 the
formula earlier used in Hague X that: ''During and after an engagement, they (hospital ships)
will act at their own risk.'' It is clear that hospital ships act at their own risk whenever they
place themselves in the immediate vicinity of legitimate military objectives. For even though
every effort must be made to avoid firing upon-or bombing-hospital ships, the presence of
the latter cannot serve to exempt nearby military objectives from attack for fear that a hospital
vessel might thereby suffer incidental injury. In this connection, however, it should be observed that there is no basis for the contention-put forward by Germany during the r939
war-that hospital ships under convoy of belligerent warships surrender their right to claim
exemption from direct attack. There is no provision either in the r949 Convention or in Hague
Convention X forbidding hospital ships from sailing under convoy. Indeed, in accompanying
fleet forces to the scene of an engagement in order to succor the wounded and shipwreckeda task specifically conferred upon hospital ships-it is obvious that hospital vessels are-in a
sense-sailing under convoy.
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seen in the broader context of the present liability of belligerent merchant
shipping to attack and destruction. 18
f. Application and Enforcement
Each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions For the Protection of the
Victims of War contain a number of similar provisions relating to application and enforcement of all. However, the relevance of these provisions
will necessarily depend largely upon the particular category of war victims
under consideration. With respect to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked
at sea, many of the general provisions found in the four Geneva Conventions
have only a limited relevance and warrant no more than a brief summary. 19
The 1949 Convention on the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea is
applicable "to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.'' 20 In the event
that one of the Powers in conflict is not a party to the Convention, those
Powers who are Parties shall nevertheless remain bound by it in their
mutual relations. Moreover, those Powers already bound by the Convention shall be bound in relation to a Power not a Party, provided the
latter accepts and applies the provisions of the Convention. 21 Special
provision is also made-in Article 3-for the collection and care of the
wounded, sick and shipwrecked during an armed conflict which is ''not of
an international character'' (i. e., in a civil war and analogous situations);
each Party to such conflicts being obligated to treat the sick, wounded and
shipwrecked in a humane manner and without any adverse distinction
18 See pp. 57-70.
It need hardly be pointed out that the above remarks are not intended as
a jttstiftcation for the fact that hospital ships were frequently attacked during World War II. It
is apparent, however, that a policy allowing unrestricted warfare against merchant ships
by submarines and aircraft must-almost of necessity-render the hospital ship's position a
far more hazardous one. And this is especially true when the weapons used to implement such
a policy permit destruction at great distances.
19 For a detailed analysis of these general provisions see, in particular, Paul de La Pradelle,
La ConfErence Diplomatiqtte Et Les Nottvelles Conventions de Geneve dtt Aodt I949 (195 r).
20 Article 2. The general significance of this provision has been noted elsewhere in the
text (see pp. 23-4).
21 The above provisions of Article 2 are completed by the further stipulation that the Convention applies' 'to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting
Party even if the said occupation meets with no resistance."-Although the Convention normally comes into force for a Party six months after the instruments of ratification have been
deposited, Article 6r declares that situations "provided for in Articles 2 and 3 shall give immediate effect to ratifications deposited and accessions notified by the Parties to the conflict
before or after the beginning of hostilities or occupation."-Denunciation of the Convention
shall take effect one year following notification, but a denunciation during a period of armed
conflict shall not take effect until peace has been concluded and until operations connected
with the release and repatriation of the persons protected by the Convention have been termi-:
nated (Article 62).
·
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founded on race, colour, religion, sex, or any other similar criteria. 22
The field of application of the 1949 Convention is limited by Article 4
to forces on board ship. Once forces are put ashore they immediately
become subject to the provisions of the Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. 23
The Convention takes precaution to ensure that the rights conferred upon
protected persons shall not be adversely affected by special agreements
Parties to the conflict may conclude in the course of hostilities. 24 Similar
care is taken to emphasize that protected persons may "in no circumstances"
renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the Convention.25 Nor can this obligation imposed upon the parties to the Convention
to respect the rights of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked be restricted by
the operation of reprisals. For Article 47 of the Convention declares that:
''Reprisals against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons, the personnel, the vessels or the equipment protected by the Convention are
.
prohibited. 26
The importance of the provisions in the Convention dealing with the
Protecting Powers-neutral states whose duty it is to safeguard the interests
of the Parties to the conflict-is limited. Th~ difficulties involved in
obtaining the presence of representatives of the Protecting Powers at the
scene of operations-particularly at sea-are well known. Besides,
Article 8 of the Convention directs such representatives of Protecting
Powers to "take account of the imperative necessities of security of the
22 Article 3 raises many novel problems which cannot be dealt with here.
It is interesting
to note, however, that this article seeks to obligate not only the present Parties to the Convention but also future rebel forces that may rise up within the territory of any of the Parties.
There is no assurance, though, that such future forces will agree to consider themselves bound
by the "fundamental" obligations laid down in Article 3· Nevertheless, Article 3 is-so far
as the Parties to the Convention are concerned-unconditional and not dependent upon reciprocity of treatment on the part of unrecognized forces in a future civil war. However, once
the rebellious forces are recognized by the parent state-and, perhaps, if not by the parent state
then by third states-the conflict takes on an "international" character, and Article 2. applies.
But once Article 2. applies the parent state is released from any of the obligations laid down by
the Convention, if the newly recognized belligerent refuses to accept and apply the provisions
thereof.
23 And Article 5 declares that neutral Powers "shall apply by analogy the provisions of the
present Convention to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and to members of the medical
personnel and to chaplains . . . received or interned in their territory, as well as to dead
persons found.''
24 Article 6.
2 5 Article 7.
26 A provision whose rigid observance may prove difficult with respect to an enemy who
insistently refuses to adhere to the provisions of the Convention, and-in particular-resorts
to inhumane measures in treating the wounded, sick or shipwrecked falling under its power.
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State wherein they carry out their duties .'' 27 Nevertheless, prov1s1on is
made for Protecting Powers, and in order to fulfill their tasks of safeguarding the interests of the Parties to the conflict these Powers may appoint
delegates chosen from their diplomatic or consular staff, from amongst
their own nationals or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The delegates so chosen are subject to the approval of the Power with which they
are to carry out their duties, and once approved the task of the delegates is
to be facilitated to the greatest extent possible. 28 One function of the
Protecting Powers warrants special mention. Article I I of the Convention
provides that where they deem it advisable in the interest of protected
persons, and particularly in cases of disagreement between the Parties to
the conflict as to the application or interpretation of the Convention, the
Protecting Powers shall lend their good offices with a view to settling the
disagreements. For this purpose a Protecting Power may, either on its
own initiative or at the invitation of one Party, propose a meeting of the
representatives of the Parties to the conflict. The latter are bound to give
effect to the proposals made to them for this purpose.
In general, the Parties to the Convention are obliged to ensure-through
their Commanders-in-Chief-that the specific provisions of the Convention
are properly executed and that unforeseen cases are provided for in conformity with the general principles laid down therein. 29 The text of the
convention must be disseminated as widely as possible. 30 Of particular
significance-not only for what they contain but also for their omissionsare the provisions dealing with the repression of abuses and infractions.
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in Article 50, "to enact any
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the
present Convention . . . ''-the latter being defined 31 as "wilful killing,
27 And although Article 8 goes on to state that the activities of representatives of Protecting
Powers "shall only be restricted as an exceptional and temporary measure when this is rendered necessary by imperative military necessities," it will be apparent that such "imperative
military necessities" may prove to be of frequent occurrence in operations at sea.
28 Article 9 provides that the provisions of the Convention ''constitute no obstacle to the
humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other
impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict
concerned, undertake for the protection of wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons, medical
personnel and chaplains, and for their relief.'' And Article ro contains provisions which allow
the Parties at any time to agree to entrust ''to an organization which offers all guarantees of
impartiality and efficacy the duties incumbent on the Protecting Powers by virtue of the present
Convention." The organization referred to in Article ro is not to be confused with the Red
Cross or other humanitarian organizations already in existence. Instead, it refers to the possible future creation of an organization capable of taking over the functions of Protectin.g
Powers in a war in which there may be no neutral states.
29 Article 46.
30 Article 48.
31 Article 51.
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torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly." The obligation is laid upon
each contracting Party to search for persons alleged to have committed, or
to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and to bring themregardless of nationality-before its own courts. As an alternative it
may-though only if it so prefers-hand such persons over for trial to
another contracting Party, provided the latter has made out a prima facie
case. And apart from the acts held to constitute grave breaches of the
Convention the Parties are further obliged to take whatever measures are
necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the
Convention. 32
Finally, attention may be directed to the inquiry procedure provided for
1n Article 53 of the Convention. Article 53 reads:
At the request of a Party to the conflict, an inquiry shall be instituted, in a manner to be decided between the interested Parties,
concerning any alleged violation of the Convention.
If agreement has not been reached concerning the procedure for
the inquiry, the Parties should agree on the choice of an umpire,
who will decide upon the procedure to be followed.
Once the violation has been established, the Parties to the conflict shall put an end to it and shall repress it with the least
possible delay.
32 Although the Convention does not so state, the "grave breaches" enumerated in Article
51 are certainly war crimes. It can hardly be said, however, that the procedure set out in
the 1949 Convention for the punishment of grave breaches of the Convention constitutes a
marked departure from traditional procedures. For all practical purposes Article 51 of the 1949
Convention obligates the contracting parties to do little more to repress abuses and infractions
than did its predecessor-i. e., Hague X, in Article 2.1. This is all the more significant in view
of the fact that the 1949 Convention was concluded during a period in which the establis.h ment
of new procedures to ensure individual responsibility for violations of international law through
the creation of international criminal courts has been widely proclaimed as one of the essential
tasks of the present international legal order. And the obvious reticence of the drafters of the
1949 Geneva Conventions even to use the term "war crimes," let alone to initiate a truly international procedure for the apprehension of war criminals, stands in clear contrast to many of the
rather sweeping estimates of the significance to be attached to the recently concluded war
crimes trials as well as to resolutions-without binding effect-made by the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning war crimes and individual responsibility for such crimes.
A further provision of the 1949 Convention-Article 52.-states that: "No High Contracting
Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other High Contracting Party of any liability
incurred by itself or by any other High Contracting Party in respect of breaches referred to in
the preceding Article (52.).'' The obligation imposed by this Article does not refer to the war
but to the peace treaty concluded between Parties to the Convention (see Kunz, op. cit., p. 2.86).
The apparent intent is to prevent a victor from absolving himself of liability incurred for grave
breaches of the Convention by means of a provision in the peace treaty he may impose upon
the defeated state.
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The inquiry procedure is optional, therefore, and dependent entirely
upon the prior agreement of the Parties to a dispute. A similar procedure
for investigating alleged violations was laid down in Article 30 of the 1929
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick of
Armies in the Field, though this Article was never once used during World
War II. 33
G. RUSES IN NAVAL WARFARE
It has already been observed that one of the general principles of the law
of war is the principle forbidding the resort to treacherous means, expedients or conduct in the waging of hostilities. Although belligerents are
permitted to resort to ruses, or stratagems, in order to obtain an advantage
over an enemy, acts of treachery are prohibited. Whereas both ruses as
well as acts of treachery usually partake of the element of deception, the
former are regarded as "measures for mystifying or misleading the enemy
against which the enemy ought to take measures ot protect himself.'' 34
Acts of treachery, on ·t he other hand, are held to consist of measures of
deceit wh ich involve a breach of faith with an enemy.
To the extent that the general principle forbidding the resort to treachery
(and, conversely, permitting the resort to ruses) has been given express
application in the form of specific rules of custom or convention no particular difficulty arises w ith respect to its interpretation. 35 Thus it is
33

And doubt may be expressed over the future effectiveness of Article 53 of the 1949 Convention. Nor is this glaring defect of the 1949 Convention compensated for by the Resolution
accompanying the Final Act of the Conference, which recommended that Parties unable to
settle disputes by other means should endeavor to submit such disputes to the International
Court of Justice.
34 U. S. Army Rules of Land Warfare, paragraph 49·
There is a certain terminological
confusion with respect to the term "ruse". Many writers use the term to cover only those
acts of deception permitted to belligerents. The term treachery-or perfidy-is then used to
cover forbidden acts of deception. In the Hague Regulations (1907) Article 2.4 speaks of
"ruses of war" as "permissible measures," and Article 2.3b forbids "treacherous" action.
Not infrequently, however, the term "ruse" is used to cover both legitimate and illegitimate
acts of deception; treachery then meaning an illegitimate ruse. In the text the former usage
is adhered to.
35 In the absence of specific rules considerable difficulty may arise. It has never been easy to
establish general criteria that could be applied to all possible acts of deception in order to
determine whether such acts may be regarded as permissible ruses or forbidden treachery. The
difficulties involved are very similar to the difficulties involved in the attempted interpretation
and application of the principle of humanity (see pp. 46-9). If it is stated that treachery consists
of acts of bad faith which are forbidden by custom or convention, while ruses consist of acts
permitted (at least negatively) by law, then this answer merely amounts to saying that deception expressly forbidden by law is treachery whereas acts of deception not expressly forbidden
are ruses. This statement is quite true, but it is of little or no assistance as applied to novel
acts of deception in order to determine whether such acts fall within the category of permissible
ruses or within the category of treachery.
English and American writers generally follow Halleck, who distinguished between ruses
and treachery by stating that "whenever a belligerent has expressly or tacitly engaged, and is,
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clearly forbidden to use a flag of truce as a means of deceiving an enemy
and in order to obtain an advantage over him. It is also forbidden to use
the red cross, or other equivalent distinctive emblems, for any purpose
other than those humanitarian purposes which such emblems are universally understood to signify. Hence in warfare at sea, hospital vessels and
medical aircraft, as well as their personnel, which bear these distinctive
emblems and enjoy the protection offered thereby, must not be used for
any military purpose. 36 The same considerations apply to the attempted
use for military purposes of cartel ships and any other vessels \V"hich-by
special agreement between belligerents-have been accorded exemption
from attack and capture.
The most important ruses employed in naval warfare relate to the measures belligerent warships may take in order to conceal their identity.
Subject to those prohibitions indicated above, ahnost every conceivable
form of disguise is permitted to belligerent warships. They may even take
on the disguise of merchant vessels. In addition, they are permitted,
according to custom, to disguise their true identity by the use of false
colors, provided only that prior to the exercise of belligerent rights (attack,
visit or search, seizure) they show their true colors. 37
therefore, bound by a moral obligation, to speak the truth to an enemy, it is perfidy to betray
his confidence, because it constitutes a breach of good faith . . . " But when has a belligerent
the obligation to speak the truth, particularly in an era (as both Stone (op. cit., p. 56r) and
Spaight (op. cit., p. r69) well point out) in which false communications and false reports have
become standard practices? Spaight suggests that the preferable formula run as follows: "A
procedure, emblem, or signal to which a recognized significance is attached by international
law or custom, may not be diverted to another purpose prejudicial to its being respected when
used for its original restrictive or humanitarian purpose.'' Apart from the fact that this formula
does not seem to cover all possible acts of deception, it does not really solve the problem. The
phrase "recognized significance" begs the decisive question. If "recognized significance"
means "embodied in a rule of customary or conventional law" then Spaight's formula simply
states that the law should be observed. To say, for example, that the red cross emblem should
"not be diverted to another purpose" is merely to state what the law governing the use (and
misuse) of this emblem already states.-Stone proposes that "the test (between ruses and
treachery) on principle should be whether the deceit attacks the security of some interest or
principle to which States generally, whether enemies or not, attach special importance. Thus,
using civilians as a shield, or misuse of the flag of truce, undermines the principle of immunity
of civilians, and that negotiations should be possible even between enemies. Of course, evaluations are here involved, which allow diversity of opinion even if such a test were accepted." .
There is much to be said for this proposal, despite the fact that it also raises some of the difficulties already referred to.
36
See pp. r2.6-8 for a discussion of the provisions which deal with the misuse of the red cross
emblem in the I949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea.
37
See Law of Naval Warfare, Section 64oa.-It is customary for writers to point out the well
known case of the German cruiser Emden which, in r9r4, "hiding her identity by rigging up a
dummy fourth funnel and flying the Japanese flag, passed the guardship of the harbour of Penang
in the Malay States, made no reply to its signals, came down at full speed on the Russian cruiser
Zemshug, and then, after lowering the Japanese flag and hoisting the German flag, opened fire
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Although the use of false colors (i. e., enemy or neutral) by belligerent
warships is clearly permitted by custom-and was frequently resorted to
during both World Wars-the practice has been the object of some criticism. 38 It has been claimed that whereas the use of enemy flags, uniforms
and insignia is forbidden at all times in land warfare an analogous practice
is permitted, in part at least, in naval warfare. In fact, however, the
position with respect to the wearing of enemy uniforms and insignia in
land warfare is-at present-unsettled. 39 Be that as it may, it does not
appear entirely useful to compare, in this respect, land warfare to naval
warfare. Even if it is assumed that in land warfare belligerent forces are
permitted to wear enemy uniforms and insignia save when engaged in
actual combat, this practice will involve only the combatants. In naval
warfare the practice of permitting warships to disguise themselves as
and torpedoed her." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. sro.-During World War II the
Germans enjoyed a measurable degree of success through the skillful disguise they provided
for their armed raiders. Roskill (The War at Sea, p. 277) describes this disguise as follows:
"Their funnels and topmasts were telescopic, dummy funnels and derrick posts could be fitted;
false bulwarks, false deck houses and dummy deck cargoes were other devices employed; and
repainting was often carried out at sea to render valueless any reports of their colouring which
the Admiralty might obtain and promulgate." The tactics of the armed raiders were to reveal
their true identity only after having come within close enough range to overwhelm the victim
(usually armed enemy merchant vessels) by surprise.-Gne of the most notable actions involving
these armed raiders took place in November 1941 between the Australian cruiser Sydney and
the German armed raider Kormoran. The disguised raider, when approached by the Sydney,
identified herself as a Dutch merchant vessel. Before the Sydney could establish the truth or
falsity of her claimed identity the Kormoran cast off her disguise and opened fire at a distance of
2,ooo yards. As a result of the action the Sydney was destroyed with complete loss of officers
and crew. The incident is described by Roskill, pp. 547-9. Also Von Gosseln, "The Sinking
of the Sydney," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 79 (1953), p. 25.
38 For example, by H. A. Smith, op. cit., pp. 91-3, and Erik Castren, op. cit., pp. 264-6.
Article 7 of the U. S. Naval War Code of 1900 declared that "the use of false colors in war is forbidden.'' Later discussions, however, indicated uncertainty over the desirability of this
provision in the absence of international agreement. U. S. Naval War College, International Law
Discussions, I90J, pp. 37-42; also for the year 1906, pp. 7-2o. Neither the 1917 nor the 1941
Instructions issued to the U. S. Navy contained a provision relating to the use of false colors by
warships.
39 Article 23f of the Hague Regulations merely forbids the "impr'oper use" of the "military
insignia and uniform of the enemy," leaving unsettled (at least by a literal interpretation) the
question as to precisely what acts may constitute improper use. It has been contended that
the wearing of enemy uniforms at any time is forbidden and that this was the true intent of
Article 23f. Thus, one writer concludes, after a careful survey, that "internation-al law,
customary as well as conventional, forbids under all circumstances the use of enemy uniforms
for purposes of deceiving the enemy." Valentine Jobst III, "Is the Wearing of the Enemy's
Uniform a Violation of the Laws of War?," A.]. I. L., 35 (1941), p. -44L Some writers contend, however, that this rule only extends to combat, and the U.S. Army Rules of Land Warfare:
state in paragraph 54: "In practice it has been authorized to make use of national flags, in-.
signia, and uniforms as a ruse. The foregoing rule (Article 23, paragraph (f) HR) does not
prohibit such employment, but does prohibit their improper use. It is certainly forbidden to
employ them during combat, but their use at other times is not forbidden."
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merchant vessels has as one effect to render more difficult the retention of
the distinction made between combatants and non-combatants. Experience has shown that it is futile to expect a belligerent to adhere to the
traditional law vvhen this can be done only under circumstances of great
peril to the visiting warship. 40 Besides, the prohibition in land warfare
against employing enemy uniforms and insignia in actual combat does
serve to prevent further deception on the battlefield, and to insure that
when engaged in combat belligerents will be able to distinguish friend
from foe. In naval war-fare it is difficult to see how the same purpose-or,
for that matter, any purpose-is served by the rule requiring that a warship
show its true colors prior to attack. The show of colors rna y be carried
out almost simultaneously with the act of attack. But once the attack
begins there is no longer any possibility to deceive. It is for this reason
that the rule has been considered by some writers as arbitrary since it
forbids certain acts of deception from the moment at which they cease to
deceive. 41
It is also true that the use of false colors may affect adversely the interests
of neutral states. In the past the view has been that the use of neutral
colors by belligerent warships was a matter primarily of concern to belligerents, neutral states having only an indirect interest. This vievv must
assume, however, that belligerents will rigorously observe the traditional
rules governing belligerent interference with neutral trade. But in a
40 "As things stand, the warship which honestly tries to conform to the traditional rules
places herself in great peril. She may stop a vessel wearing some neutral flag and approach
her in accordance with the prescribed routine. At any moment the other ship may hoist her
true colours and discharge a heavy broadside upon the ship which is trying to obey the law."
H. A. Smith, op. cit., p. 92.. Smith considers the rule permitting false colors to be an anachronism, a survival from the days of pirates and privateers. "In earlier times there were good
reasons for the old rule, which often helped ships to make their escape from pirates or privateers. Pirates obeyed no law and privateers were often not much better. The outwitting of
such enemies could call for no censure." There is, in addition, a considerable difference between the effectiveness of the ruse in modern combat, as distinguished from naval battles of
earlier days. The speed and firepower of vessels allowed in earlier days time to establish
identity and to provide for action in case of mistake. Today the loss of a few minutes, or even
seconds, is likely to prove decisive, as the case of the Sydney seems to bear out.
41 W. E. Hall, A Treatise On International Law (sth ed., r9o4), pp. 538-9. "A curious arbitrary rule affects one class of stratagems by forbidding certain permitted means of deception
from the moment at which they cease to deceive. It is perfectly legitimate to use the distinctive emblems of an enemy in order to escape from him or to draw his forces into action; but it
is held that soldiers clothed in the uniforms of this enemy must put on a conspicuous mark by
which they can be recognized before attacking, and that a vessel using the enemy's flag must
hoist its own flag before firing with shot or shell. The rule, disobedience to which is considered to entail grave dishonor, has been based on the statement that 'in actual battle, enemies
are bound to combat loyally and are not free to ensure victory by putting on a mask of friendship.' In war upon land victory might be so insured, and the rule is consequent! y sensible;
but at sea, and the position is spoken of generally with reference to maritime war, the mask of
friendship no longer misleads when once fighting begins, and it is not easy to see why it is more
disloyal to wear a disguise when it is absolutely useless, than when it serves its purpose."
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period when belligerent claims of control over neutral trade are already extensive, the use of neutral colors by belligerent warships can serve only to
provide belligerents with an additional reason for making still greater
claims of control over neutral shipping. 42
The criticisms raised against the ruse which permits the use of false colors
is therefore not without substantial merit. Nevertheless, as matters now
stand the law is reasonably clear, despite the fact that continuance of the
practice forms a contributing cause in the increased liability of merchant
vessels to attack. It is doubtful, however, that belligerent military aircraft are permitted to make use of similar ruses in opera dons at sea. Although there are no conventional rules regulating the marking of aircraft
in time of war, the practice of belligerents during World Wars I and II
would appear to indicate acceptance of a prohibition against the false
marking of aircraft in order to deceive an enemy. 43
42

These neutral difficulties are considerably increased by the use of the neutral flag by belligerent merchant vessels in order to avoid capture or destruction. As between belligerents the
practice of so disguising merchant vessels is not open to objection and probably should not be
classified as a ruse de guerre in the strict sense. The neutral state may claim, however, that the
practice represents the misuse of its flag and endangers its interests. When during World
War I Great Britain ordered its merchant vessels to simulate neutral vessels as closely as possible, and to use the flags of neutral states, several neutrals protested. In particular, the United
States declared that while the neutral flag could be used on occasion by belligerent merchant
vessels in order to escape seizure by an enemy this did not mean that such vessels could make use
of the neutral flag as a general practice or that the belligerent state could claim this as a right
with respect to its merchant vessels. Great Britain did not accept the protest, maintaining
that custom allowed belligerent merchant vessels to resort to such disguise. The British
Government did state though that it had no intention of advising merchant shipping "to use
foreign flags as general practice or to resort to them otherwise than for escaping capture or
destruction." cited in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 455-8. The concern of neutrals
arose from a fear that the British action would serve to deprive neutral vessels of immunity
from attack by German submarines. The British contention that belligerents were forbidden
either to capture or to destroy a merchant vessel before ascertaining its nationality or character,
and that hence neutral vessels were placed in no greater danger by the belligerent use of the
neutral flag, was formally correct. Given the circumstances under which the conflict was
being fought, however, the reply was no more than formal.
Section 14 of the U.S. Neutrality Act of November 4, 1939 provided:
"(a) It will be unlawful for any vessel belonging to or operating under the judrisiction of
any foreign State to use the flag of the United States thereon, to make use of any distinctive
signs or markings, indicating that the same is an American vessel.
(b) Any vessel violating the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall be denied for
a period of three months the right to enter the ports or territorial waters of the United States
except in cases of force majeure." U. S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, I9J9,

P· I2.I.
43 Spaight (op. cit., pp. r69 ff.), in reviewing this practice, considers it as constitutive of a
customary rule. Presumably this prohibition extends to aircraft which bear no markings.·
Stone (op. cit., p. 6r2.) states that: "Protests by each side against alleged false use in both World.
Wars, and the care taken to deny such charges, suggests an inchoate prohibition. But no
details of any such prohibition have emerged, for instance, as to whether (as in naval warfare)
false marks could be used while cruising, provided true colors are shown before opening fire."
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H. BOMBARDMENT
In principle, bombardment may be undertaken either for the purpose of
effecting the immediate entry and occupation of the area bombarded or
for the purpose of attacking objectives the destruction of which would
constitute a military advantage to the belligerent. Traditionally, the
former purpose has been associated with the operations of forces on land,
and in the circumstances of warfare that prevailed up to World War I the
principal test for determining the legitimacy of land bombardment was
whether or not the place attacked was" defended." 44 Perhaps the main
circumstance that formerly characterized bombardment on land v1as the
short range of artillery, which meant that a city or town being bombarded
by land forces was within the combat zone.--- An "undefended" city or
town was, in effect, one that was open to the immediate entry of and
occupation by enemy forces, and because of its situation the further bombardment of such a place would merely cause unnecessary destruction of
lives and property. 45
In naval operations, however, the occupation of enemy coastal areaseven if only temporary in character-may prove exceptional. Instead of
serving as a prelude to occupation the object of naval bombardment is
frequently limited to that of denying an enemy the continued use of his
military resources. For this reason the rules laid down in Hague Convention IX (1907), regulating bombardment in naval warfare, while forbidding the bombardment by naval forces of ''undefended ports, towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings," 46 expressly exempted from this pr~
hibition "military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms
or war material, workshops or plants which could be utilized for the needs
of the hostile fleet or army, and ships of war in the harbor . . . " 47
44 Article 25 of the Land Warfare Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV (1907)
provided that the "attack or bombardment by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings
or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.''
45 Thus John Westlake (International Law, (1907), part II, p. 77) wrote that the principle
upon which Article 2.5 of Hague IV was based "is that a land force can occupy an undefended
place and, if it must afterwards evacuate it, can destroy before doing so all that its military
value to the enemy exposes to lawful destruction; therefore bombarding the place without or
before occupying it would be wantonly to endanger both the lives of the population and the
property not lawfully subject to destruction. The same reason will apply to the dealings of
a fleet with the undefended coast town, unless it cannot spare the force or the time required for
landing and occupying it, including re-embarkation if necessary: in that case only can the
question of its right to bombard it arise."
46 Article 1.
47 Article 2.. Furthermore, according to Article 2. the commander of a naval force could-as a
rule-destroy such objectives in an "undefended" town or port only after the local authorities
had been summoned to destroy them and had failed to do so. But this latter obligation was
qualified by the further provision that "if military necessity demanding immediate action
permits no delay, it is nevertheless understood that the prohibition to bombard the undefended
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Hague Convention IX therefore expressly recognized the belligerent
right to bombard certain" military objectives" even though located in or
near an "undefended" enemy area. Nevertheless, this particular juxtaposition of the criterion of defense and the criterion of the military objective
has been the source of some uncertainty and confusion in dealing with
bombardment in naval warfare, and, it may be added, this confusion has
carried over into aerial vvarfare as well. In naval warfare a town or port
may be completely without defenses 48 though not open to entry by the
naval forces of an enemy, for the reason that enemy naval forces may be
incapable of occupying the undefended place. If enemy naval forces are
not capable of occupation then bombardment is permitted, but only against
military objectives. It is only if a town or port contains neither defenses
nor other legitimate military objectives that bombardment is prohibited.
Immunity from bombardment by naval forces need not result from the
fact of being actually open to entry-in the sense that these forces are
capable of effecting entry-but from the reason that the area contains no
object that may lawfully be attacked. Of course, if an enemy place,
though containing military objectives, can be entered and occupied by
naval forces then further bombardment of these objectives is evidently
superfluous and-if undertaken-would constitute a violation of the rule
forbidding wanton destruction. 49
town holds good . . . " Finally, a commander incurs no responsibility "for any unavoidable
damage which may be caused by a bombardment under such circumstances.''
Article 3, of negligible significance today, provided that an undefended town or port could
nevertheless be bombarded if the local authorities declined to comply with the demand for
requisitions "necessary for the immediate needs of the naval force before the place in question. '
48 Precisely when this will in fact be the case is a question over which there has been a good
deal of controversy. It seems clear that the second paragraph of Article r of Hague IX, stating
that a place "cannot be bombarded solely because automatic submarine contact mines are
anchored off the harbor," is neither generally indicative of an answer to this question nor
satisfactory in itself. For example, would fortifications placed on adjacent coasts be enough
to turn a nearby town or port into a defended area in the sense of Hague IX?
49 See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 62.Id.-It should be made clear, however, that the "incapacity" of a naval force to enter and occupy an undefended coastal town or port may be the
result of the mission upon which it is engaged at the time. If the military mission upon which
the naval force is engaged does not permit entry and occupation a coastal town or port containing military objectives may be bombarded even though undefended. Hence the phrase "can
be entered and occupied"-and used in the text above--must be understood as implying not
only the absence of any defense but also a compatibility between entrance and occup~tion and
the military mission assigned to the naval force.-In aerial warfare a city or town loca.ted well
behind the front lines, i. e., in the hinterland or well outside the zone of combat, is certainly
not open to entry, even though not itself possessing any defenses. Terminology drawn from
land warfare becomes very misleading here and it is best to omit altogether the term undefended
town, as did Article 24 of the unratified 1923 Rules of Aerial Warfare. The criterion to ~e
used in reference to cities or towns in rear areas is that of the military objective, and any defenses
located within the city or town are simply considered as military objectives. Hence a to~n
containing neither defenses of its own nor any other military objectives is immune from bombardment.
Some confusion on this score arose during World War II, when claims for immunity from air

144

With respect to the military objectives that may be made the target of
lawful attack according to Article 2. of Hague IX, it would appear that
recent developments have rendered this list unduly restrictive, and it can
no longer be accepted as exhaustive. It is clear, for example, that communication systems used for military purposes may be bombarded by naval
forces, even though not included in the list given in Hague IX. The same
may be said for other objectives that belligerents have now come to recognize as forming legitimate targets for attack. 5°
bombardment were made on behalf of "undefended" cities located, in many instances, at considerable distances behind the combat zone. Not being ope~ to immediate entry and occupation they were not accorded exemption from aerial bombardment if containing military objectives. The fact that these cities did not possess defenses of their own, nor even attempt to intercept aerial attackers, was not held to be decisive. These cases are reviewed by R. Y. Jennings
("Open Towns," B. Y. I. L., 2.2. (1945), pp. 2.58-64) who observes: "There is no virtue in mere
lack of defense. Unless accompanied by its corollary of freedom of entry the exemption of
the undefended town would lead to the absurd-result that a belligerent could secure the immunity
of his production centres and lines of communication from lawful bombardment simply by
omitting to defend them, and could thus concentrate all his arms for attack" (pp. 2.6o-r).
It does appear, however, that on several occasions during World War II immunity was claimed
on the basis that the belligerent putting forth the claim was allegedly prepared to deny himself the use of all military resources within the city. This raises a different question. In
principle, it would seem, as Jennings points out, "that a belligerent may claim exemption for
a town if he voluntarily ceases to use its resources for military purposes . . . " Nevertheless,
the experience of World War II is of little guidance on this point, and there are no instances
where such a claim was conceded. Certainly, the practical difficulties in the way of insuring
that an enemy would in fact forego use of the military resources of a city would be very great.
Besides, there is the further objection that even if such abstinence could be insured there could
be no guarantee that the agreement would not be broken off at any time with the result that
the belligerent accorded immunity would be able to place in use those resources preserved intact.
But the other belligerent would then be confronted with the task of destroying those resources
at a time when, for various reasons, he might be unable to do so.-Finally, a careful distinction
should be drawn-for the purposes of aerial bombardment-between bombardment in the
zone where land operations are proceeding and bombardment carried out against cities in the
rear areas. Within the combat zone aerial bombardment is restricted only by the rule forbidding
wanton destruction-e. g., in attacking cities open to entry by the land forces. This follows
for the reason that the zone of combat is regarded as constituting one vast military objective.
50 Though Article 5 of Hague IX certainly remains valid and obligates the commander of
naval forces undertaking the bombardment either of defended or undefended places to take
"all necessary measures . . . to spare as far as possible buildings devoted to religion, to the
arts and sciences, or to charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where
the sick or wounded are collected, on condition that they are not used at the same time for
military purposes." The inhabitants have the duty of indicating such places by visible signs
consisting of large stiff rectangular panels divided diagonally into two coloured triangular
portions, the upper portion black, the lower portion white. The provisions of Article 5 have
been generally recognized as applicable to aerial warfare as well. See Law of Naval Warfare,
Article 62.2., and notes thereto, for the relevant provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of theW ounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field which
deal with the protection of medical establishments and units as well as with the establishment
of hospital zones and localities. Special note should also be taken of the provisions of the 1949
Geneva Convention Relative to The Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War dealing with
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But where the limits of the legitimate "military objective"-against
which bombardment is lawful-are to be drawn is a question to which no
precise answer can presently be given. It need hardly be stated that the
outstanding feature of warfare in the twentieth century is the constant expansion of the military objective. The effects of this expansion have not
been without substantial effect in broadening the scope of action permitted
to belligerent naval forces in attacking the cities, towns and ports of an
enemy. It is in aerial warfare that the effects of this expansion have
proven the most far reaching though, and given the importance of aircraft
as a component part of the naval forces of belligerents the problem of aerial
bombardment deserves at least brief co1nment.
The developments to date in aerial warfare provide an impressive illustration of the limited results that may follow from the attempt to apply
directly to a novel form of warfare the general principles of the law of war,
and particularly the principle requiring that a distinction be drawn between
combatants and non-combatants. It has been asserted time and again on
high authority that the minimum restrictions upon aerial bombardment
are that non-combatants must not be made the object of direct attack, such
attack being unrelated to a military objective, and that attack for the
purpose of terrorizing the civilian population is forbidden. 51 Yet the
the establishment of hospital, safety and so-called neutralized zones. Thus Article 14 of this
Convention provides for the conclusion of agreements between the Parties to a conflict
establishing "hospital and safety zones and localities so organized as to protect from
the effects of war, wounded, sick and aged persons, children under fifteen, expectant mothers
and mothers of children under seven." And Article 15 provides for the establishment, again
only by mutual agreement, of neutralized zones intended to shelter from the effects of war "(a)
wounded and sick combatants or non-combatants; (b) civilian persons who take no part in
hostilities, and who, while they reside in the zones, perform no work of a military character."
These provisions are indicative of the state to which the practices of belligerents, and particularly the practices of aerial bombardment, have reduced the combatant-non-combatant distinction. It is significant to note that those civilian persons able to enjoy the protection of
neutralized zones must perform no work of a ''military character.'' Presumably this would
include-though the phrase is far from clear-all those working in factories producing war
materials, at the very least a large percentage of the population.
Finally, passing note should be taken of Article 6 of Hague IX requiring that, military
exigencies permitting, the commander of attacking naval forces "before commencing the
bombardment, must do his utmost to warn the authorities." And see Law of Naval Warfare,
Article 62.3. In effect, warning is dependent upon the discretion of the commander of the
attacking naval or aerial forces, though whenever possible it should be given.
51 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 62.1 b, c.-Article 2.2. of the 192.3 Rules of Aerial Warfare stated: "Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian populacion, of
destroying or damaging private property not of military character, or of injuring non-combatants, is prohibited." The principles embodied in Article 2.2. were subsequently reaffirmed
on several occasions prior to World War II by the League of Nations and other international
bodies. Further, they were given prominent expression in the military manuals of many states.
During World War II the belligerents never failed to render verbal service to these principles,
if only by resolutely denying that aerial raids were taken against non-military objectives or in
order to terrorize the civilian population.
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practical significance of these restrictions in their application to aerial
bombardment ought not to be overestimated, particularly by drawing mis··
leading analogies with other forms of warfare. In bombardment by land
or by naval forces it may still prove possible to determine with some degree
of assurance when the civilian population deliberately has been made the
object of direct attack, such attack being unrelated to a military objective.
In aerial bombardment the difficulties involved in reaching a similar determination are obviously far greater; so much greater, in fact, that in the
absence of specific rules commanding the general agreement of states, and
providing for the detailed regulation of aerial bombardment, the mere
attempt to apply directly the general principle distinguishing between
combatants and non-combatants must prove in its effects far more apparent
than real. 52
It should be made clear, therefore, that the ominous threat posed by
aerial warfare is not simply a resuJt of the failure to agree upon what
constitutes a military objective, against which bombardment is permitted,
52 This would appear to be one reason for the significant absence of war crimes trials
in which the accused were charged and convicted of terror bombing undertaken against the
civilian population. And although one of the charges of war crimes listed in Article 6 of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was "the wanton destruction of
cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity'', none of the accused
was convicted of deliberately ordering the bombardment of civilian populations. In the
Einsatzgruppen Trial there is an interesting passage in the Tribunal's judgment which reads as
follows:
"A city is bombed for tactical purposes; communications are to be destroyed, railroads wrecked, ammunition plants demolished, factories razed, all for the purpose of
impeding the military. In these operations it inevitably happens that non-military
persons are killed. This is an incident, a grave incident to be sure, but an unavoidable
corollary of battle action. The civilians are not individualized. The bomb falls, it
is aimed at the railroad yards, houses along the tracks are hit and many of their occupants killed. But that is entirely different, both in fact and in law from an armed
force marching up to these same railroad tracks, entering those houses abutting thereon,
dragging out the men, women, and children and shooting them. (U. S. v. Otto
Ohlendorf eta!.) Trials of War Criminals 4 (r949), p. 467.
No doubt there is a difference in law between the deliberate killing of the civilian
population by forces on land and the incidental-though unavoidable-injury to the civilian
population through aerial bombardment of military objectives. But this difference does noc
do away with the consideration that the danger to the non-combatant population may be, in
fact, far greater as a result of the "unintentional" injury inflicted by aerial bombardment than
intentional acts committed by land forces. More important, however, there remains unanswered the question as to the methods of determining in practice when the civilian population has been made the deliberate object of attack by aerial bombardment. It is precisely the
difficulties involved in reaching such a determination that has led Lauterpacht to admit that
the practical importance of the prohibition against resorting to the bombing of the civilian
population for the "mere purpose of terrorization . . . is of limited value. In most cases
centres of civilian population will in any case constitute centres of communication or contain
or be located in the vicinity of some objectives which the attacking belligerent will claim to be
of military importance. In these cases the terrorization of the civilian population, however
real in intention and effect, can plausibly be represented as being incidental to attack upon
military objectives." "The Revision of the Law of War," p. 368.
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though of course this failure is itself one of considerable moment. Even
if it were possible to assume substantial agreement today upon this latter
question there would remain the problem of determining the limits of the
"incidental" or" indirect" injuty that may be inflicted upon the civilian
population in the course of attacking such objectives from the air. 53
Here again, analogies drawn from land or naval warfare are frequently
resorted to whose relevance can only prove-at best-extremely limited.
It is quite true that the immunity of non-combatants from the injurious
effects of bombardment by land or naval forces has never been considered
absolute. In land warfare those measures permitted within the immediate
zone of military operations may afford very little protection to the civilian
population located therein. In naval warfare a commander need not
abstain from the bombardment of" undefended" coastal areas even though
''unavoidable damage'' may be inflicted upon the lives and property of the
civilian population located in the near vicinity of military objectives. 54
53 The solution to these problems put forward in Article 2.4 of the draft 192.3 Rules of Aeria 1
Warfare may be summarized. Bombardment undertaken outside the immediate neighborhood
of the operations of land forces (i. e., combat zone) was considered as legitimate only when
.. direcced exclusively'' at the following objectives: military forces; military works; military
establishments or depots; factories constituting important and well known centres engaged in
the manufacture of arms, ammunition, or distinctively military supplies; lines of communication
or transportation used for military purposes. In addicion, Article 2.4 stipulated that where
these objectives are so situated that they cannot be bombarded without the "indiscriminate
bombardment of the civilian population" aircraft must abstain from attacking them. This
prohibition against "indiscriminate bombardment" is not made dependent upon the intent of
the attacker, but simply upon whether it is in fact possible in a specific instance to bombard
military objectives without indiscriminately bombing the civilian population in the near
vicinity. The point raised is an important one even today, since experience seems to indicate
that although it is next to impossible to determine when the civilian population has been made
the deliberate object of attack, unrelated to a military objective, it is by no means impossible to
determine when the civilian population has been indiscriminately bombarded in the course of
attacking military objectives. Indeed, it seems reasonably clear that the so-called target-area
bombings of World War II entailed the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population,
even though the primary purpose was to strike at an enemy's military resources. It is submitted that on this decisive point Spaight (op. cit., pp. 2.59 ff.) is-at best-confusing. On the
one hand, he endorses the legality of target-area bombing by declaring that: "If in no other
way than by target-area bombing can a belligerent destroy his enemy's armament centres and
interrupt his enemy's process of munitionment, then target-area bombing cannot be considered
t o offend against the principles of the international law of war . . . . Military effectiveness
has been the test and by that test rarget-area bombing passes muster" (p. 2.71). On the other
h and, Spaight insists that: "nothing that has happened in the second World War has shaken
the legal objection to indiscriminate bombing. Against that kind of war-waging international
law still sets its face" (p. 2.77). Presumably, this approval of target-area bombing and disapproval of indiscriminate bombing has as its basis the belief that the latter is unlawful because
it is deliberately aimed against the civilian population. But this opinion is misplaced, since
indiscriminate bombardment need not depend upon the element of intent. Nor is it easy, 'in
t his connection, to follow Spaight's stricture that: "while target-area bombing comes close ro
the border-line of permissibility, atom bombing definitely oversteps it" (p. 2.76). The latter
need not prove any more indiscriminate in its effects than the former.
54 Hague IX, Article 2..
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Generally speaking, however, these exa1nples-taken from the older forms
of warfare-applied only to limited areas, and even then have been regarded as exceptional departures from the normal rule. But in aerial
warfare the potential area of bombardment operations has no limitations
save that of the ever expanding concept of the military objective, and what
has formerly been an exceptional situation now threatens to become a
normal condition. Given these circumstances the problem of determining
the lin1its of the'' incidental'' injury that may be inflicted upon the civilian
population in the course of attacking 1nilitary objectives become crucial.
The failure to provide a concrete solution to this problem may well mean
that from a practical point of view the general prohibition against making
non-combatants the direct object of attack will prove no more than nominal.
At the present time though there is no indication that any solution holding
the possibility of imposing detailed and effective restraints upon belligerents
is in sight. 55
55 Of necessity, the above remarks cut short a rather complicated development.
But the
essential outlines of this development have been presented. They may be summarized by stating that so long as uncertainty exists both as to the nature of the military objective against
which aerial bombardment is permitted and the limits of the indirect injury that may be inflicted upon the civilian population in attacking such objectives the reaffirmation of general
principles must unfortunately prove largely illusory. Thus ir is of little use to suggest that
the limits of the indirect injury permitted against non-combatants may be determined by
weighing the military advantage to be gained against the injury that will be caused to noncombatants. If the experience of World War II is at all indicative of how belligerents will
carry out this vague procedure it is clear that the scales will be weighted heavily in favor of
military advantage. In fact, it would seem that this path easily leads to the justification of
indiscriminate bombardment and the consequent obliteration of the combatant-non-combatant distinction.-In a penetrating criticism of the problems raised by aerial bombardment
in World War II, Professor Stone (op. cit., p. 63o) writes that the protection afforded civilians
against deliberate attack through aerial bombardment "when such 'incidental' attack is clearly
licensed, is verbal merely . . . " and that even more important than the "deceptive futility"
of the general prohibition against the deliberate attack on civilians is ''that by preserving the
confusion of issues it prevents any real approach to agreed legal regulation." The confusion,
according to Stone, lies in the failure to distinguish between the "quasi-combatant workforce
and genuine civilians," and to recognize that belligerents "do regard the morale of the enemy's
quasi-combatant workforce as a military objective." His proposal, therefore, is to effect a
separation between these two categories of the civilian population, acknowledge the belligerent's right to strike at the quasi-combatant workforce, and set up effective safeguards for other
civilians. The practical difficulties in the way of this proposal-already made prior to World
War 11-are admittedly enormous when applied to the entire populations of states. At the
very least it would be essencial to provide clear criteria for distinguishing between those in~
dividuals engaged in work of a "military character" and those not so engaged. As already
noted, Article 15 of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons makes
this same distinction with respect to "neutralized zones," though offering no criteria for
applying it in practice. Furthermore, even if such criteria could be provided the resulting
dislocation involved in so separating belligerent populations would be staggering. Finally,
the guarantee of effective observance would require both continuous inspection by neutral
parties and a rather large degree of mutual trust as between the belligerents. Recent experience
indicates, however, that there is small reason for believing that either of these conditions
could be readily obtained.
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